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INTRODUCTION
This is the final report for a project on Research in Geosciences Policy, NASA
Grant NAGW-1415, covering the period January 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992. Previous
work was reported by Dr. Radford Byerly, Jr., the original Principal Investigator on
the project.
The research reported here was performed under a no-cost extension of the
project requested by Dr. Byerly. t As described in that request, the general task of
the extension was to look beyond the adverse physical impacts of global change to
the pressures for policy action stimulated by those impacts and to defining the policy
problem. "[I]n order for policy actions to be effective they must address the right
policy problems, which will be different from and broader than the physical
problems." More specifically:
We will work on defining the policy problems with a view to indicating
how practical solutions might be implemented. In particular, public
officials need advice on what should be said, and done, and for what
purposes. That advice needs to be based on systematic analysis of: (i)
The scholarly literature in the social sciences, and related disciplines;
(ii) the changing content of the policy debate at the center of
attention; and (iii) how citizens perceive and understand issues related
to global change. We will conduct this analysis.
Chapters 1 and 2 each report work on defining the policy problem and analyzing the
scholarly literature. Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, address the policy debate and
citizen viewpoints on issues related to global change. The purpose of this
Introduction is to show how the chapters are related to each other and to the
I Letter from Radford Byerly, Jr. to Dr. Dixon M. Butler, NASA HQ, February g, 1991.
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agency'sbroader goalsand programs.
Chapter 1, Defining the Policy Problem, identifies and documents the three
most dominant definitions of the policy problem in Washington. Each definition
identifies a barrier to major policy action, and suggests what must be done as a
prerequisite to major policy action:
In the scientific definition, the policy problem is construed as uncertainty
about the future magnitude, timing, and location of climate change, as well
as the human impacts of those changes. Hence we must first reduce
uncertainty through scientific research.
In the economic definition, the policy problem is construed as the enormous
cost and questionable effectiveness of the means available to reduce the build-
up of greenhouse gases. Hence we must first develop more economical
instruments of policy.
In the political definition, the policy problem is construed as the need to
make comprehensive, centralized policy decisions on national and
international scales commensurate with the scope of global change. Hence
we must first develop the capacity to make such decisions.
Critical examination suggests that these definitions of the policy problem do not meet
practical criteria of rationality or the test of practical experience. In effect, the U.S.
appears to be m/sdefming the policy problem.
To be sure, there are good reasons to support scientific research to reduce
scientific uncertainty, to develop more cost-effective instruments of policy, and to
improve our capacity to make policy decisions. But such advances are neither
necessary nor sufficient conditions for rational policy action in response to the threat
of global climate change. And waiting for such advances is not a valid reason to
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postpone policy action: We already know how to curb the build-up of CO2 emissions
and to develop the capacity to cope with the diverse local and regional impacts of
global warming, if it occurs, without compromising prosperity and other national
interests. We already know how because a decentralized energy strategy met the test
of practical experience during and after the energy crisis of the 1970s. With
leadership from public officials, that strategy can be adapted and implemented to
curb CO2 emissions and, if necessary, to cope with the diverse impacts of global
warming.
The misdefinition of the policy problem, the apparent failure to learn the
lessons of the energy crisis, and the scholarly literature suggest that the policy
problem may be cultural. By "cultural" we mean generally-accepted perspectives --
bridging differences of personality, interest, and class -- that have evidently and
irrationally circumscribed the search for effective policy action. The dominant
culture may constitute the policy problem rather than the locus of policy solutions.
If so, then the recommended goal for leadership is to enlarge the perspectives that
have so far been brought to bear on policy. The first objective is to educate the
public and other public officials on the energy crisis as a precedent for climate
change policy. The second objective is to use public understanding of the energy
precedent to open up the larger cultural issues. This course of action does not imply
an a priori commitment to any particular policy or cultural outcome. It can be
justified in terms of common interests in making more rational decisions and in
making them more democratically.
The other chapters in this report develop the implications of this cultural
definition of the policy problem for public officials who may choose to take the lead.
Chapter 2, The Energy Precedent, documents and evaluates the lessons of the
energy crisis, providing a precedent for climate change policy and a means of
educating the public and other public officials.
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Chapter 3, The Policy Debate, documents and analyzes what has been written
about climate change policy in the Washington Post, as a basis for
understanding the debate and how it might be opened up.
Chapter 4, Citizen Viewpoints, documents and analyzes citizen viewpoints on
climate change policy issues, as a basis for understanding how to communicate
non-conventional ideas to the public.
A distinction between conventional and non-conventional perspectives on the energy
precedent, climate change policy, and the larger cultural issues runs throughout the
report.
The work reported here is relevant to the Global Change Research Program,
which overlaps with the agency's programs and goals. Consider the justification of
the Global Change Research Program as summarized in the President's budget for
1992:
This program is designed to reduce the significant uncertainty
associated with predicting the behavior of the coupled ocean-
atmosphere-land Earth system which determines climate phenomena
and to form the basis for rational, comprehensive and cost effective
responses to climate change. 2
The relationship between science and policy is often understood to be serial and
tightly coupled: That is to say, the reduction of significant uncertainty is taken as a
prerequisite for sound policy responses to climate change. The work reported here
suggests that it would be advantageous to reinterpret the relationship as parallel and
only loosely coupled, and to proceed accordingly.
Reinterpretation of the relationship would be advantageous to policy because
we need not wait for the reduction of scientific uncertainty to take rational and cost-
effective policy action. As noted above, we already know how to begin to curb the
2 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1992, Part
Two, pp. lO0-101.
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build-up of CO2 and to learn how to cope with climate change through a
decentralized energy strategy. Moreover, comprehensivepolicy responsesare not
likely to be approved intact in our pluralistic political system,even if they are
otherwise rational. The National Energy Plan of 1977is a case in point.
Reinterpretation of the relationshipwould beadvantageousto sciencebecause
the conventionalunderstandingleavesscienceunnecessarilyvulnerable. A scientific
program once justified as the basis for climate change policy becomes vulnerable
when policy-makers begin to question its policy relevance -- perhaps because they
have found a different basis for policy in the meantime, or because other policy
problems have diverted their interest and attention. In the long run, a scientific
program that fails to meet the high expectations set by a policy justification
undermines the credibility of science. 3 Note that it will be much easier to fulftU the
scientific expectations for a predictive model of the integrated Earth system than to
fulfill the policy expectations for it.' On the other hand, scientific programs justified
primarily on scientific grounds are more likely to enjoy the stability and continuity
of support on which good science thrives.
A parallel and loosely coupled relationship between science and policy is
consistent with the informal "social contract" worked out between representatives of
the public and publicly-supported scientific researchers after World War II.
According the Office of Technology Assessment,
This social contract implied that in return for the privilege of receiving
Federal support, the researcher was obligated to produce and share
knowledge freely to benefit -- in mostly unspecified and long-term ways
3 For example, the failure of the National Acid Precipitation AsJeument Program to meet expectations
cast some doubt on the policy relevance of climate change programs. See Leslie Roberts, "Learning from an
Acid Rain Program," Science 251 (15 March I991), pp. 1302-1305.
4 The policy justification ral_ harder queetio_ about what must be predicted, on what geographical and
time scales, how precisely and accurately, and how amon? And how will we know, ex ante, that all significant
feedbacks sad interactions affecting its predictions have been included?
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-- the public good.5
The Global ChangeResearch Program benefits the public good, and so would policy
actions that begin to reduce the threat of climate change and to increase our ability
to adapt, if significant change occurs. But the Program and the policy actions need
not be tightly coupled in series.
At the conclusion of our work under this grant, we were pleased to learn that
public officials have also begun to appreciate the cultural aspects of the policy
problem and their implications. The Chairman of the Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology began a recent article with the observation that "l'he controversy
surrounding global change says much about our culture and especially the respective
roles of science and politics in American society. '_ Near the end he wrote that
The immediate challenge for science and technology must not
be viewed as the need to reduce scientific uncertainty about climatic
warming. This is a hollow ambition. It is too easy to support and too
unlikely to bear fixtit. The real challenge is to find ways to increase
the quality of life of humankind throughout the world... 7
In retrospect, we hope our work responds to that challenge.
5 Office of Technology A_meument, Federally Funded Research: Decisions for a Decade, OTA-SET-490
(Washington: Government Printing Office, May, 1991), p. 4.
e George E. Brown, Jr., "Global Change and the New Definition ofProgrem," Geotimes (June, 1992),
p. 19. This article exeeptJ Brown's comments at the GSA Global Challenge round-up at the 1991 annual
meeting m October, 1991, in San Diego.
7 ib/d., p. 21.
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CHAPTER 1
DEFINING THE POLICY PROBLEM l
Ronald D. Brunner
Introduction
Ozone depletion, deforestation, high temperatures, and the greenhouse effect
have generated growing concern in the United States about global climate change.
For example, Congress appropriated $659 million for the U.S. Global Change
Research Program for FY 1990, and $955 million for FY 1991. The President's
budget for FY 1992 requested $1.186 billion, an increase of 24%. 2 The President's
budget for FY 1993 requested $1.37 billion, another increase of 24%. This growing
concern begs the question: What is the policy problem, given the various signs of
climate change?
Definition of the policy problem is important because further research -- and
policy recommendations, decisions, and actions -- are misguided and probably futile
if the policy problem is misdefined in the first place. Recall the well-worn story of
the drunkard who lost his watch on the dark side of the street but searched for it on
the other side, under the street light. The street light, like a problem definition,
bounds the search for policy solutions. This paper raises the disturbing possibility
t This chapter is a revision of Rona/d D. Brunner, "Global Climate Change: Defining the Policy
Problem," Policy Sdtnce$ 24 (1991), pp. 291-311.
2 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1992,
Part Two, p. 102. Table E-10 also includes the distribution of the program's budget by agency.
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that the U.S. is misdefining global climate change as a policy problem.
The first section of the paper documents three related definitions of the policy
problem that now dominate the center of attention and policy in the U.S. The
second section critiques these dominant definitions, focusing on global warming for
the sake of concreteness. It contends that the dominant definitions meet neither the
criteria of rationality nor the test of practical experience; they do, however, bound
the search for policy solutions. The third section suggests another definition of the
policy problem, based on ideas that have received little attention outside scholarly
circles. The implications for policy and policy research on global climate change are
reviewed in the Conclusion.
I. Dominant Definitions
The three definitions of the policy problem that are now dominant emphasize,
respectively, the alleged scientific, economic, and political barriers to effective policy
responses to the threat of global climate change. Like any other threat to common
interests, global climate change is an opportunity for diverse groups to advance their
respective interests by various means that include problem definition. In the
competition to define the policy problem, these definitions are dominant because
have been selectively circulated and recirculated at the center of attention to the
virtual exclusion of other ways of construing the problem.
In the scientific definition, the policy problem is construed as profound
uncertainty about the future magnitude, timing, and location of climate change, as
well as the future impacts of such changes on human populations. This definition
supports the position that major action is premature on scientific grounds, and that
more scientific research is required to predict climate changes and human impacts.
This is the primary position of the Bush Administration and of some scientists
directly involved in climate research. Scientists do differ on the need for action, but
these differences are secondary to their agreement on the need for more funding and
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more research.
Statements by the President's science advisor, D. Allan Bromley, illustrate this
scientific definition of the policy problem. In late 1989, in testimony before a Senate
subcommittee, he said that %re should not move forward on major programs until we
have a reasonable understanding of the scientific and economic consequences of
those programs. "3 Early in 1990, in a letter introducing a report to Congress on the
U.S. Global Change Research Program for FY 1991, he wrote that
The research program presented here is a key component of the
President's overall approach to the global change issue. This approach
has, as its central goal, the provision of a sound scientific basis for
developing national and international policy on global change?
According to the report, a sound scientific basis for policy is "An improved predictive
model of the integrated Earth system and a better understanding of human
interactions with this system... "5 The corresponding parts of the equivalent letter and
report for FY 1992 remained much the same? Thus the Administration emphasizes
research as a prerequisite to major action programs.
In the economic definition, the policy problem is construed as the enormous
cost and questionable effectiveness of the means available to reduce the build-up of
greenhouse gases. This definition supports the position that reasoned action is
premature on economic grounds -- at least until technology lowers costs, more
3 D. Allan Bromley as quoted by Warren T. Brookes in "The Global Warming Panic," Forbes
(December 25, 1989), p. 97. The issue before the subcommittee was the Administration's refusal to sign
an internadonal draft resolution calling for stabiliTation of emissions of greenhouse gases by the year
2000.
4 Our Changing Planet" The FY 1991 U.S. Global Change Research Program, A Report by the
Committee on Earth Sciences and A Supplement to the U.S. President's Fiscal Year 1991 Budget.
5/b/d., p. 1.
6 Our Changing Planet: The FY 1992 U.S. Global Change Research Progrwn, A Report by the
Committee on Earth Sciences and A Supplement to the U.S. President's Fiscal Year 1992 Budget. For
example, "approach to the global change issue" was changed to "approach to the global stewardship" and
"a sound scientific basis" was changed to "a sound scientific and economic basis."
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effective technologies are developed, or climate change makes action unavoidable.
This is a secondary position of the Bush Administration and the primary position of
most economists.
A front-page story in the New York Times illustrates this economic definition
of the policy problem. The story reports a consensus among economists that through
the next century, trillions of dollars probably would be required to curb the build-up
of carbon dioxide (CO2), a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming.
Some effort to curb carbon dioxide may eventually prove to be
a cost-effective means of coping with the greenhouse effect. But in
the near term, most economists conclude, a major effort to limit
carbon effluent makes little economic sense unless it can be justified
on grounds of energy security or tax revenue. 7
A feature article in Forbes illustrates the precision and certainty often attributed to
particular economic research results:
The Environmental Protection Agency finds that just to stabilize
U.S. CO2 emissions at present levels would force 30% taxes on oil and
coal, while to meet environmentalists' demands for a 20% reduction
in U.S. CO2 emissions would require a tax of $25 per barrel of oil, and
$200 a ton on coal, effectively doubling U.S. energy costs?
The article was skeptical of global warming projections, but uncritically accepted
these economic projections. Even if the uncertainties of economic projections are
acknowledged with a warning to policy makers, the warning tends to be mitigated by
the apparent precision and certainty of associated numbers and graphs. 9
In the political definition, the policy problem is construed as a questionable
ability to coordinate and enforce centralized policy decisions on scales commensurate
7 Peter P_ell, "Economic Watch: Cure for Greenhouse Effect: The Costs Will be Staggering," New
York Times (November 11, 1989), p. 1.
s Brookes, op. cit, p. 98.
9 See, for example, the exhibits used in a briefing on Economics and Policy of Climate Change:
Survey of the State oftheArt, The White House, April 6, 1990. The first exhibit reads: "Warning Label
on Global Warming: This Topic Contains Enormous Uncertainty. We Know Almost Nothing." Later
exhibits include many figures and graphs.
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with the scope of global climate change issues. This definition supports the position
that major action requires greater capacity to effect centralized and comprehensive
decisions at national and international levels. Not surprisingly, this is the position
of most people who have some formal or effective role in decisions made at these
levels.
Elder statesman Elliot Richardson used this definition in support of his
proposal for a treaty "to coordinate and enforce international action" on global
warming:
Environmentalists and politicians can argue the costs and
benefits of international action on global warming from now until
doomsday, and they probably will. But nothing will get done without
an international mechanism to develop, institute and enforce
regulations across national boundaries. _°
A similar political position was taken by the presidents of the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine after
considering the scope of global change problems:
Many possible courses of action ... involve multiple and
interlinked costs and benefits transcending both national and
generational bounds. Such problems can only be assessed, and prudent
long-term response policies can only be effectively developed, at the
highest political levels. Global change is quintessentially an issue for
leadership at the level of heads of state. It
This report, transmitted to President-Elect Bush, advocates the strengthening of
national and international mechanisms for the coordination of research and policy
on global climate change. _2
10Elliot L Richardson, "How to Fight Global Warming," New York Times (February 7, 1990), p.
A23.
1_ The report and covering letter are reproduced as pp. 10-21 in Globa/Warming, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, February 21 and May 4, 1989, Serial No. 101-31 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1989). See p. 13 for the passage quoted here.
_2Ibid., p. 16.
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The scientific, economic, and political definitions of the policy problem have
been selected from the milieu and moved up into the center of attention and policy
on global climate change. As shown in Figure 1.1, President Bush used versions of
these three definitions to structure his opening remarks to a White House
Conference on April 17, 1990. Consider also the summary justification of the Global
Change Research Program in the President's FY 1992 budget:
This program is designed to reduce the sign/ficant uncertainty
associated with predicting the behavior of the coupled ocean-
atmosphere-land Earth system which determines climate phenomena
and to form the basis for rational, comprehensive and cost effective
responses to climate change, t3
Qualifications and other definitions of the policy problem can be found in these and
other sources. But the other definitions have been inconsequential in the search for
policy solutions, even though they have been available in the scholarly literature of
many disciplines.
The dominance of these three definitions does not necessarily mean they are
the most realistic and worthwhile as bases for policy recommendations, decisions, and
actions. Their selection over other definitions could be understood as the
convergence of well-placed interests with certain prevalent predispositions in the
culture. Americans tend to believe that scientific research can solve major policy
problems; and scientists are not likely to question that belief while seeking funds for
their research. Americans tend to believe that knowledge of the long-term future is
feasible and necessary for rational decisions; and economists are not likely to
question that belief while claiming such knowledge. Americans tend to believe that
big problems require big (centralized and comprehensive) solutions; and elected and
appointed officials in Washington are not likely to question that belief while striving
to control attention and policy.
Moreover, it is no secret that public officials often seek advice and support
t30p. cit., pp. 100-101.
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Figure 1.1
The Three Dominant Def'mitions:
President Bush's Opening Remarks
The White House Conference on Science and Economics Research
Related to Global Change
April 17, 1990
...This conference can help in three ways. First, it provides an opportunity to
help sort out the science on this complex issue... What we need are facts, the stuff that
science is made of. A better understanding of the basic processes at work in our whole
complex world -- better Earth system models that enable us to calculate the complex
interaction between man and our environment ....
The second way this gathering can advance our understanding is to address the
economic factor and environmental questions. We know that cleaning up our
environment costs money -- a lot of money... And yet, as we move forward, all of us
must make certain we preserve our environmental well-being and our economic
welfare... Environmental policies that ignore the economic factor, the human factor, are
destined to fail.
And this brings me to the third way this conference contributes to a net gain in
knowledge. The fact that it provides us the opportunity to form a partnership between
nations and across the many disciplines represented here .... And the new partnership
must bind nations as well [as disciplines]. The fact of the matter is, no one nation acting
alone can safeguard our Earth environment.
Source: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President in
the Opening Address to the White House Conference on Science and Economics Research
Related to Global Change, Washington, D.C., April 17, 1990.
from scientistsand economists, and that scientists and economists often seek access
to funds and influence from public officials. The present point is not to condemn
politics, but to suggest that the dominance of a policy problem does not necessarily
mean it is the most realistic or worthwhile.
II. A Critique
The dominant definitions of the problem do not meet practical criteria of
rationality or the test of practical experience. To be sure, there are good reasons for
more basic research on the Earth system, for the development of more cost-effective
technologies, and perhaps for stronger political capabilities. But such advances are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for rational policy action on global climate
change in general or global warming in particular. And waiting for such advances
is not a valid reason to postpone action to curb CO2 emissions, for example, given
a strategy which met the test of practical experience in the energy crisis of the 1970s
and still makes sense today. CO2 emissions are not the only factors in global
warming, but they comprise a separable part on which action is warranted whether
or not significant global warming occurs.
Criteria of Rationality
In formal terms, a rational decision depends upon four elements: A set of
action alternatives; expectations about the future consequences of those alternatives;
expectations about future preferences for evaluating those consequences; and a
decision rule to select an alternative according to its expected consequences for
preferences. This formal outline underlies all theories of rationality. However, the
standard theories have been challenged in recent decades by behavioral theories
grounded in the observation of real choices and decisions. Differences between the
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standard and behavioral theories are key in this discussionJ 4
The standard theories assume that a rational decision must integrate complete
and consistent knowledge of a/l alternatives, a/l consequences, and a/l preferences
with a decision rule that selects the alternative with the highest expected value. Such
God-like omniscience is far beyond the capabilities of mere mortals and machines,
and we cannot even come close in situations as complex and open-ended as global
warming. Such substantive rationality is an ideal of the standard theory that is never
realized in practice. It is nevertheless influential: People sometimes think, talk, or
act as if substantive rationality has been achieved, or can and should be achieved.
One example is the demand for comprehensive and centralized policy.
Observed behavior, on the other hand, is boundedly rational: We can attend
to only some of the alternatives, consequences, and preferences in any decision
situation, and we do so with degrees of reliability, insight, and conscious reflection
that fall far short of the ideal. Hence significant uncertainties and ambiguities are
inevitable in complex decision situations. However, we can often cope satisfactorily
through procedures that are overlooked in the standard theories. For example, it is
often procedurally rational to act in modest and discrete steps on parts of a larger
problem, in order to reduce uncertainties about consequences, to clarify ambiguous
preferences, and to discover anything that might be significant but previously
overlooked or misconstrued. Practical experience from each step informs the next
step, facilitating a better approximation to rationality.
In short, while we lack the omniscience necessary to achieve the ideal of
substantive rationality, we can and do employ procedures to improve the rationality
of real decisions in particular situations. The only practical criteria of rationality
t4 For an introduction to theories of rationality, see Herbert Simon, Reason in Human Affairs
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), and James G. March, "Theories of Choice and Making
Decisions," Society 20 (November/December, 1982), pp. 29-39. March notes that some choice behavior
is sensible even if it is not rational according to the formal outline.
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stem from the behavioral theories.
Rationality in Practice
The scientific definition of the policy problem presumes that major action in
the face of profound uncertainties and ambiguities is irrational. In the spirit of the
standard theories, rationality depends upon a much better approximation to a
complete and consistent substantive understanding of global climate change -- and
that understanding, in turn, depends upon funding more basic scientific research.
However, it is procedurally rational to develop policy independently of on-
going but incomplete basic scientific research -- first by implementing alternative
prototype programs that are designed (in part) to discover what is feasible and
preferable in the field; and then by weeding out, propagating, or supplementing the
prototypes according to the test of practical experience. For example, a rational
policy process could evolve cost-effective programs to reduce CO2 emissions in
selected localities, and then diffuse and adapt those programs to many other
localities. In the face of profound ambiguities and uncertainties, good policy is
experimental and self-correcting on the basis of experience. Thus a predictive model
of the integrated Earth system is not necessary to proceed rationally) 5
Moreover, a predictive model of the integrated Earth system is not sufficient
for rational decisions on global warming. Clarifying the future consequences of
alternatives is only one element of a rational policy process, which also involves the
invention, evaluation, and selection of action alternatives. In addition, a rational
policy process provides rules for reconciling substantive differences over the realism
t_ In the same spirit, the historian Lynn White, Ir. in Dynmno and V'trg/nReconsidered." Essays in
the Dynamism of Western Culture (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1971) criticizes the modern tendency to
disparage technology development that proceeds without a deep or comprehensive understanding of the
science involved. He also observes that the development of technology proceeded more or less
independently of scientific research until the fh'st half of the 19th century.
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accuracy of those predictions have been included? As a caution against scientific hubris,
skeptics can point to predictions a decade and a half ago that we were entering a new ice
age. t6 Skeptics can also point to chaos theory, which suggests fundamental limits on
the predictability of determinant but non-linear systems. For example, perturbations
smaller than measurement errors can trigger massive changes in system behavior. 17
More generally, continuous modification of complex models does not necessarily improve
their forecast accuracy.t8
The basic research already funded in the Global Change Research Program will
contribute some answers relevant to some policy issues. But it will also generate
additional questions, which will generate additional funds and additional research, which
will generate additional questions, and so on -- until the public and public officials are
no longer concerned or funds are unavailable. Closure on all the important scientific
issues -- not to mention the broader policy issues -- is not a realistic prospect, t9
The economic definition of the policy problem also presumes that action in the
face of profound uncertainties and ambiguities is not rational. The approach, however,
is to absorb uncertainties and ambiguities through quantification and model specification -
- as /f any guesses about the future consequences of alternatives and the future
preferences for evaluating those consequences had already been eliminated through
research, and any remaining substantive differences had already been resolved through
politics. Consider, for example, the Forbes article quoted above, which attributes to the
Environmental Protection Agency some precise results on the energy tax increases
t6 Brookes, op. cit., p. 97, reports that one well-known global change scientist, in a 1976 book, supported
the popular view that a little ice age could be coming. Brook_ aim asks, "could we be witnessing the 19901
version of earlier scares: nuclear winter, cancer-causing cranberries and $100 oil?"
17 James Gleick, Chaos." Making a New Science (New York: Penguin, 1987).
18William Ascher, "The Forecasting Potential of Complex Models," Poh'cy Sciences 13 (1981), pp. 247-
267.
19 The policy relevance of large scientific programs has been called into question. See Leslie Roberts,
"Learning for an Acid Rain Program," Science 251 (15 March 1991), pp. 1302-1305.
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realistic prospect, t9
The economic definition of the policy problem also presumes that action in
the face of profound uncertainties and ambiguities is not rational. The approach,
however, is to absorb uncertainties and ambiguities through quantification and model
specification -- as if any guesses about the future consequences of alternatives and
the future preferences for evaluating those consequences had already been
eliminated through research, and any remaining substantive differences had already
been resolved through politics. Consider, for example, the Forbes article quoted
above, which attributes to the Environmental Protection Agency some precise results
on the energy tax increases required to stabilize U.S. CO2 emissions. The boundary
conditions, theoretical assumptions, data limitations, and other qualifications
necessary to understand the results are not mentioned in the article, leaving the
impression that we know what it would cost to stabilize CO2 emissions.
Any such impression is unwarranted by the experience of economic forecasting
in energy policy. In a comparative study published in 1978 by the National Academy
of Sciences, several modeling groups used the same initial conditions and
assumptions about economic growth to project the outcomes of six policy scenarios
to 2010. 20 William Ascher summarized major discrepancies among the results of
the modeling groups:
In forecasting energy consumption, the base case projections for the
year 1990 vary up to 19% for total energy, and by more than 50% for
electricity generation. Some models project five times the consumption
of oil than other models; even when the two extreme projections ... are
dropped, one remaining projection of oil consumption is less than half
the levels forecasted by the other two models. One model projects
19 The poficy relevance of large scientific programs has been called into question. See Leslie
Roberts, "Learning for an Acid Rain Program," Science 251 (15 March 1991), pp. 1302-1305.
20National Research Council, Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, Synthesis
Panel, Modeling Resource Group, Energy Modeling for an Uncertain Future, Supporting Paper 2
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1978).
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more than twice the consumption of nuclear energythan the others.2_
There are also major discrepancies in production and price forecasts. For example,
under scenarios that constrain coal and shale oil development, the price of coal over
the period from 1990 to 2010 increases two-fold in one model and decreases by
nearly half in another model. According to Ascher, 'q'he unavoidable conclusion is
that some of the models must be wrong in quite significant ways on policy-relevant
issues. ''22 Quantification and formal model specifications do not eliminate
uncertainties and ambiguities.
Experience also shows that complex models can be misused to lend an aura
of scientific respectability to a priori political positions. For example, early in 1977
the Project Independence Evaluation System (or PIES model) was used by the White
House energy planning staff to promote the National Energy Plan as a prerequisite
to energy independence. Barry Commoner summarized the paper trail of changes
made in the PIES model at the request of the staff, and concluded in part:
By arbitrarily changing the PIES model, the White House planning
staff was able to make the import-saving effect of the [National
Energy] Plan appear to be more than four times larger than it had
been before the changes were made.23
Similarly, an energy project at the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA) drew policy conclusions that were subsequently shown to
misrepresent its models and results. 24 Quantification and formal model
specifications do not guarantee scientific objectivity or political neutrality.
2t Ascher, op. c/t., p. 252.
22 Ibid., p. 253. Ascher goes on to note that "even agreement across models need not be an
indication of validity;,they could all be wrong. For example, all energy models predicting the 1975 levels
of U.S. electricity, petroleum, and total,energy consumpfon projected these levels higher than they
actually turned out to be." For details on the forecasts of 1975 levels, see William Ascher, Forecasting:
An Appraisal for Policy-Makers and Planners (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), Ch. 5.
23Barry Commoner, The Politics of Energy (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 15.
24 See Bill Keepin, "A Technical Appraisal of the IIASA Energy Scenarios," Policy Sciences 17
(I984), pp. 199-275. Keepin and Brian Wynne subsequently published a shorter report as commentary
in Nature 312 (20/27 December, 1984), pp. 691-695.
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Economic analysisis clearly important when applied to tractable problems in
a rational decision process -- such as estimating and evaluating the cost-effectiveness
of discrete pilot projects. But on the larger and less tractable problems, the
assumptions of the analysis become more interesting than the results and the results
are best discounted in proportion to their scope: Forecasts many years ahead and
on a global scale are educated guesses at best. Economics has only begun to account
for ecological and related costs of growth, _ and to consider such basic issues as the
assignment of intergenerational rights to natural resources implicit in neo-classical
theory. 2_
The political definition of the policy problem presumes that heads of state and
their advisers know enough to coordinate and enforce a policy on global warming at
the national or international level. The presumption of knowledge is optimistic if the
reference is to a narrow policy focusing on one aspect of the overall problem of
global warming. The presumption is utopian if the reference is to a comprehensive
policy encompassing most major parts of the overall policy problem.
A comprehensive policy that is centrally coordinated and enforced at the
national or international level would not approximate substantive rationality. Among
other things, such a policy would discount or ignore significant differences among
localities and regions that would be differently impacted by warming. Quite apart
from the additional knowledge required by such differences, any policy alleged to be
substantively rational from the standpoint of the nation or the globe as a whole
would be less than rational when significant local and regional differences are taken
into account. However, such differences are a valuable source of diversity in an
25 Peter Passell, "Rebel Economists Add Ecological Cost to Price of Progress," New York Times
(November 27, 1990), p. B5.
26Richard B. Norgaard and Richard B. Howarth, "The Rights of Future Generations and the Role
of Benefit-Cost Analysis in the Poficy Process," Poh'cy Sciences (forthcoming). An earlier version of this
paper was presented at the Twelfth Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management, October 18-20, 1990, San Francisco, CA.
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experimental, self-correcting policy based on modest and discrete pilot programs.
A comprehensive policy that is centrally coordinated and enforced would not
be procedurally rational. Such a policy implies that action on any separable part of
the overall global warming problem would be delayed until all parts of the problem
were addressed comprehensively -- even if some parts warranted earlier action. For
example, action on CO2 would be delayed until all the greenhouse gases could be
addressed; action in one country would be delayed until other countries were ready
to act. Such a policy would also entail enough bureaucratization to transform a
change in any part, however constructive, into a difficult, costly, and unwanted
disruption of the whole. It is more rational to proceed on each separate part of the
global warming problem as action becomes warranted, with responsibility and
accountability for the separate actions decentralized.27
A comprehensive policy is not likely to be politically realistic in any case.
The comprehensive National Energy Plan developed by the White House energy
planning staff in 1977 is a case in point. In promoting the Plan on national
television, President Carter argued that the nation faced a binary choice: 'q'he most
important thing about these proposals [the National Energy Plan] is that the
alternative may be a national catastrophe. "u In a covering letter, he wrote that "it
is a carefully balanced Plan, which depends for its effectiveness on all of its major
parts. "_ However, Congress took apart the legislation to implement this
comprehensive and "carefully balanced Plan," distributed the pieces to several
27 For a case study on this point, see Ronald D. Brunner, Maryann Friday, and Eugene Tierney,
"The Organization and Management of a Community Energy Initiative," in Ronald D. Brunner and
Robin Sandenburgh (eds.), Community Energy Options: Getting Started in Ann Arbor (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1981), Ch. 2, pp. 21-70.
2s "The Energy Problem," The President's Address to the Nation, April 18, 1977 in the Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 13, No. 17, p. 560.
29 The letter, dated April 29, 1977, is reproduced before the text of The National Energy Plan by
the Executive Office of the President, Energy Policy and Planning (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1977).
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committees in both houses, considered many of the proposals more or less
independently of the others, and introduced many alternatives to those proposals.
The five bills that became law a year and half later only loosely resembled the initial
legislation.
Of course there is a role for national leadership and centralized policy in
response to global warming. But that role is limited by the number and complexity
of the specific policy problems involved compared to anyone's capacity to understand
them all; and by the practical political need to rely on policies that make some sense
to the local, regional, and other interests that are motivated and able to participate.
Policies that make sense only from the top down are difficult to enact and
prohibitively expensive to enforce on national or global scales.
Finally, these dominant definitions of the policy problem presume rather than
clarify the value preferences that are used as criteria for evaluation and goals for
planning in any rational decision process. This is not surprising. Scientists often
represent their work as independent, in principle, of any moral, ethical, or political
position. Neo-classical economists start with the assumption that tastes and
preferences are given, and like scientists, typically have no special training or
competence in the clarification of values. _ Appointed public officials are prone to
accept the preferences of elected officials, who in turn are prone to use whatever
moralizations the public will accept21
Consider, for example, Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate, a draft
report to Congress by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in February, 1989.
The title expresses a preference for stabilizing the global climate. However,
30 See the Introduction to Robert B. Reich (ed.), The Power of Public Ideas (Cambridge: Ballinger,
1988).
31 Abraham Kaplan emphasizes the dualism between moralization and vulgar pragmatism in
American Ethics and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).
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stabilizing the global climate is not an end in itself but a means that begs justification
in terms of other preferences. Procedural rationality is served by making those other
preferences explicit in order to adapt them, if necessary, to changing circumstances.
For example, the underlying preference may be to stabilize "the" American
way of life. But life in America has been conceived and lived in myriad different
ways over time and across groups. Some of these ways may be less burdensome for
the global ecology yet quite satisfactory for the Americans who live them -- and
potentially for others as well. And the ways of life that are more burdensome for the
global ecology may not be sustainable if the globe has, in fact, entered an era of
rapid climate change induced by human activities on an unprecedented scale. The
sustainability of American (or Western) ways of life merits explicit consideration
before they are promoted or accepted as models for the Third World to emulate.
The preferences expressed or implied in any policy are not standardized and
stabilized, once and for all, even though scientists, economists, politicians and others
often assume or act as if they are. It is procedurally rational to reconsider the
mutual adaptations among alternatives, consequences, and preferences as events
unfold. Putting preferences on the table for discussion adds a degree of freedom in
the search for policy solutions.
Test of Experience: The Energy Crisis
The energy crisis of a decade and a half ago is the most relevant experience
for understanding global warming as a policy problem. On the one hand, many of
the policy perspectives shaped during the energy crisis are now being applied to
global warming, often by the same policy analysts and public officials. On the other
hand, what was learned about the consumption of fossil fuels is directly relevant,
since the consumption of fossil fuels accounts for about two-thirds of the COs build-
up.
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Amory Lovins transformed the energy crisis into a quasi-experiment in the fall
of 1976, when he proposed a "soft path" strategy as an alternative to the traditional
"hard path" strategy. Part of his challenge was a definition of the policy problem that
brought social goals or preferences to the fore:
...the energy problem should be not how to expand supplies to meet
the postulated extrapolative needs of a dynamic economy, but rather
how to accomplish social goals elegantly with a minimum of energy
and effort, meanwhile taking care to preserve a social fabric that not
only tolerates but encourages diverse values and lifestyles. 32
National energy policy in response to the oil embargo in 1973-74 presumed the first
definition of the problem, but included some efforts consistent with the second
definition of the problem. Some details on the alternatives are necessary to
understand the quasi-experiment and its results.
National energy policy focused on increasing supplies of energy through the
expansion of centralized production and the development of more sophisticated
energy technologies. Lovins characterized this as the hard path strategy. It included
enhanced production from domestic fossil fuel resources, on land and offshore, to
reduce dependence on oil imports; construction of the Alaskan pipeline and other
means of distributing enhanced production over long distances; continued promotion
of nuclear power; and, looking ahead, plants to demonstrate breeder reactor
technology and technologies for synthetic fuels and shale oil production.
National energy policy also included peripheral efforts to reduce energy
consumption through conservation and efficiency, and to begin a transition toward
renewable energy resources (such as solar and low-head hydro) as long-term
substitutes for fossil fuels and nuclear power. These efforts were consistent with the
soft path. The technologies involved are typically easy to understand and use, and
32Amory Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (San Francisco: Friends of the Earth
International, and Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977), p. 13. See also "Energy Strategy:. The Road Not Taken?"
Foreign Affairs 55 (October, 1976), pp. 65-96, which was the earliest work on the soft path to attract a
great deal of attention.
June 30, 1992 - 23 - Defining the Problem
matched in scale and geographic distribution to end-use needs. Hence they can be
readily adapted to diverse local circumstances through decentralized decisions made
by state and local authorities and by businesses and households -- all of whom
typically have little say in centralized-supply or high-technology decisions.
The results of the quasi-experiment are rather clear, despite the difficulty of
tracking the soft path through Federal energy information systems) a According to
various estimates, covering roughly the decade following the 1973-74 oil embargo,
savings in energy consumption through conservation and efficiency contributed nearly
twice as much as additions to energy supply in meeting national needs. Among the
additions to energy supply, the development of renewable resources contributed more
than fossil fuels. Even though nuclear power was a major factor in the additions to
energy supply, the nuclear power industry scaled back its plans by a factor of two
over this period and is now essentially stagnantfl The disposal of nuclear wastes
and the decommissioning of obsolete nuclear plants remain unsolved problems. And
finally, the breeder reactor, synthetic fuels, and shale oil demonstration projects
spawned by the energy crisis are either moribund or terminated.
In short, while Washington was preoccupied with a hard-path energy strategy,
the peripheral soft path elements of national policy combined with millions of
decentralized decisions turned out to make the most difference in meeting national
needs. Of course these decentralized decisions were not in direct response to Lovins'
33 In effect, these information systems presume and institutionalize a hard path strategy. Important
aspects of the soft path are virtually invisible in them. The author is indebted to Susan Iott for extensive
research on the results of the quasi-experiment. Her sources include the Monthly Energy Rev/ew,
published by the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy; U. S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Energy Use and the U.S. Economy, OTA-BP-E-57 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, June, 1990); Eric Hirst et al., "Recent Changes in U.S. Energy
Consumption: What Happened and Why," Annual Review of Energy (1983), pp. 193-245; a draft paper
on "Impacts of Improved Efficiency" by Lee Schipper a al. ; and an interview with Amory Lovins.
34 According to the Monthly Energy Review (July 1989), p. 89, the total design capacity of nuclear
generating units (operable and projected) dropped by one-half in one decade from 1976, the peak year,
to 1986. This reflects the cancellation of plans to add to nuclear generating capacity.
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challenge but to the diverse needs and circumstances faced by citizens everywhere.
Rising energy prices stimulated innovation and the widespread replication of
workable solutions, old and new.
The implications for global warming policy are rather obvious: We already
know how to begin to reduce CO2 emissions through the conservation and more
efficient use of fossil fuels and the substitution of renewable energy resources. These
are, on the whole, the least-cost alternatives for meeting our end-use energy needs
according to the test of experience; and this is a more reliable basis for policy than
the projections of complex models? 5 Moreover, the potential for further progress
in the U.S. through conservation, efficiency, and renewable resources is still vast
according to engineering estimates _ and to standards set by the most energy-
efficient industrial countries. Hence there is little uncertainty about the realism or
worth of a soft path strategy to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and to
ameliorate the build-up of greenhouse gases, whether or not global warming occurs.
h
In more fashionable terms, a soft path strategy provides "insurance" against the risk,
and "no regrets" if significant global warming does not occur -- and it is procedurally
rational.
The question is not the outcome of the quasi-experiment, but what has been
learned from it. In various places around the country, people have learned through
direct experience that decentralized energy decisions, based on modest technologies,
can be both politically feasible and cost-effective in practice. For example:
35 See Ascher, op. cir. Consider also that a model is a simplified representation of the real world.
Hence it necessarily excludes some factors in the real world and ob6cures others through aggregation.
These factors typically interact with the factors expliciOy represented in the model. The only reliable
way to gauge the significance of these interactions for policy purposes is to act on the model in the real
world and to examine the results. As en_aeers sometimes put it, "What hasn't been tested [in the real
world] can't be trusted."
3_See, for example, Arthur H. Rosenfeld and Daniel Hafemeister, "Energy Efficient Buildings,"
Scienn'fic American 258 (April, 1988), pp. 78-85.
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• In 1976 in Davis, California, contractors unsuccessfully fought the
imposition of a municipal building code that required the use of passive solar
energy in new residential construction. After learning how to comply with the
code and examining the results first-hand, the contractors endorsed it as an
effective means of reducing energy bills without increasing construction costs.
• In 1976, after months of controversy, Seattle decided to rely on
conservation and hydro development instead of additional investments in the
Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) to meet its projected
power needs to 1990. The early results of the decision exceeded expectations.
The wisdom of the decision was reaffirmed in 1983, when WPPSS defaulted
on $2 billion in bonds to construct two canceled nuclear reactors.
" Also in the mid-1970s, a nuclear engineer and planner for a Wisconsin
utility unsuccessfully fought state regulations mandating least-cost alternatives
to meet new electricity demand. On the basis of experience, however, he now
endorses such least-cost alternatives as conservation and efficiency programs
as well as small, modular, coal-fired plants that minimize risk when new
capacity is needed. 37
Note that scientific and economic research were insufficient for policy innovation in
these cases. Political leadership was necessary to precipitate a conflict that
challenged an obsolete policy and substituted a new one; and the direct experience
of successful implementation was necessary to include those who had resisted in a
new consensus. The primary role of research was to design promising policy
innovations.
37 The Wisconsin story was told by several participants at the Retrospective Conference on
Energy/Environment Management at IIASA in Austria in June, 1987. For background, analysis, and
sources on the decisions in Davis and Seattle, see Ronald D. Brunner, "Decentralized Energy Policies,"
Public Policy 28 (Winter, 1980), pp. 71-91.
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However, the lessons of the energy crisis have been largely ignored in
Washington, D.C. For example, shortly after leaving office in 1981, two energy
officials of the Carter Administration argued the case for centralized energy policy
to meet the national security threat posed by Western dependence on foreign oil.
According to the former Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and Evaluation and
his principal deputy, "Energy policy is best dealt with by placing accountability in one
place with capability for policy integration, international coordination, and technical
judgment. "38 This is an eloquent statement of hard path hubris. When the
statement was made, energy savings from millions of decentralized decisions were
already undermining the cartel's international power.
National energy policy since the Carter Administration has sought to reduce
the role of government but retained a preference for hard-path technologies.
Research funding on renewable energy resources fell by 89% in constant dollars over
the last eleven years. Meanwhile, funding for DOE's magnetic fusion program was
cut only 7% and basic energy research increased by 47% in constant dollars. 39
Signs of global warming have drawn attention to a new generation of "safe" nuclear
power plants to reduce CO2 emissions.40 More recently, amidst turmoil in the
Persian Gulf, the focal point of national energy policy has been the Administration's
proposals to expand drilling for oil in Alaska and offshore. Ironically, the continuing
acceptance of conservation, efficiency, and renewables at the periphery of national
energy policy helps avoid a direct, public debate between the hard and soft path
alternatives.
National energy policy is less responsive to experience than to a view of reality
as W'dliam W. Lewis and Lester P. Siiverman, "The Value of Central Managing of Energy," New
York T'_nes (March 15, 1981).
David P. Hamilton, "Energy R&D Funding Shift Urged," Science (7 September 1990), p. 1101.
40For an assessment of this alternative, see Bill Keepin and Gregory Kats, "Greenhouse Warming:
Comparative Analysis of Nuclear and Efficiency Abatement Strategies," Energy Policy 16 (December,
1988), pp. 538-561.
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tacitly accepted as a matter of faith (if not interest) in and around Washington.
Essentially the same view of reality constrained the search for solutions to energy
problems almost a decade and a half ago by relegating the soft path to the periphery.
Lovins recognized the conflicting views of reality at the time:
Underlying much of the energy debate is a tacit, implicit
divergence about what the energy problem "really" is. Public discourse
suffers because our society has mechanisms only for resolving
conflicting interests, not conflicting views of reality, so we seldom
notice that those perceptions differ markedly. 41
We still seldom notice the conflicting views of reality. And essentially the same view
of reality now constrains the search for effective responses to the threat of global
climate change. Because that view of reality meets neither practical criteria of
rationality nor the test of practical experience, alternative views still merit careful
consideration.
IlL Alternatives
The alternatives have been described in the scholarly literature as
"ideological," "religious," and "cultural" ideas, as well as a "new consciousness" and a
different 'Mew of reality" or '_vorld view." The differences in terms are less
significant than the common allusion to basic ideas of potential value to society that
are not now debated at the center of attention and policy in the U.S. Fortunately,
the alternatives are debated in the scholarly literature, as we shall see by example
below.
To visualize the confrontation between the alternatives and the accepted
world view, imagine a cone-shaped space filled with ideas. The narrow tip of the
cone represents the restricted scope of ideas that are debatable within the world view
accepted at the center of attention. The broader base represents the fuller range of
ideas that are debatable among scholars and others below and beyond the center of
4t Soft Energy Paths, op. cit., p. 12.
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attention. Diffusion of alternative ideas up and in toward the center is normally
restricted: For example, the ideas may be filtered out because they are perceived as
threatening or as foolish within the accepted world view. Occasionally, however, the
less-threatening ideas are partially incorporated into the accepted world view in order
to defend it. And sometimes the ideas that make up an accepted world view are
displaced piecemeal through reform or wholesale through revolution. 42
The alternative ideas include Amory Lovins' summary, in twelve succinct
points, of the world view that had co-evolved with the soft path strategy? 3 Three
points are especially relevant here:
* Lovins observed that '_ve know next to nothing about the carefully designed
natural systems and cycles on which we depend," but took this as a caution "to
preserve flexibility and resilience, and to design for large safety margins..."
when we act.
* He contended that "energy, technology, and economic activity are means,
not ends, and their quantity is not a measure of welfare; hence economic
rationality is a narrow and often defective test of the wisdom of broad social
choices...M
* Affirming faith in ordinary people, he contended that "concepts of central
governance by a cynical elite are unworthy of the people, increase the
likelihood and consequences of major errors, and are ultimately tyrannical..."
42 For an introduction to the theory of ideological change, which includes hypotheses on the
circumstances under which various outcomes occur, see Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel
deSola Pool, "The Comparative Study of Symbols: An Introduction," in Pool (ed.) The Presage Press: A
Comparative Study of Political Symbols (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970), Ch. 1. See also Harold D.
Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), especially
Chs. V and X.
(3 Ibid., pp. 12-14, from which the following selections are taken.
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Thesepoints have had little influence at the center of attention after a decade and
a half, but they could be revived as direct challenges to the three dominant
definitions of the policy problem.
Sustainable development is another alternative idea and a good candidate for
early diffusion into the center of attention on global warming. Writing in Scientific
American, William C. Clark quotes an authoritative source, Gro Harlem Brundtland,
who
...characterizes sustainable development as paths of social, economic
and political progress that meet "the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. '_
Sustainable development is relatively non-threatening to advocates of the dominant
definitions and unobjectionable for ordinary citizens -- at least until the policy and
program implications are spelled out. But a major function of such key symbols is
to frame the debates over specific policies and programs. Moreover, preserving
options for future generations makes sense from a procedurally rational standpoint.
Note that a preference for intergenerational equity is also implied in the U.S.
Constitution, which was established in part to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our posterity..."
Moreover, "sustainable development" is arguably the common rallying point
for representatives of various alternatives to the accepted world view. Despite
differences in meaning, frequent repetitions of the phrase build pressure to move
sustainable development up and in to the center of attention. However, the idea has
made little headway so far, if coverage in the Washington Post is taken as
representative of the ideas at the center of attention. A computer search of the
electronic edition from 1985 through May, 1991 turned up only 16 stories or op-ed
pieces (of approximately 460 on global climate change) in which "sustainable" or its
W'dliam C. Clark, "Managing Planet Earth," Scientific American 261 (September, 1989), p. 48.
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variants were used as references to a policy goal. 4s (The Worldwatch Institute
deserves credit as the single most important source for directing attention to
sustainability in this sample.) Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a President or
member of Congress might publicly advocate sustainable development as a general
aim and aspiration of policy, and thereby invite others to debate particular policies
and programs in those terms.
However, it is now hardly conceivable that a President or member of Congress
would publicly question the meaning of economic growth as a policy goal, along the
lines of the critique by the economist Fred Hirsch in 1976. _ Hirsch argued that
social welfare declines as economic growth increases when social congestion is
significant. For example, more automobiles produce more traffic jams if not gridlock
in congested areas., Under these circumstances, more automobiles reduce social
welfare but count as economic growth. Similarly, additional educational credentials
are needed to compete for jobs in congested markets but not needed to perform
those jobs. Credentialism reduces social welfare but counts as economic growth. To
the extent that traditional measures fail to account for these social costs of economic
growth and for other ecological costs, they distort decisions and inhibit adaptation.
Moreover, it is now hardly conceivable that a President or member of
Congress would take up the challenge of the historian Lynn White, Jr. in 1967.
White traced the historical roots of our ecologic crisis to _the Christian dogma of
man's transcendence of, and rightful mastery over, nature."
Both our present science and our present technology are so tinctured
with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for
our ecologic crisis can be expected from them alone. Since the roots
of our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be
45 The author is indebted to Carolyn M. Hennefeld for this observation.
Fred Hirsch Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).
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essentially religious, whether we call it that or not? 7
Lewis W. Moncrief later argued that "Judeo-Christian tradition is only one of many
cultural factors contributing to the environmental crisis. ''48 Similarly, the social
anthropologist Timothy C. Weiskel characterizes the environmental crisis as "a
fundamental crisis in meaning, value and belief for the industrial world... ''49
Yet we will need extraordinary political leadership on global climate change
if, as these scholars contend, the dominant culture constitutes the problem rather
than the locus of policy solutions. Global climate change could be another symptom
of a culture that creates science-based technologies powerful enough to threaten its
own survival. Before the atom bomb, John Dewey wrote that "A culture which
permits science to destroy traditional values but which distrusts its power to create
new ones is a culture which is destroying itself." Abraham Kaplan added the
qualification that "Not science itself but the leaden shield that insulates it from ethics
and politics is deadly. "5° One task of leadership is to reintegrate science, ethics, and
politics in the on-going search for practical solutions to problems created by science-
based technology.
This suggests an alternative definition of the policy problem: In the cultural
definition, the policy problem is a culture that fails to integrate science-based
technologies for mastering nature with ethical and political constraints on their use,
and thereby jeopardizes its own sustainability. Hence reasoned action begins with
leadership that challenges selected elements of the dominant culture and directs
47 Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," Science 155 (10 March 1967), pp.
1203-1207; quotations at pp. 1206, 1207, respectively.
48Lewis W. Moncrief, "The Cultural Basis for Our Environmental Crisis," Science 170 (30 October
1970), p. 508.
49 *Cu.[tllre Values and Their Environmental lmpficafions: An Essay on Knowledge, Belief and
Global Survival," p. 2. This paper (dated 17 February 1990) was presented at the 1990 Annual Meeting
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in New Orleans.
_o Kaplan quotes Dewey and adds his own qualification in op. cir., p. 103.
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attention to alternatives. The evidence in support of this construction of the policy
problem includes the three dominant definitions of the policy problem, which reflect
and reinforce cultural barriers to effective policy. The evidence also includes the
inability to recognize, at the center of attention in Washington, what worked in
response to the energy crises and what did not.
Summary and Conclusion
The perspectives brought to bear on defining the policy problem are important
- particularly the perspectives that bridge differences of personality, interest, and
class and may therefore be designated "cultural". The dominant culture presumes,
among other things, that:
Scientific research is a prerequisite for action on a major policy problem like
global climate change.
Rational action depends on long-term, broad-scope forecasts of the cost-
effectiveness of policy alternatives.
Big policy problems like global climate change require big (centralized and
comprehensive) policy solutions.
Moreover, the dominant culture presumes that we can reduce scientific uncertainty,
forecast accurately over the long term and with broad scope, and achieve national
or international consensus on comprehensive policy solutions -- and that we can do
so in a timely fashion. This chapter has outlined the case that these presumptions
of the dominant culture are misleading, at best, as a basis for policy in response to
the threat of global climate change. If so, then the dominant culture constitutes the
policy problem rather than the locus of effective solutions.
From the standpoint of rationality, the dominant culture is the policy problem
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because it circumscribes the search for effective policy solutions. While we wait for
reductions in scientific uncertainty, for improvements in the projected cost-
effectiveness of alternatives, and for agreement on comprehensive national and
international policies, we forego modest steps toward ameliorating the buildup of
greenhouse gases and learning how to cope with potentially-serious disruptions from
global warming. Modest steps are procedurally rational despite (and because of)
uncertainties and ambiguities. The decentralized energy strategy that was unwittingly
field-tested and proven cost-effective in the aftermath of the energy crisis is the
appropriate model for taking the first modest steps to reduce COs emissions. The
decentralized energy strategy is also the appropriate means for learning how to cope
more effectively with diverse local and regional disruptions if global warming occurs.
Yet the dominant culture marginalizes the decentralized energy strategy or leaves it
in the dark.
From the standpoint of aspirations for democracy, the dominant culture is the
policy problem because it reinforces the particular interests of centrally-placed
scientists, economists, and public officials, who are not particularly interested in
providing the public with alternatives. In any realistic view of democracy, the people
are powerless unless their leaders give them a choice among alternatives on the most
fundamental issues. 5t The fundamental issue not before the public is whether a
loose coalition of scientists, economists, and public officials should coordinate and
enforce a comprehensive policy on global climate change. Instead, such secondary
issues as when such a policy is prudent, and what that policy should be, dominate the
public agenda. Thus the dominant culture obscures the decentralized and
incremental alternatives to centralized and comprehensive policy.
Political leadership is necessary to address the problem. The recommended
goal for potential leaders is to enlarge the perspectives brought to bear on the issue
sl E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's Hew of Democracy in America
(Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press, 1975), especially the last chapter.
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of global climate change, and to make the presumptions of the dominant culture
controversial in the process. More specifically:
The first objective is to educate the public and public officials on the energy
policy experience as the relevant precedent. This includes distinguishing the
centralized and decentralized energy alternatives, and developing the
empirical and normative bases for public evaluation of these alternatives.
The empirical basis includes evidence on what each alternative did and
did not accomplish, and how; the normative basis includes
opportunities for public participation (along with the experts) in the
making of policy decisions under each strategy.
The second objective is to use improved public understanding of the energy
policy experience (past and on-going) to open up the larger cultural issues.
For example, a case can be made that this experience runs contrary to the
presumptions of the dominant culture. In particular:
Big policy problems can be factored geographically into their different
parts to facilitate multiple, independent, and quasi-experimental
searches for solutions that can be adapted elsewhere, if proven
successful.
Searches for solutions to parts of the problem can avoid global and
long-term uncertainties and ambiguities, which are largely intractable,
and can rely on existing analytical capabilities to select and evaluate
trial solutions of modest scope.
Through trial and error in multiple quasi-experiments, we can evolve
better solutions without understanding the fundamental scientific
principles involved. Existing scientific knowledge can be used select
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better trials and conduct better evaluations.
Of course the rich literature on alternatives to conventional culture, selectively
reviewed in Sec. HI above, provides the basis for opening up many more
cultural issues.
The audience for good leadership under these recommendations is not limited to the
general public but includes various experts as well. The centrally-placed experts in
particular can be expected to mount a vigorous public defense of their presumptions,
and should be encouraged to do so.
Are the recommended goal and objectives both realistic and worthwhile? On
the question of realism, we know historically that opinions on policy issues and the
cultural presumptions behind them are subject to change. (The end of the Cold War
provides vivid examples, in both the East and the West.) The level of crisis
conditions the pace of change; leadership shaI_es the direction of change and, at its
best, channels heightened emotional energies into constructive directions that
eventually alleviate the causes as weLl as the symptoms of crisisJ _ Appeal to the
energy policy experience is crucial because changes in opinions and cultural
presumptions (as opposed to theft reinforcement) depend on evidence that is
perceived as more than propagandaJ 3 The question is not whether leadership can
effect change, but whether potential leaders will accept the inevitable and uncertain
risks of leadership.
On the question of worth, the recommended goal and objectives appeal to two
basic aspirations broadly shared within the American political system, rationality and
52 See H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950),
especially Chs. VI and X.
53 See ibid., p. 113: "Propaganda in accord with predispositions strengthens them; propaganda
counter to predispositions weakens them only if supported by factors other than propaganda." Faaors
other than propaganda include evidence and experience.
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democracy. For example, Americans value the competitive marketplace of ideas,
which is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution, because it facilitates
the testing and selection of better ideas (rationality) and because it hinders the
undue concentration of political power (democracy). s4 Consequently, those who
differ on specific issues -- for example, whether a particular response to the threat
of global climate change is a net cost or prudent insurance -- can nevertheless appeal
to their common interest in more rational and democratic decisions and attempt to
resolve their differences on that basis. Climate change policy, we believe, can
become more rational if the search for solutions is broadened beyond the dominant
culture and if preferences (including policy goals) are made explicit and opened up
for discussion. Policy can become more democratic if the people are given a choice
between important alternatives on the most fundamental issues.
Acceptance of the recommended goal and objectives for political leadership
does not entail advocacy of any particular outcome, either at the level of climate
change policy or at the level of culture. Acceptance does require that leaders draw
a sharp distinction between centralized and decentralized energy strategies, and
between the dominant (or conventional) culture and the subordinate (or non-
conventional) culture. Without making the distinction sharp, the distinction is not
likely to get across to the general public. However, the synthesis that would
eventually emerge, in dialectical fashion, from the confrontation of sharply-drawn
alternatives cannot be predicted with confidence or in detail, nor is there much point
in trying to predict it. The marketplace of ideas tends to deliver outcomes that are
"messier," as well as more rational and democratic, than the sharply-drawn inputs of
advocates on either side.
In conclusion, it is worthwhile to stress the power of ideas in a culture that
prizes objectivity and emphasizes the material over the symbolic factors in social
See the Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1947).
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change. Objectivity presumes that knowledge of the real world can be independent
of the viewpoint of the observer. Yet Thomas Kuhn has shown that even scientific
knowledge is contingent upon a paradigm, which consists of basic assumptions
scientists share and is subject to change through a scientific revolution." Moreover,
Herbert Simon recognized the main consequence of the fact that no one is
omniscient.
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems
whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real
world .... [T]he first consequence of [this] principle of bounded
rationality is that the intended rationality of an actor requires him to
construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to deal with
it. ,,_
Experience often confirms that there is a difference between the expected
consequences of an action in the simplified model and the actual consequences of
that action in the real world. In short, there is a significant difference between "The
World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads. "57
The upshot is that the ideas shaping the simplified, subjective models on which
we act are important. Recall Lord Keynes' famous conclusion to the book that
revolutionized macroeconomics:
...the ideas of economists and philosophers, both when they are fight
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men,
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economistfl
_ T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scienttfic Revolutions 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969).
H. A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 199.
57 This is the title of Ch. 1 in Walter Lippmann, Pub//c Op/n/on (New York: The Free Press, 1965),
first published in 1922.
ss j. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, & World, 1965), p. 383. See also R. Reich, The Power of Ideas (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988),
especially the Introduction.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ENERGY PRECEDENT
Susan E. Iott
The energy crisis of the 1970s is the most relevant precedent for
understanding global climate change as a policy problem, and for taking steps to cope
with it. First, the centralized strategy invoked more or less as a reflex after the first
oil embargo was challenged, within a few years, by a decentralized strategy. These
strategies are representative, respectively, of the dominant conventional culture and
the non-conventional alternatives to that culture. These different perspectives have
been brought to bear on the climate change problem, often by the same policy
analysts and public officials. Second, the strategies can be evaluated on the basis
of experience. Experience is the best source of insight into what was overlooked or
misconstrued in the perspectives brought to bear on a policy problem. We do not
yet have sufficient experience with global climate change itself to correct our
perspectives on the realism and worth of the alternatives. Finally, what can be
learned about the alternative energy strategies is directly relevant to the build-up of
CO2, a major "greenhouse" gas that contributes to global warming. The consumption
of fossil fuels accounts for about two thirds of the COs build-up, and the energy
precedent shows how to reduce that build-up without compromising other values.
This chapter documents and evaluates the energy policy experience as a
precedent for climate change policy. The analysis is intended to be useful to those
potential leaders who share the goal of opening up the search for solutions to the
climate change problem. In particular, it provides evidence and specific anecdotes
June 30, 1992 - 39 - Energy Precedent
that are especially useful in communicating non-conventional ideas to the public, t
as well as references to additional literature relevant to the purpose.
The first section of this chapter describes the energy crisis and America's
policy responses as a quasi-experiment that provided an opportunity to evaluate
alternative energy strategies: A centralized "hard path" strategy and a decentralized
"soft path" strategy. The second section documents what the alternative strategies
contributed to meeting the nation's energy needs, and other significant consequences
including how decisions were made. The third section considers the lessons that can
be drawn from the energy policy precedent, and the extent to which those lessons
have not been learned.
I. The Quasi-Experiment
The Energy Crisis
The energy crisis was triggered by an oil embargo in October, 1973, following
a few weeks of war in the Middle East and years of gradual but profound change in
the international oil industry. 2 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) embargoed oil shipments from October 18, 1973 to March 18, 1974. During
that period, the price of foreign crude oil rose from $3.00 to $11.65 per barrel, an
increase of about 400%. The cost of gasoline for automobile drivers in the United
States rose from 33 cents to 56 cents per gallon. As shown in Figure 2.1, the real
price of crude oil in the United States leveled for several years, then rose rapidly
again in 1979, 1980, and 1981. Thereafter they began to decline to present low
I On the communication of policy information in anecdotal or story-like form, see R. D. Brunner, I.S.
Fitch, J. Grassia, L. Kathlene, and K. Hammond, "Improving Data Utilization: The Case-Wise Alternative,"
Policy Sciences 20 (1957): 365-394.
2 For background on the energy crisis, see Congressional Quarterly Inc., Energy Policy (Washington:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1979). On the changes in the oil industry, see J. Blair, The Control of O_l (New
York: Pantheon Books).
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Figure 2.1
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levels. A similar pattern of increases and levelling occurred for the real consumer
prices of residential electricity, residential natural gas, and gasoline (leaded regular
prices).
Rapid price increases put pressure on households, businesses, and
governments at all levels to adapt; high prices remained a problem wherever and
whenever adaptation was difficult. These problems were compounded by shortages
of gasoline at some stations and long lines at others during the periods of rapid oil
price increases. Shortages of natural gas and other energy supplies occurred on a
local or regional basis at various times. The crisis stimulated widespread and intense
demands for immediate action; reflection on the wisdom of available courses of
action was secondary. Conversely, declining and relatively low energy prices over the
last decade, together with relatively reliable energy supplies, have encouraged
complacency that may set the stage for another energy crisis. In general, rapid or
significant changes in the environment, together with a limited capacity to adapt, are
the factors precipitating crisis. 3
Alternative Strategies
President Nixon announced Project Independence in November, 1973.
Although virtually every national interest was affected by the energy crisis, the
primary goal of Project Independence was to make the United States energy self-
sufficient by 1980. The goal was later scaled back to freedom from unreliable
foreign off supplies by 1985. However operationalized, the goal of energy
independence was a matter of consensus, and no doubt selected as the primary goal
for that reason. The goal implied that the primary policy problem was the vulnerable
supply of foreign oil, and that achievement of energy independence would restore the
3 leadership based on good policy intelligence may be sufficient to avoid or ameliorate crises. Signs of
the coming crisis in the early 1970s, including sporadic and localized shortage of gasoline in the United States
well before the embargo, were not fully appreciated by public officials in Washington. Historical failures of
policy intelligence are potentially important but largely neglected topics in global change research.
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nation to a satisfactory position.
The quest for energy independence in the post-embargo 1970s focused on
increasing the supply of energy through expansion of domestic production and long-
d/stance distribution of energy from fossil fuels and from nuclear power. Both the
Ford and Caner energy plans continued this focus on increasing domestic supply,
although these plans included increasingly comprehensive efforts to curb national
energy consumption. Perhaps the most intense political struggles focused on
domestic oil price controls and natural gas price regulations, which were gradually
decontrolled and deregulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s to boost domestic
production and reduce demand. Conversion to coal, particularly in new utilities, was
encouraged because domestic coal reserves were relatively large. The nuclear power
industry was assisted in various ways, including an extension of the Price-Anderson
Act which limited the industry's liability for accidents and efforts to streamline the
licensing process for nuclear plants. The crisis expedited passage of the Tram-Alaska
Pipeline Authority Act, which had been stalled in Congress. There were also
proposals to construct another pipeline over the Rockies to deliver oil to the Midwest
and East Coast. In addition, the Federal government authorized enhanced
production from the Naval Petroleum Reserves and creation of a strategic off reserve
to boost domestic supplies in case of another embargo.
For the longer-term future, national energy policy focused on ensuring energy
supplies through research, development, and demonstration of new technologies for
large-scale production facilities that could easily be integrated into the energy system.
In 1970, the Federal government agreed to finance a demonstration plant to assist
in the commercialization of breeder reactor technology, which produces plutonium
fuel through the fission of uranium. A group of utilities operating as the Breeder
Reactor Corporation also invested in the plant to be located on the Clinch River in
Tennessee. After the second oil embargo in 1979, the Federal government
established the Synthetic Fuels Corporation to bring technologies "from the pilot
plant stage and into full scale production by reducing the financial risks to developers
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of 'pioneer' plants."* The corporation received $18 billion in initial funding and
considerable autonomy to achieve a production goal of 2 million barrels of oil
equivalent per day by 1992. 5 The goal of the legislation was to fund 30-40 synthetic
fuel projects at a cost of $1-$2 billion each. 6 It invested in production of oil from
shale, the production of gas and liquid fuels from coal, and fuels from heavy oil and
tar sands. For the very long-term, the Federal government invested in research and
development of fusion reactor technology. Plans and money for fusion research
continue in the 1990s; currently, DOE plans to move the fusion program from the
research phase to a "goal-oriented energy development program. "7 To that end, $273
million was spent in 1991 and $337 million have been requested for two
demonstration projects; one is the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) and the other is the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor.
The energy crisis became a quasi-experiment when, in the fall of 1976, Amory
Lovins proposed a fundamental alternative in an article in Foreign Affairs, other
papers, and Senate testimony? Lovins challenged the focus of national energy policy
as a "hard path" strategy, and proposed an alternative "soft path" strategy. He alleged
that national leaders had misconstrued the energy problem:
4 D. CoGa_n, "Energy Policy and Boom/Bug Cycles: Government Action and Instability in the
Development of Oil Shale," Policy Studies Journal 13 (1984): 409.
5 United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on
Bank_g, Finance and Urban _, Contributions of Renewable and A/ternaa've Fuels to Long-Term U. $.
Energy Security 101st Cong., 2d Seu., Serial No. 101-77 (Wmhington: GPO, 1990) 143 (Fifth Annual Report
of the Synfuels Corporation) (Hereafter, Contributions of Renewables).
6 Contributions of Renewables 141.
United States Department of Energy, Posture Statement and Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Overview
(Washington: COP, 1991) 52-53.
s See Amory Lovins, "Scale, Centralization, and Electrification in Energy Systems." Prepared for the
Future Strategies of Energy Devetopment symposium, Oak Ridge Associated Universities on 20-21 October
1976; and United States Congress, Senate Select Committee on Small Business and Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Alternative Long-Range Energy Strategies 94th Cong., 2d Seas., Serial No. 94.-47 (Statement
and Exhibits of Amory Lovins).
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...the energy problem should be not how to expand supplies to meet
the postulated extrapolative needs of a dynamic economy, but rather
how to accomplish social goals elegantly with a minimum of energy
and effort, meanwhile taking care to preserve a social fabric that not
only tolerates but encourages diverse values and life styles?
Thus Lovins attempted to make the domestic energy system problematic, and to put
the broader goals affected by that system on the table for discussion.
Among other things, Lovins believed the "hard path" strategy to expand energy
supplies by reliance on centralized decisions to construct and manage large-scale,
sophisticated technologies would adversely affect broader social goals. Such
technologies allow little margin for human error, and are vulnerable to massive
disruption from small technical errors or acts of sabotage. For example, a break in
an oil, natural gas, or high-voltage power line can have serious consequences in a
highly-centralized system. Politically, the "hard path" would concentrate power in
the hands of centralized elites and restrict opportunities for ordinary citizens to
participate in making decisions. The "hard path" also would be less economically
efficient, less environmentally benign, and less tolerant of social diversity than the
"soft path."
Lovins believed that the "soft" path could meet our energy needs "elegantly
with a minimum of energy and effort" and without compromising other goals,
including security, democracy, efficiency, environmental protection, and social
diversity. The "soft path" alternative relied on improvements in energy conservation
and efficiency to reduce energy consumption, and on the development of renewable
energy resources (such as solar and low-head hydro) as long-term substitutes for
fossil fuels and nuclear power. The technologies involved are typically easier for the
ordinary citizen to understand and use, and are "appropriate" in that they are
9 Amory Lovins,SoftEnergy Paths:Toward a Durable Peace (San FranciJco:Friendsof the Earth
International, and Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977): 13. See allo, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?"
Foreign Affairs 55 (October, 1976): 65-96, which was the earliest work on the mt_ path to attract a great deal
of attention.
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matched in scale and geographic distribution to end-use needs. Hence they can be
readily adapted to diverse local and regional circumstances through decentralized
decisions made by local, state, and other authorities as well as by private businesses
and households -- all of whom typically have little say in centralized-supply and high-
technology decisions.
Although Lovins' "soft path" attracted a great deal of interest in the Senate
and elsewhere in Washington in the fall of 1976, it was essentially absorbed and
neutralized by the Energy Research and Development Administration and by many
other established interests with a stake in national energy policy. Nevertheless, the
Federal government approved and implemented a variety of means consistent with
the "soft path," for reasons that had more to with energy independence and pork-
barrel politics than with the broad social critique and goals of the "soft path." These
means included regulations to improve the energy efficiency of automobiles,
appliances, and buildings; loans and grants for weatherization of hospitals, schools,
government buildings, and the homes of the low-income and elderly; tax credits for
conservation and the installation of equipment to use various renewable energy
resources, including geothermal, solar, and wind; and grants for state and local
energy programs.
Priorities
The quasi-experiment was biased in favor of the "hard path" strategy. The
consensus goal was clearly energy independence, not the other goals affected by the
effort to achieve energy independence. The effort presumed that the task was to
restore the domestic energy system after the shift in the international control of oil,
not to restructure the domestic energy system to meet other goals as well as energy
needs. The effort to achieve energy independence relied primarily on expanding
centralized sources of supply, and relegated conservation, efficiency, and renewables
to a peripheral position. The Carter Administration's National Energy Plan,
introduced in April, 1977, was less imbalanced with respect to supply and demand
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measures and with respect to fossil and renewable resources, but it also attempted
to centralize more control in the Federal government at the expense of the energy
industries. In the end, much of it was rejected by Congress.
While the general intent was to make the "hard path" work, it is not clear how
much of an advantage "hard path" measures had over "soft path" measures in terms
of concrete help from the Federal government. The analytical problem is formidable
because of the number and variety of actions taken, differences in administrative
effectiveness, and incommensurables. For example, it is difficult to estimate the
worth of the Price-Anderson Act limiting liability for the nuclear industry, compared
to a Federal mandate for states to consider demand-management techniques for
regulated utilities, t° It is beyond the scope of this study to assemble reliable data
on the magnitude of the "hard path" advantage.
However, the Department of Energy's civilian research and development
budget is of some help in this connection, because comparable figures are readily
available, n As shown in Figure 2.2, the total investment increased from 1973 to a
peak in 1981, the last Carter Administration budget. The investment in conservation
and renewables increased from nothing in 1973 to 40.2% of the total in 1981.
Nevertheless, over the period 1974-1981 inclusive, cumulative additional investments
in "hard path" technologies (fossil and nuclear energy and general science) exceeded
cumulative additional investments in "soft path" technologies (conservation and
renewables) by a small amount. The DOE budget for civilian research and
development declined sharply after 1981, as did the funding allocated to research on
soft path energies.
to For an attempt to estimate the dollar value of subsidies to energy sources, see H. Richard Heede and
Amory B. Lovins, "Hiding the True Costs of Energy Sources," The Wall Street Journal (September 17, 1985),
p. 28.
1I R. Sutherland, "An Analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy's Civilian R&D Budget" The Energy
Journal 10 (1989): 36-53.
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The Reagan Administration deemphasized Federal involvement in energy
generally, and in conservation and renewables in panicularJ 2 The Administration
cut personnel assigned to conservation and renewable programs. While Congress
consistently refused to cut appropriations for conservation and renewables programs
as much as the Administration wanted, the Administration did not spend those
appropriations on time and did not keep contracts on schedule. Along with
personnel and budget cuts, the reorganization of DOE eliminated or merged some
offices with conservation and renewable responsibility. :3
II. Results of the Quasi-Experiment
This section examines the results of the quasi-experiment. The hard and soft
path strategies are compared on the basis of how much they contributed to meeting
national energy needs in the decade or more after the first oil embargo. Then each
strategy is examined in terms of some other values at stake in energy policy through
the analysis of cases.
Meeting National Energy Needs
The hard path strategy contributes to meeting national energy needs by
producing additional energy from fossil and nuclear fuels. The soft path strategy
contributes by producing additional energy from renewable energy sources and, more
importantly, through improvements in energy conservation and efficiency.
Conservation and efficiency are contributions in that we meet our national energy
needs without having to consume (or produce) more energy: A barrel of oil saved
is equivalent to a barrel of oil produced. Both conservation and efficiency result in
savings in energy consumption, relative to the amounts that otherwise would have
:=M. Kral_ and R. Axelrod, "Political Constraints on Development of Alternative Energy Sources: Lessons
from the Reagan Administration" Policy Studies Journal 13 (1984): 322.
i_ According to Kra_ and Axelrod, p. 325, theae changes could not be justified aJ "improved management
and decision-making."
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been consumed. However, improvements in conservation stem from a change in
behavior, such as setting the thermostat at a lower level; improvements in efficiency
stem from changes in technology, such as insulation that keeps the indoor
temperature at the same level by burning less fuel.
The contributions of hard path are much easier to estimate than the
contributions of the soft path. One reason is that the data systems of the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) of the DOE reflect and reinforce the hard path
viewpoint; another is that it is easier to track production and consumption through
large, centralized facilities than through small, decentralized facilities which are much
more numerous. For example, the natural gas company can report how many cubic
feet flowed past a meter on a main trunk line, but the homeowner typically does not
know how much natural gas was saved by the passive solar architecture of her home.
Solar and other decentralized sources of additions to energy supply typically show up
as energy savings. In any case, the Federal government has not been particularly
interested in collecting or disseminating information on the soft path. In 1984, the
EIA terminated the serial, Energy Conservation Indicators, but even that publication
did not attempt to estimate the aggregate contribution of conservation, efficiency, and
renewables to meeting national energy needs.
Hence the principal difficulty in assessing the relative contributions of the two
strategies is the lack of a definitive estimate of energy savings. As the first step
toward making an estimate of energy savings, consider a counteffactual question:
How much energy would have been consumed over the period of interest if the
energy crisis and its consequences (including changes in national energy policy) had
not occurred? If this question could be answered, then energy savings could be
calculated as the difference between what would have been consumed and what was
actually consumed according to data from the EIA. The logic is straightforward, but
estimating what would have been consumed requires some assumptions.
As the second step, assume that the energy efficiency (or inefficiency) of the
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U.S. economy in the years before the oil embargo of 1973had remained constant
over the yearsafter the oil embargo. Assumefurther that the appropriate measure
of inefficiency before the oil embargo is the total amount of energy consumedper
constant dollar of grossnational product (GNP). This is a measure of inefficiency
because a higher ratio means that more energy was consumed for each constant
dollar of GNP. With these assumptions, it is easy to estimate what would have been
consumed in post-embargo years if the ratio had remained constant. The logic is
summarized as follows:
If EC_, / GNP, = (EC / GNF).,
Then EC_ = GNFy x (EC / GNP).,
Where
ECy is estimated Energy Consumption in post-embargo year y,
GNPy is observed GNP (constant $) in post-embargo year y, and
(EC / GNP). is observed average inefficiency ratio over pre-embargo
years.
Notice that ECy takes into account the fluctuations in GNT in the post-embargo
period. 1( A smaller GNP means Jess energy consumption; a larger GNP means
more.
As the third step, consider the data necessary to estimate how much energy
would have been consumed without improvements in conservation and efficiency.
Figure 2.3 graphs the EIA time series on Total Energy Consumption per GNP, in
thousands of British thermal units per constant 1982 dollar over the period 1949
through 1973, the pre-embargo years, t5 Notice that the annual ratios vary little
from the trend, and that the trend itself is rather fiat. The minimum ratio is in ; the
maximum is 27.49 in 1970, only 10% more than the minimum. These properties of
the data justify using the average of the annual ratios over the pre-embargo period,
14 See Energy Information Administration Annua/Energy Review 1988 (Washington: GPO, 1989) 291,
for GN'P in constant 1982 dollars.
15 Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1988, Table 8, p. 25.
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Figure 2.3
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26.19 Btus per 1982 dollar of GNP, to estimate how much energy would been
consumed without improvements in conservation and efficiency in the post-embargo
years. These estimates are higher than actual consumption because there were, in
fact, improvements in conservation and efficiency in the post-embargo years. 16
Estimated energy savings in each post-embargo year is simply the difference between
estimated and actual energy consumption for that year.
Figure 2.4 pulls together the contributions of the individual hard and soft path
sources to meeting national energy needs in the post-embargo period, 1974-1986. t7
The additions are calculated by subtracting out the level of the energy source in the
pre-embargo base year, 1973, to emphasize changes after the embargo. Notice that
the "additions" for oil and natural gas are negative, which means that production of
these nonrenewable resources declined. These negatives are set to zero in
calculating total hard path additions, because the declines are picked up in savings,
and therefore should be counted only once. Notice also that hard path additions to
supply come almost entirely from nuclear and coal. Soft path additions come almost
entirely from energy savings.
The results of the quasi-experiment (in terms of meeting national energy
needs) are summarized by comparison of the cumulative additions over the post-
embargo that are attributable to the hard and soft paths respectively. As shown in
the column on the far right of Figure 2.4, cumulative additions attributed to the hard
path are about 70 Quads. Cumulative additions attributed to the soft path are 121
Quads. These cumulative additions are proportional to the shaded areas in Figure
2.5, which graphs the annual additions, by hard and soft path, from Figure 2.4.
Rough as the estimates of energy savings may be, it is clear that the soft path
alternatives contributed more to meeting national energy needs in the post-embargo
period. And the soft path was relatively successful despite the hard path priority of
le For example, the ineftieieucy ratio decreased to 19.95 in 1986.
t7 Energy Information Administration, Table 2, p. 9.
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Figure 2,5
Additions to Supply and Savings
by Hard and Soft Path, 1974-1986
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Federal Energy policy. In effect, the nation sought a hard path solution to its energy
problems after the first oil embargo, but found a solution that was primarily soft
path.
The estimates of energy savings in this analysis fall within the range of other
estimates for all or part of the same period, t8 Other studies attempt to identify the
causes of energy savings. The energy savings estimated by Hirst, Marlay, Greene,
and Barnes are 28 Quads of energy in 1981, 16 Quads from conservation and
efficiency and 12 Quads from slower economic growth. The authors' estimate for
1981 is 11.0 Quads; the difference can be attributed to the fact that Hirst, et 02
consider higher energy prices in their estimates. Schipper, Howarth, and Geller
estimate that 19.7 EJ, or about 18.6 Quads of primary energy were saved in 1987; the
authors' figure for 1987 is 24.5 Quads. The difference is again due to the method of
estimation. Schipper et 02 do not consider changes in energy-use or changes in
energy-using activity as energy savings in their estimates. The Rocky Mountain
Institute (RMI) estimate (graph) shows 27.4 Quads of energy savings in 1987. This
figure is higher than the authors' because RMI uses an energy inefficiency ratio
based on 1973 consumption and GNP to estimate savings after 1973. The Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) estimates 15 Quads of energy were saved in 1985
because of conservation and efficiency efforts, compared to the authors' 21 Quads.
Like Schipper, et at, the OTA distinguishes structural causes of energy savings from
efficiency savings; OTA attributes 9.5 Quads of savings to structural change, bringing
their total estimated savings in 1985 to 24.5 Quads. Causes cannot be specifically
18 See E. Hirst, R. Marlay, D. Greene, and R. Barnes, "Recent Changes in U.S. Energy Consumption:
What Happened and Why" Annual Review of Energy eths. J. M. Hollander, H. Brooks, and D. Sternlight (Palo
Alto, Ca: Annual Reviews Inc., 1983) 193-245; Office of Technology Assessment, Encr_7 Ust and the U.S.
Economy Background Paper (Wa_aington: GPO, 1990); L. Sehipper, R. Howarth and H. Geller, "United
States Energy Use from 1973 to 1987: The Impacts of Improved Efficiency" in Annua/Re_,w ofEnergy eds.
J. Hollander, R. Socolow and D. Sternlight (Palo Alto, Ca: Annual Reviews Inc., 1991) 455-504; and Rocky
Mountain Institute, "U.S. Primary Energy Use: Actual vs. Predicted by GNP" Graph, (Snowmase, Co: Rocky
Mountain Institute, 1990). The methods used include 1) regression and counterfactual of aggregate energy use,
energy prices, and GNP (I-firet, et al.); 2) energy sector disaggregation, factoring of causes, and calculation of
each factor relative to others held constant (Schipper et al.); 3) input-output analysis of energy by sector (OTA);
and 4) scaling GNP by a ratio of 1973 energy consumption to 1973 GNP (Rocky Mountain Institute).
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proven for the savings, but these studies suggest that structural change (from industry
to service-oriented economy), fuel shifting, prices, and conservation programs all
played a role in the consumption changes.
The estimations made here attempt to be conservative. The figures are higher
than the OTA and Schipper figures in part because those analyses do not consider
structural change in energy-using sectors as conservation or efficiency. The accuracy
of the estimates depends on the definition of savings used; here, the definition of
savings associated with the soft path includes structural and societal changes that
impact consumption. Finally, the soft path estimates here are based on an average
ratio of energy inefficiency over the period 1949 through 1973. However, the ratio
actually increased by 1.3% per year over this period. Use of such increases would
have increased the estimated energy savings over the post-embargo period.
Other Values: Hard Path
The comparison of hard and soft path energy should indude those other
values that Lovins made explicit in the 1970s, including those benefits that cannot be
measured and compared in quantitative terms. These include democracy, security,
efficiency, environmental protection, and social diversity. The hard path tends to
compromise these other values, while the soft path does not. Hence the
compromises are unnecessary to some extent. A few examples illustrate the point.
One centralized approach to energy independence was the Alaskan pipeline
to deliver north shore off almost 800 miles to the port of Valdez, from which it could
be shipped to West Coast ports. Although federal approval had been stalled for
environmental and other reasons, the embargo accelerated passage of the Tram-
Alaska Pipeline Authority Act with an exemption from challenges under the National
Environmental Protection Act and with limits on liability for oil spills and other
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potential damage, t9 The pipeline now carries about 1.6 million barrels of oil a day,
compared with U.S. imports of about 6 or 7 million barrels of oil a day. But this
contribution is mitigated by compromises in other values. In the authorization,
national needs as determined by public officials in Washington overrode
environmental and financial concerns of some citizens in Alaska and elsewhere. In
the aftermath, some of those concerns were corroborated by damage from oil spilled
from the breached hull of the Exxon Valdez.
Nuclear power became uneconomical, quite apart from widespread public
objection to nuclear plants or wastes located in the immediate vicinity. By 1975,
orders for nuclear reactors began to drop sharply (28 in 1974, 4 in 1975), and by
1982, 100 reactor orders had been canceled and no new orders have been placed
since then. 2° The net effect is that the operating and planned capacity of the
nuclear industry dropped by half from 1976 to 1986. One nuclear engineer and
planner for a Wisconsin utility learned the lesson. In the mid-1970s, he vigorously
fought proposed state regulations to mandate least-cost alternatives to meet new
electricity demand, because he believed that nuclear power was clearly the best
alternative. Now he endorses such least-cost alternatives as conservation and
efficiency programs for meeting demand, and when new capacity is needed, small,
modular coal-fired plants that can be built in four years. The latter minimize
financial risks.
The Clinch River Breeder Reactor was initiated in 1970 to demonstrate the
potential of nuclear as a source of independent power and to put in place an
industrial base for commercial plants. Like conventional nuclear plants, the breeder
technology also proved to be uneconomical. By 1974, projected costs of the plant
had more than doubled to $1.7 billion, of which the government would pay $1.3
19 For bsckground, see Congressional Quarterly Inc., pp. 6A, 8A-IIA.
United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Nuclear Plant Cancellations:
Causes, Costs, and Consequences (Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 5.
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billion. By 1983,the government had spent $1.5billion on the project and DOE
projected another $1.5 billion from the federal government to complete it.21
Utilities had spent $257 million on the project by 1983and DOE projected their
shareof the completion coststo be about $800million to $900million. While DOE
estimated the total project coststo be $3.6billion in 1983,other estimatesstood at
$8.5billion (GAO). 2_ Other factors, chiefly concern about proliferation of nuclear
weapons, led Carter to attempt the termination of the project during his
administration. The project was becoming technologically obsolete when it was
terminated by the Congressin 1983.
Other Values: Soft Path
On the other hand, different places in the country learned in the 1970s that
decentralized decisions about modest technologies could be cost-effective and
politically feasible. In 1976, the city of Davis, California passed a building code
requiring the use of passive solar in new residences, a move that contractors fought.
The contractors actually endorsed the code as cost-effective after learning to comply
with it and experiencing the results first-hand. Also in 1976, the city of Seattle
decided to rely on conservation and hydroelectric development instead of investing
in the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) to meet its projected power
needs to 1990. This decision was reaffirmed when WPPSS defaulted on $2 billion
in bonds for two canceled nuclear reactors. Scientific and economic research were
insufficient for policy innovation in these cases. Political leadership was necessary
to precipitate a conflict that challenged an obsolete policy consensus and led to a
new policy; and the direct experience of success in implementation was necessary to
include those who had resisted in a new consensus. The primary role of research was
to design promising policy innovations.
21 A. Murray, "Congress Moving to Scuttle Clinch River Breeder Reactor," Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report 21 May 1983: 995.
W. Lanouette, "Dream Machine" l'h¢ Atlantic Monthly 25 (1983): 48.
June 30, 1992 - 54 - Energy Precedent
The economic payoffs of energy efficiency and conservation have been
accepted by the world's largest investor-owned utility, Pacific Gas & Electric in
California. The utility's conservation and efficiency programs saved customers $3.5
billion by avoiding 1,800 megawatts of new power plant construction since 1976.23
Successful experience with the different programs led the utility to testify before
Congress about the potential savings from efficiency and conservation and the
relative cost-effectiveness.
Another utility example illustrates how environmental groups have worked
with utilities at the local level to implement energy saving programs. The
Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) worked with a Vermont utility, Green
Mountain Power, to let the utility earn profit on energy-saving investments, u
Collaborative efforts between the New England Electric System (NEES) and CLF
resulted in the drafting of new regulatory rules that several New England states
adopted. 25 The rules provide incentives to utilities that invest in energy
conservation and efficiency. In California, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC) worked with that state's utilities to develop similar incentives. 26
State public utility commissions have played a large role in bringing least-cost
planning innovations to the attention of their utilities. Altogether, 43 states have
made or are considering changes in electricity regulationfl This represents the
23 Pacific Gas & Electric, Regarding Aspects of a National Energy Strategy Concerning Energy E_ciency,
Renewable Energy, and Compeation Te_imony before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Energy and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 7 March 1991, Unpublished, 1 (Hereafter,
pG,t E).
24 |. Dillon, "Utilities and Environmentalists See the Light: Fighting is lug Waste of Time," Rutland
Herald 17 March 1991: 1.
25 D. Stipp, "Utilities Rush to Profit from Selling Lem," The Wall Street Journal 5 November 1990: BI.
26 Stipp 1]1.
27 Electric Power ReNarch Institute, Status of/east Cost Plannin& in th_ U.S. (Palo Alto, Ca: Electric
Power Research Institute, 1988) cited in R. C. Cavanagh, "Global Warming and [.east Cost Energy Planning,"
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diffusion of conservation, efficiency, and renewables across the state public utility
commissions. The Department of Energy had to respond to the states' efforts by
creating an Integrated Resource Planning program in 1986, which is a minimal
federal commitment but nonetheless helpful.
The diffusion of decentralized energy alternatives does not require mandates
from Washington. The record shows that decentralized energy alternatives proven
in practice tend to be picked up and replicated voluntarily when they are perceived
as better means of meeting requirements by those who have fallen behind the
leaders. However, the diffusion process could be improved significantly if national
leaders directed the nation's attention to the leading examples -- thereby putting
informal pressure on those who have fallen behind to catch up with the leaders or
explain why they can not or should not make the attempt. The federal government
can also relax regulatory barriers to replication of proven alternatives, provide seed
money to innovation, and perform third-party evaluations to warrant that the claims
made leaders do not mislead potential followers. There are still many more gains
in energy efficiency to be realized, according to engineering estimates and the
standards set by other industrial nations? a
IIL Lessons Not Learned
The lessons of the energy crisis apparently have not been learned in the
nation's capital, even though they have been diffusing slowly around the country and
Annual Review of Energy eds. J. Hollander, R. Socolow, and D. Sternlight (Palo Alto, Ca: Annual Reviews
Inc., 1989) 360.
2s One estimate of conservation potential states that if the United States became as energy efficient as
Japan, it would consume half as much energy as it does today and would gross $220 billion annually, with a
net savings of $170 billion. See Arthur H. Rmenfeld and Daniel Hafemeister, "Energy-Efficient Buildings,"
Scientific American 258 (April, 1988): 78-85. Another estimate states that the United States can decrease
energy intensity (1000 Btu/$) by 2.5 percent annually by doubling auto and truck fuel economies; promoting
utility least*cost alternatives; supporting energy efficiency r_ch for induraial application; and improving
building efficiency. The goal of 2.5 percent a year equals the drop in intensity achieved during the 1976-1986.
W. Chandler, H. Geller, and M. Ledbetter, Energy E_ciency: A New Agenda (Springfield, Va: American
Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 1988) 14.
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havereceived some attention consistently over the years from the Energy and Power
Subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representativesfl
Shortly after leaving office in 1981, two energy officials of the Carter
Administration argued the case for centralized energy policy to meet the national
security threat posed by Western dependence on foreign oil. According to the
former Assistant Secretary of Energy for Policy and Evaluation and his principal
deputy, "Energy policy is best dealt with by placing accountability in one place with
capability for policy integration, international coordination, and technical
judgment. "3° Policy on conservation and renewables during the Reagan
Administration seems to have been well-summarized in the title of a 1982 internal
DOE paper: "Current Federal Effort to Deliberately Obstruct Conservation and
Renewable Energy Options in the Development of National Energy Policy". Jl In
the Bush Administration, a draft National Energy Strategy emphasizing conservation
and efficiency was developed under the leadership of Energy Secretary Watkins, but
rejected by the White House. a2 The approved National Energy Strategy emphasizes
nuclear energy.
The evidence of lessons not learned in Washington is more than anecdotal,
however. To test the claim that the hard path dominates, we assumed that more
attention would be paid to the hard path energy sources if they are still considered
the more important. Further, we assumed that coverage of energy issues in the
Washington Post during 1990 was a reasonable sample of the relevant attention
The Subcommittee hearings included 1991 testimony from PG & E, previously cited. For analysis of
the Subcommittee's 1978 hearings on Local Energy Poli¢ieg, _e Ronald D. Brenner, "Decentralized Energy
Policies," Public Policy 28 (Winter, 1980): 71-91.
30 W. W. Lewis and L. P. Silverman, "The Value of Central Managing of Energy," New York 17rues
(March 15, 1981).
31 See T. Hobson, "Current Federal Effort to Deliberately Obela'uct ConJervation and Renewable Energy
Policy," internal DOE paper, 18 November 1982, cited in Kraft and Axelrod.
32 p. Kuntz, "Watkina: Energy C,/asnost," Cotmressional Ouarterlv Weekly Report 2 February 1991: 297.
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frame. Using "energy" and other key words, we retrieved the headlines and lead
paragraphs of over 1,700 articles from the electronic edition. The sample was edited
to eliminate articles that were not relevant to our purpose; for example, articles
about energy problems overseas that made no direct connection to U.S. energy needs
or policy issues. Then we counted the references to hard path and soft path energy
sources that occurred in the sample.
The expectation was that there would be many more references to the hard
path sources because they are still considered more important in Washington. This
expectation was borne out by the data. Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of attention
from January through July 1991 (darker base), the period immediately before the
Iraqis invaded Kuwait and threatened oil supplies. Figure 2.6 also shows the
distribution from August through December 1991 (lighter extension). Clearly,
references to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear predominate. The primary effect of
the invasion was to increase the attention paid to oil. The focus was on increasing
domestic oil production, relaxing offshore oil-drilling regulations, and reopening the
Alaskan Wildlife Refuge for drilling. The pattern of response is reminiscent of the
1973 oil embargo, almost eighteen years earlier.
Conclusion
This chapter contends that the soft path alternatives have met the test of
experience, that the lessons have not been learned in Washington, and that the world
view associated with soft path has hardly been considered. Evidently, Federal energy
policy continues to be grounded less in experience after the energy crisis than in tacit
faith in a world view that supports the hard path and marginalizes or ignores the soft
path. 33
33Ronald D. Brunner, "Global Climate Change: Defining the Policy Problem" Policy Sciences 24 (1991):
291-311.
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Lovins recognized the significance of world views in the energy debate in 1976,
and observed that
Public discourse suffers because our society has mechanisms only for
resolving conflicting interests, not conflicting view of reality, so we
seldom notice that those perceptions differ markedly. 34
Perhaps public discourse can be improved by leadership that refers the claims of
conflicting interests to the test of experience, not tacit faith. And perhaps public
discourse can be further improved by making the tacit faiths explicit, so that
Americans become aware of the differences and have an opportunity to resolve them.
Lovinl, Foreign Affairs 12.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLICY DEBATE
Carolyn M. Hennefeld
Introduction
The policy debate on global climate change is important because it
circumscribes the search for poLicy solutions. Regardless of their potential
contribution to better solutions, ideas left outside the poLicy debate do not have the
opportunity to be assessed and refined through competition that is more than
academic. Nor do those ideas have the opportunity to compete for a political
following. If the limits of the present debate on global climate change constitute the
problem rather than the locus of policy solutions, as contended in Chapter 1, then
the common interest in more rational and democratic policy decisions would be
served by importing some unconventional (if not new) ideas from the academic
hinterlands into the national policy debate in Washington.
The purpose of this chapter is to suggest how to open up the national policy
debate in Washington, and how to make the major conventional ideas controversial
in the process. The first section provides an overview of the debate over the last
several years, emphasizing imbalances and changes in the focus of attention over
time. This clarifies the evolving historical context of potential leadership. The
second section distinguishes conventional and non-conventional ideas on energy
policy within the debate on climate change policy, and provides a critique. This
clarifies the ideas that might be avoided, played up, or added to the debate, and the
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vocabulary with which the ideas might be effectively communicated. Similarly, but
more generally, the third section distinguishes the conventional and non-
conventional cultural ideas within the debate, and provides a critique. In short, an
understanding of the focus and significant content of the debate can be used to
inform efforts by potential leaders to open up that debate.
This chapter is based on new stories, features, opinions, and editorials on
climate change policy that were published in the Washington Post from January, 1986,
through May, 1992. In particular, any piece that mentioned "greenhouse effect,"
"global warming," "climate change," or "global change" was identified by computer
search of the electronic edition, and downloaded for analysis by computer and by
more traditional methods. Of the 602 pieces identified, 148 were excluded from the
text file because they contained little more than a passing reference to "climate
change" or one of the other phrases. This remaining text file consists of 454 pieces
in electronic form. The changes in the number of stories over time is indicated in
Figure 3.1.
The Washington Post is an appropriate source given the purpose of this
chapter. On the one hand, the Post reflects debate on climate change policy by
public officials and others with policy expertise, both in and outside Washington. On
the other hand, the Post helps shape that debate along with many others. It is widely
read within the nation's capital, and it influences reporting and opinions disseminated
more widely through other media, including television. To the extent that there is
such a thing as a "national policy debate," it is carried out primarily in the pages of
the Post and a few other serious national newspapers -- not only in the op-ed pages,
but also in news stories.
I. The Focus ot Attention
As noted above, ideas left outside the focus of attention or relegated to its
margins have little opportunity to be refined through public debate or to attract a
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public following. Given the goal of opening up the debate on global climate change
issues, there is a need to distinguish between conventional and non-conventional
ideas. What is "conventional" or "non-conventional" is an ideal type that exists
nowhere in pure form. Ideal types are nevertheless useful in identifying, classifying,
and clarifying ideas in news and opinion on global climate change issues. The
distinction between centralized and decentralized energy strategies, and between the
cultures associated with each strategy, provide the basis for distinguishing
conventional ideas from the non-conventional. To some extent, however, types must
be constructed and illustrated with examples.
By conventional, we mean reliance on scientific prediction to reduce
uncertainty as a prerequisite for policy action; preoccupation in the short-term with
the economic costs of responding to the threat of climate change; and faith in the
longer term that advanced technological fixes will be adequate to cope with whatever
change occurs. The supporting world-view presumes the human mastery of nature
through science-based technologies, with little regard for possible moral or political
constraints on their use. The world-view also presumes that centralized,
comprehensive decisions are necessary to cope with big (or potentially big) problems
like global climate change -- and that the scientists, economists, and politicians at the
top have the ability to find and implement rational policies of that kind.
By non-conventional, we mean the less visible and less well-developed view
that scientific predictions are neither necessary nor sufficient for national policy
action; that some of the means now available to cope with the threat of climate
change are prudent investments; and that changes in ideas and institutions as well as
technology will be necessary to cope with whatever change occurs. The supporting
world-view presumes that there are ecological limits to the exploitation of nature for
human purposes, and that such limits are worth respecting through moral and
political constraints. It also presumes that in the face of uncertainty and ambiguity,
policy based on multiple, modest, and diverse programs -- and self-correcting on the
basis of experience -- is consistent with our shared aspirations for more rational and
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democratic decisions.
The distinction between the conventional and non-conventionalperspectives
as used here should not be confusedwith popular distinctions, like the distinction
between non-environmentalists and environmentalists or between conservatives and
liberals. As shown below, environmentalists and non-environmentalists alike espouse
both conventional and non-conventional ideas; liberals and conservatives, too, can
be found on both sides of the debate. For example, some liberals and conservatives
believe in relying on advanced technology and on the most knowledgeable experts,
while other liberals and conservatives believe that advanced technology and the
technical experts should play a respected but secondary role. Among the latter, the
liberals have a populist tradition and the conservatives have respect for market
competition and for the states as laboratories.
Key Symbols
To clarify the focus of attention on global climate change issues, we searched
the five and half years of text in our sample for the key symbols of the conventional
and the non-conventional viewpoints. Perhaps the most obvious are "growth" or
"development" or "progress" in the traditional economic sense on the one hand, and
"sustainability" or "stewardship" on the other. Such key symbols are highly concise
references, providing a means of economizing on the number of words used in a
communication. But just what such key symbols refer to is typically unclear; through
association with all kinds of specific references (such as policy proposals that are
allegedly justified by these key symbols) they come to mean almost anything and
everything. For precisely these reasons, key symbols are used to organize a following
behind an ambiguous and open-ended complex of ideas and practices - and for
present purposes, they are useful "markers" for tracking the conventional and non-
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conventional viewpoints in the policy debate. 1
The goal here is to understand how these viewpoints are distributed in the
global warming debate in the Washington Post. Figure 3.2 lists the key words for the
conventional and the non-conventional cultures as well as the total number of times
each one is mentioned in the pieces from the Post. We generated a concordance of
the main cultural markers using the Oxford Concordance Program (OCP); analysis
of the concordance, which provides the word and the text surrounding it, allowed us
to understand how each word was used. Words used by representatives of both the
conventional and the non-conventional perspectives were eliminated from the list.
What remains here in Figure 3.2 are potential key symbols that were clearly used
affirmatively on one side of the debate or the other. The lists separate relatively
specific reference to the energy aspects of global climate change from relatively
general references to culture. In each list, the words are arranged by decreasing
frequency of occurrence in the sample.
Figure 3.2 shows that the conventional perspective on both energy and culture
dominates the agenda in the global climate change issue arena. Ideas from the non-
conventional perspective are eclipsed. A brief description of how the words are used
in context shows why each word belongs to the purview of either the conventional or
the non-conventional side of the debate.
The focus in a majority of the statements about "oil" is on producing more
domestic oil; related topics include calls to rely on the marketplace to help produce
more oil, requests to decrease dependence on foreign oil, and discussions of the
barriers to domestic production, such as limits on offshore drilling and other
environmental restrictions. Some references to non-conventional ideas do appear;
t For more on key symbols, see Walter A. Lippmann, P¢blic Opinion (New York: Free Press,
1965); especially Part 5 on "l'he Making of a Common Will" and pp. 132-133, 150-151. See also Harold
D. LasswelL "Key Symbols, Signs and Icons," Ch. 13 in Symbols and Values: An Initial Study. ed. by
L. Bryson et. al. (New York: Harper 1954), pp. 199-204.
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Conventional Energy
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Figure 3.2
Potential Key Symbols
Non-Conventional Ener_
Conservation 179
Efficiency 166
Solar 131
W'md 32
Renewables 30
Geothermal 21
Hydropower 8
Conventional Culture
National 529
International 335
Growth 228
Plan(s)(ed) 201
Large 195
Development 191
Big 183
Progress 88
Predict 66
Comprehensive 27
Coordinate(d)(s) 21
Centralized 5
Non-(_0nventiQnal Cultur_
Life 170
Small 168
Nature 77
Local 77
Limits 69
Regional 40
Ethic(s)(al) 36
Sustainable(ity) 36
Morai(ity) 25
Evolve(s) (d) (tion) 21
Values 18
Flexible(ility) 16
Steward(s)(ship) 9
Decentralized 1
Source: W_ehington Post, January 1986 - June 1992
these include proposals for carbon taxes, calls to decrease oil consumption, and
highlights the risks associated with oil use. References to "gas" primarily include
optimistic statements about the worth of natural gas (although approximately one-
third of the statements refer to carbon or greenhouse g..__.es, so they do not directly
apply). Natural gas is referred to as being relatively efficient, a relatively low emitter
of carbon dioxide, and environmentally benign; it is also abundant. In general,
statements about natural gas refer to different technologies to develop its use and
increase the use of the fuel.
"Nuclear" energy is considered a benign substitute for fossil fuels; it is linked
with solar and other renewables in the statements. Many statements refer to
developing new nuclear technology, and others refer to nuclear as being necessary--
the only sane alternative. The public's fear of accidents is viewed as irrational.
References are made to how Three Mile Island and Chernobyl doomed the nuclear
industry. The inevitable need for nuclear energy underlies many of the statements.
"Coal" is referred to in conjunction with oil to describe the impact that burning fossil
fuels has on the atmosphere since carbon dioxide is a by-product. About one-third
of the statements are critical of coal as a source of energy; the other statements refer
to ways to make coal more acceptable, by developing clean coal technology, enacting
coal taxes, by stressing the huge reserves found in the U.S.
Increasing "electricity" demand is the underlying assumption of this group of
statements as well. Electricity, not oil, is seen as the growing fuel of the 1990s.
Prices have fallen and there has been a glut of electricity, but this will eventually end
and the country will need new power plants. The statements assume shortages will
occur soon and that electricity demand will continue to grow. On the non-
conventional side, some references are made to opportunities for electric
conservation and the cost effectiveness of investing in efficiency rather than fuels.
On the non-conventional side of the energy debate, the primary symbol is
"conservation;" the message of the statements is primarily that conservation has been
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proven to work and that an energy strategy must include measures to increase
conservation. Automobiles are a prime target for increasing efficiency. A
conservation ethic appears to be on the rise in the country, and ample conservation
potential exists. Several statements point out the down side of conservation, i.e., that
the gains have stopped, the country still needs other sources of energy, conservation
has faded as a national habit, it must be balanced with development, and it is
equated with freezing in the dark, etc. Energy "efficiency" is presented as a cost-
effective way to get more fuel; people are called upon to increase efficiency. The
statements indicate the uncertainty surrounding how to become more efficient,
whether the government should mandate efficiency, and how or if the efficiency
market should be fostered.
The word "solar" is frequently used to explain the greenhouse effect, in that
the atmosphere warms because it traps solar heat. Solar power is referred to as a
renewable fuel; it is used in conjunction with other renewable sources and most of
these statements support increased use of solar, though with few details about how
to foster its utilization. Solar is considered quicker, cheaper and more efficient.
"Geothermal" energy is linked with other renewable sources as alternatives to fossil
fuels; its development in Hawaii highlights some of the conflicts within and between
the conventional and the non-conventional approaches. References are to "hydro"
power do not clearly advocate one position over another. "Renewable" energies are
considered alternatives to fossil fuels and a complement to conservation and
efficiency. The statements refer to research and development of technologies,
indicating that they are still considered as peripheral energy sources. "Wind" power
is categorized with other renewable alternatives as options to fossil fuels.
On the cultural side of the debate, the conventional perspective again
dominates the discussion. Use of the word "national" indicates that, in approximately
one-third of the uses of the word, action is associated with national groups that have
national agendas, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Wildlife Federation, National Research Council, and national laboratories.
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The substantive uses of national occur in themes such as: national agenda, national
energy plan, national leadership, national research concerns, national science policy,
and national scope. Mentions of the word "international" occur with themes such as
conference, agenda, relations, summit, community, coordination, cooperation,
controls, and consensus. The mentions include other countries besides the U.S.,
indicating that a focus on international solutions to the global warming problem is
international itself. Also, two international precedents are mentioned for global
warming, the Montreal Protocol and the Marshall Plan.
The word "growth" tends to be used in conjunction with "increased,"
"economic," and "population." Some statements explicitly describe threats to growth
and the desire to avoid stunting economic growth. Growth is occasionally used in
non-conventional ways in that some writers question the purpose of growth, they ask
how much growth we want, and they contrast growth with sustainability. "Plan" refers
primarily to different proposed plans, for example, a spending plan, the Bush plan,
the Baker plan, the least-cost national energy plan. These plans tend to be described
as comprehensive, long-term, ambitious, concrete, or sweeping. The time frames
associated with some statements are 5, 15, or 25 years. All three roots of the word
hold to the conventional goal of planning or guiding the future. The mentions of
"large" are associated with corporations, expenses, projects, computer simulations,
vehicles, and benefits. One statement advocates overcoming large uncertainties.
"Development" is associated with organizations, primarily international
organizations. The mentions also include the idea of developing consensus, especially
among scientists. Many of the uses of the word discuss research and development,
with the intent of increasing funding for this purpose. Oil development and offshore
development are mentioned, as are the benefits of economic development. Some
statements suggest non-conventional ideas, such as limiting development, accelerating
development of non-fossil fuels, and sustainable development. "Big" is associated
with Big Green (the environmental ballot initiative in California), with companies
and firms, government, deficit, market, and oil. Several statements discuss big cars;
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several issues mention either big global economic issues, big global problems, big
powers, big picture, and big science. Big is also mentioned with job losses and price
tags. One statement suggests the non-conventional view of big, that the lesson of Big
Green is to keep it simple -- the problem was not with green, but big.
More than half of the statements associated with "progress" refer to making
progress toward some goal, typically a research or policy goal. Some statements
associate progress with economic growth, suggesting a narrow conventional under-
standing of progress as being material. One article dissected the concept of progress
from the non-conventional perspective, whereby the notions of narrow economic and
technological growth are questioned. "Predict" is used in the statements as a goal to
be achieved; it is associated with trying to, attempt to, hoped to, and ability to. The
word is also associated with scientists and climatologists who predict, economic
models that predict costs, climate models that predict, and scenarios that predict. A
few non-conventional uses of the word suggest that it is hard to predict, that we do
not know enough to predict, and that the models are not reliable. The word
"comprehensive" is used along with words like strategy, effort, statement, bill,
meeting, and energy strategy. This pattern of use indicates that global warming is
viewed as a comprehensive problem needing comprehensive solutions. Finally,
"centralized _ is not used very often; one statement calls specifically for centralized
authority.
On the non-conventional side of the cultural debate, the majority of
statements containing the word "life" refer to the concept of longevity. Life is also
associated with way of life, life styles, quality of life, how to live. Several of these
phrases are linked with the idea of changing life styles, living less wastefully, and
choices affecting American life styles. The use of %mall" in the text primarily refers
to size. Those mentions that are indicative of a non-conventional viewpoint include
small firms, small cars, and small, widely scattered sources. The text also refers to
making small improvements and _small is beautiful," in the sense that small gestures
are important. _Nature _ in the non-conventional sense is not a force to be overcome,
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but an ongoing system of which humans are part. The use of nature in the text often
refers to nature as such an entity: an independent force, living harmoniously with
nature, the intrinsic worth of nature. Even the conventional statements refer to
nature as an entity, but in the sense of something separate from humans: visitors to
nature, watching nature, manipulation of nature, receiving a blow from nature, and
nature, heavens and God. The non-conventional approach highlights "local"
programs. Local usually appears with actors: officials, governments, citizens,
communities, authorities, economics, regulators, power systems, utilities, and
politicians. Local also refers to problems, implications, processes, and control, which
indicates some attention is being paid to decentralized action. A small number of
statements refer to overriding state and local power, the limits of local, and the
hodgepodge local, state, and federal system.
The concept of "limits" is used with the idea of accepting production limits,
limits on greenhouse emissions, setting safe limits, and limits to tailpipe emissions.
Another non-conventional theme that includes the concept of limits is environmental
and ecological limits. The word "regional" in the text refers to the restricted scope
of global warming problems. Regional is associated with local changes in climate,
with changes in agriculture, with inequities in costs, and with decentralization. Some
statements use regional in a conventional manner, for example, stating that air
pollution is not a regional problem which suggests that regional solutions do not help
solve the problem. Another statement refers to the limits of models in providing
regional detail. The use of "ethic" and its variants is associated with concepts such
as conservation ethic, a new ethic of conservation and stewardship, a land ethic, and
the ethics of ecology. Ethical is associated with corporations and businesses. In the
conventional sense, the word is used to equate business ethics with American ethics,
and to link ethics with bourgeois. The text also refers to Congress and ethics and the
various Ethics Committees. "Sustain" is used mostly as in sustaining economic
growth; sustainable and sustainability refer to a way of life. They are used with
society, development, world, timber industry, energy sources, future, renewable
natural resources to indicate that their consumption should be sustainable.
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The dearest statement on "morality" in the non-conventional sense negated
environmentalism as a morality play -- as the good guys against the bad guys.
"Moral" is associated with the environment in several statements. The larger sense
of the word, however, is that morals are part of the decisions that should be made;
for example, it is not rational or moral to waste oil, a moral obligation and practical
necessity, or a moral lesson. "Evolve" and its variants are used very narrowly to refer
to the development of safety controls, thermometers, a role, and telephones.
"Evolution" is associated primarily with biology. One statement that approximates
the non-conventional viewpoint refers to the American way of life that has evolved.
The word _values" is associated with a few different concepts in the text: values are
associated with the dichotomous choice of individual versus community; debate
should be over values, not programs; narrow utilitarian values should be transcended;
traditional tasks should accommodate environmental values. Some references occur
to traditional and fundamental values, including duty, honor, and social responsibility,
without reference to nature or environment.
"Flexibility" is used in a way that approximates the non-conventional viewpoint.
The statements refer to greater flexibility, a broad range, and diplomatic flexibility.
Both variations are also used with flexible management and work schedules. Most
of the statements using the word "stewardship" refer to nature and therefore reflect
a different view of nature than, for example, domination over nature. The term is
used in conjunction with leadership, indicating that the two are not synonymous. The
key statement using "decentralized" refers to decentralizeu economies as more
efficient.
Finally, the question becomes what the preferred set of markers or key
symbols are, given that we hope to open up the debate between the conventional and
the non-conventional perspectives. Growth and development represent key symbols
for the conventional culture; the antithetical key symbols for the non-conventional
culture are sustalnability and stewardship. What is missing from the debate that
could help people understand the distinction between the two world-views is a
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conceptualization about the level where decisions are to be made, i.e., whether to
rely on centralized approaches or decentralized ones.
Ordinary Symbols
To understand the evolution of the debate, it is useful to track the usual
clutter of ordinary symbols (apart from key symbols) at the focus of attention. This
section tracks changes in the focus of attention over time in the policy debate on
global climate change. Newspaper stories from the Washington Post were analyzed
from June 1986 to May 1992. For this part of the analysis monthly word frequency
lists were generated using the Oxford Concordance Program (OCP) on the
Washington Post database. These ranked frequency lists display the most commonly
used words in descending order. The lists indicate what the focus of attention is and
how it changes over time. The words in each monthly list were categorized according
to whether they were an actor, an arena or a central issue. This was done to foster
comparative analysis and clarify the changing nature of the debate. The lists are
reproduced in the Appendix of this chapter.
An analysis of the Post stories on climate change indicate that the
debate is characterized more by continuity than by change. From June 1986 to April
1991, the debate remained relatively stable with only occasional deviations in the
focus on attention. In general, the debate is characterized by the conventional
approach, which focuses on action at the national and international levels and seeks
centralized solutions based on scientific and technological expertise. In May 1991,
however, a significant shift in the focus of attention began. This second interval is
characterized by an opening up of the debate on global climate change and the
introduction of new ideas, actors, arenas. Yet this new phase in the debate was
stifled when attention turned to the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in June
1992, because the debate reverted to a focus on international, coordinated action.
The overall trend in the focus of attention, therefore, points to paralysis and
stagnation in defining and analyzing the issues surrounding global climate change.
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June 1986
Figure 3.3
Example of Stable Core in the Focus of Attention
November 1988 July 1989 I July 1990 January. 199l
Research 4
Actors Actors Actors Actors Actors
Scientists 10 President 17 Bush 39 Bush 72 Nations 14
United States 9 Bush 10 Brady 21 United States 41 Administration 6
NASA 8 Reagan 8 President 20 Nations 33 Bush 6
Senate 5 Adviser 6 Leaders 19 Countries 32 United States 6
A_tration 4 Companies 6 Nations 18 President 31 Adelman 5
Countries 4 Administration 5 United States 18 Administration 28 Companies 5
Arenas Arenas Arenas Arenas Arenas
World 5 American 8 Economic Summit 47 Environmental 64 World 16
Global 4 Federal 8 Environmental 27 Summit 60 Gulf 8
Scientific 4 National 8 World 21 World 34 Market 8
Space 4 State 7 Space 18 Soviet 33 National 5
Government 6 American 17 West 30
Topics/Issues Topics/Issues Topics/Issues Topics/Issues Topics/Issues
Greenhouse 11 Science 24 Environment 19 Tax 66 Energy 39
Warming 9 Deficit 15 Debt 18 Carbon Dioxide 54 Oil 3_
Temperatures 8 Oil 12 Energy 18 Global Warming 54 War 21
Pollutants 7 Gas 10 Timber 15 Economic 46 Global Warming 16
Atmosphere 6 Research 9 Earth 14 Trade 46 Tax 15
CFCs 6 Tax 9 Trade 14 Energy 37 Price 13
Carbon Dioxide 5 Technology 9 Money 12 Greenhouse 30 Atmosphere 9
Change 5 Dollar 8 Global Warming 11 Emissions 28 Policy 9
Energy 5 Nuclear Power 7 Forest 10 Plants 28 Effidency
Climate 4 Trade 7 Plan 10 Environment 27 Growth
It remains to be seen where the debate will go from here.
The overall debate on global climate change (June 1986 to April 1991) is
represented by a stable core of conventional actors, arenas and ideas; some sample
monthly lists can be found in Figure 3.3. A major component of the stable core
focuses on national and international action. The stable core is defined by the
following actors: President Bush, White House, administration, United States,
nations, countries, Congress and 'the Senate. President Bush (or the Bush
Administration) is the single most important actor throughout this period. Scientists,
researchers and industry also play a prominent role in the debate, as does William
ReiUy, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator. The emphasis is on
politics, politicians, and scientists to provide direction for global climate change
policy. The core arenas of action on global climate change policy are also
characterized by this centralized, top-down approach. They include: world, national,
global, government, American, environmental, scientific, international, federal, public,
Washington.
The emphasis on scientific and technological expertise in the debate is seen
in the types of issues being discussed as weft. Conventional energy sources (oil,
nuclear, coal, natural gas, fuel) dominate the focus of attention, as do conventional,
scientific definitions of global warming. Leading issues include: science, greenhouse
effect, global warming, carbon dioxide, CFCs, ozone, temperatures, emissions,
methane, gases. The focus is on increasing energy supplies to meet increased energy
demands, rather than decreasing demand; the discussion centers on budgets, costs,
economics, and resources. Policy and program are also primary topics of discussion
in addition to treaty, reinforcing the tendency to use centralized approaches to solve
complex, decentralized problems.
Deviations in the stable core occurred under one of two conditions. First, the
focus of attention shifts from one set of conventional issues to another set of other
conventional topics, such as the Presidential election, or. second, a non-conventional
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understanding of the problem gains enough prominence in the debate to compete
(however temporarily) with the conventional definition of climate change policy.
Although these events constitute deviations from the norm, they do not as yet
represent sustained policy shifts in the focus of attention; examples of these
deviations can be found in Figure 3.4. An example of the first condition is the 1988
presidential election campaign between Michael Dukakis and George Bush. During
September and October of 1988 there was an emphasis on Democratic presidential
candidate Dukakis and his support for environmental regulations to reduce acid rain
and pollution. Media coverage of his political campaign briefly opened up the
debate on climate change policy. Although Dukakis served as a new actor in the
global warming debate, attention on his campaign was short-lived; after December
of 1988 Dukakis disappeared from the political debate.
A second type of deviation from the norm occurred when the non-
conventional approach to climate change policy gained prominence for a brief period
in the focus of attention. Examples of this type of deviation include coverage of the
twentieth anniversary of Earth Day in April 1990, where issues like environmental
pollution, diapers, and population growth gained a lot of attention. Perhaps the
greatest deviation in the stable core occurred in August and September of 1990 when
voters in California were asked to decide about the Big Green ballot initiative
(Proposition 128). For the first time, voters and people appeared among the top five
policy actors of the monthly word lists. Media coverage of Big Green coincided with
a focus on conservation, efficiency and opinion polls on climate change policy, rather
than a technical discussion of CFCs or energy resources. In each of these deviations
from the stable core, the focus of attention remains global and seeks centralized
solutions (treaties, political initiatives, etc) to remedy the policy problem. A
sustained shift from the stable core would entail a downsized, decentralized approach
to global climate change policy.
A significant shift in the focus of attention began in May, 1991, and continued
through May, 1992. This shift can be characterized as an opening up of the debate
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September 1988
Actors
Bush 33
Reagan 15
Figure 3.4
Deviations in the Focus of Attention
October 1988 April 1990 ] August 1990
Actors Actors
Dukakis 30 Bush 29
Bush 29
Actors
61 Hayden
Pcople 48 Industry 11
Lovejoy 45 Voters 11
United States 29 Administration 10
Smithsonian 25 People 10
Military 24 Presidcnt 10
State 10
Arenas Arenas
Administration 12 EPA 17
Dukalclx 12 Environmentali 13
NASA 11 State 12
Astronauts 10 Mitchel 9
Arenas Arenas
Space 47 Environmental 12 Environmental 30
Detroit 15 Global 12 World 16
Environmental 15 Government 12 Global 13
American 13 Federal 11 National 7
Public 13 Public 8
Topics/Issues Topics IssuesTopics/Issues
Shuttle 22 22
Global Warming 8 Global Warming
Energy Earth Day 43
Pollution 20 Oil 15 Air 31
Acid Rain 17 Environment 9 Energy 22
Air 16 Pollution 9 Environment 19
Cars 15 Water 9 Gas 16
Environment 15 Acid Rain 8 Pollution 14
13Gas 15
Challenger 13
Nuclear 13
Program 13
Air 7 Diapers
Campaign 7 Planet
PopulationCompromise 7
113 Environmental
55 National
47 Global
27 California
Topics/Issues
74 Energy
38 Oil
37 Initiative 128
33 Campaign
31 Big Green
30 Conservation
30 Support
28 Efficiency
28 Bill
27 Poll
12
11
11
on global climate change. There is a distinctive move away from President Bush and
his administration during this period and increased attention on local strategies and
individuals. Prominent arenas of action include local government, home, kitchen,
state government, and the European community. The policy actors also changed so
that focus on the President decreased while Hollywood actors (e.g., actor Ted
Damon), environmental groups (such as the Environmental Defease Fund), and
ordinary citizens who have found ways to remodel their homes to promote harmony
with nature all made their way into the top of the focus of attention during this
period. The 1992 Presidential campaigns also shifted attention to Democratic
presidential contenders Paul Tsongas and Bill Clinton. It is questionable, however,
how permanent this change in the debate will turn out to be. In April and May 1992,
with the approach of the Earth Summit in Rio, the focus of attention diverted from
discussion of these decentralized, non-conventional approaches back to centralized
arenas and scientific issues.
II. Energy
This section illustrates conventional and non-conventional ideas on energy
policy as expressed in the pages of the Washington Post, and then provides some
comments and suggestions.
Conventional Perspectives
Representatives of the conventional perspective on energy policy tend to be
skeptical of public participation, in part because they fear that citizens will be unable
to make informed decisions on complex, technical issues and will not make the
'correct' decision. In September 1989, the Washington Post reported on the
Department of Energy's (DOE) decision to help finance the design of a new type of
nuclear reactor that would be smaller and more standardized than existing nuclear
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power plants. 2 In this same article, the Post also disclosed that:
In a parallel effort to make it cheaper and easier to construct nuclear
power plants, the NRC has changed its rules to consolidate the
licensing process, merging the construction permit and the operating
license approval into one phase. This could save years in the complex
licensing process, but it has been criticized...by environmentalists, who
have challenged the new rules in court, as cutting out citizen
participation at a critical phase of the licensing procedure)
These two steps were described as necessary by the Bush administration in order "to
keep the 'nuclear option' alive, _ despite citizen opposition to having nuclear plants
sited in their neighborhoods and despite questions about the viability of the nuclear
industry on economic grounds.
No commercial nuclear power plant has been ordered in the United
States since 1978. Utility companies and Wall Street investors have
sunk billions of dollars into constructing plants that have never
operated, such as Shoreham on Long Island and Seabrook in New
Hampshire..?
The Bush administration nonetheless proposed funding research through DOE into
the new types of reactors.
Skepticism about public judgments takes many other forms. One columnist
pointed out that if plants like Shoreham or Seabrook do not go on line, then
residents and businesses in those areas will face higher prices for electricity; people
"want cheap electricity without accepting the need for new plants. No one wants to
pay the higher electric rates that might spur conservation and depress demand. _
Another writer, in an op-ed piece that appeared in the Post in 1988, echoed this
skepticism about citizens' ability to do the right thing regarding energy use:
z 09-06-89 Lippman "Energy Dept. to Finance Design of New Reactor; $50 Million Contract to
Westinghouae Would Help Revive U.S. Nuclear Power Industry"
3 Lippman, ibid.
4 Lippman, ibid.
5 Lippman, _id.
6 12-21-88 Samuelson "Bhckouts Coming?" The Washington Post made a similar point in a later
editorial, 4-24-89, "The Consequences of Shoreham"
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What needs to be said and done is historically unpopular. During the
1973-75 oil crisis, the two types of proposals that attracted the angriest
mail from normally civilized, decent Americans were those that would
have raised the price of gasoline and those to increase the number of
U.S. nuclear power plants. 7
In a similar vein regarding oil development policy after Iraq invaded Kuwait, one
Senator showed similar skepticism about public participation when he proposed an
amendment that was:
approved in a late-night session after virtually no debate, [that] would
grant the president far-reaching power to bypass environmental
restrictions [i.e., drill in environmentally sensitive areas, like the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge or off the coast of Santa Barbara] if oil
imports exceed 50 percent of U.S. consumption, s
Consistent with this apprehension that citizens will not make the 'correct'
decisions, the conventional culture focuses on the need for centralized,
comprehensive policies incorporating the wisdom of the experts. In 1988, two
separate bills were proposed to reverse global warming. 9 The Washington Post
described these two pieces of legislation; "taken together, the measures would impose
strict controls on everything from automobile exhaust to home furnaces, redesign
landfills, eliminate [CFCs] and effectively discourage use of coal... "_° Furthermore,
reminiscent of President Carter's comprehensive approach to energy policy in 1977,
one bill "calls for a 'Least-Cost National Energy Plan' to be devised by the
government... "n One Senator who had sponsored this legislation repeated his
appeal directly to the public in an op-ed piece that appeared in the Post in 1990:
7 10-19-88 Zarb "Ignoring the Energy Issue: How Soon We Forget'. Frank Zarb served as Federal
Energy Administrator from 1974 to 1977.
' 08-21-90 Weisakopf and Lancuter "Environmentalists Fear Setback to Efforts; Oil Shocks of '70s Put
Pressure on Clean Air Advocates, but Movement is Stronger Now"
9 07-29-88 Weisskopf "Two Senate Bills Take Aim at 'Greenhouse Effect"; Senators Tim Wirth (D-Colo.)
and Robert Stafford (R-Vt.) propmed the two pieces of legislation.
to Weisskopf, ibid.
n Weisskopf, ibid.
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We must develop a comprehensive national energy policy that makes
reduction of greenhouse gases and air pollutants a national objective.
• . Global environmental ills have replaced the Cold War as the
greatest threats to international security, and we do nothing. We must
change course. 12
Many other environmentalists tend to agree; in fact, one "said it is important...to
impose controls on industry so they will know 'what our long-term goals are. '''13 The
wisdom of the experts is assumed and the magnitude of the threat is taken as
sufficient justification for their central role.
The politicians who supported these bills assume that a top-down, command-
and-control response is essential to elicit the appropriate behavior from industry and
citizens. One consequence of demanding a comprehensive, national approach,
however, is that deadlock is a frequent outcome, meaning that, ultimately, little
action is taken. Even the two Senators who proposed the global warming bills
recognized this. "[T]he bills trample on so many interest groups that neither of the
chief sponsors...expect to achieve anything more than committee hearings in the
remaining months of the current Congress. "_4 Similar frustration is likely when the
focus of attention is on eliciting international cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
Finally, theconventional political approach to energy tends to regard
international cooperation as necessary before any action can be taken by the United
States, despite the certainty that if the U.S. alone were to reduce its own emissions,
the level of greenhouse gases would be less than they otherwise would have been.
Typifying this expectation was an editorial that ran in the Washington Post: "Speaking
n 02-20-90 Wirth "Hotter and Hotter in the Greenhouse"
13 Weisskopf, 07-29-88, o__. tit.; the person quoted is Michael Oppenheimer of the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF).
_* Weisskopf, 07-29-88, .9._. cir. Other writers in the Post sample agree that national action is
unlikely. 06-12-86, Washington Post editorial, "The Warming Trend'; 12-21-88, Samuel.son, "Blackouts
Coming?"
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of international cooperation, it will be central to any realistic attempt to control
greenhouse warming. ''ts This sentiment was echoed during the 1988 presidential
election campaign when both Michael Dukakis and George Bush were reported as
favoring an international approach:
Dukakis would seek...international solutions to the problem [of global
warming]. Bush would have the United States take a leadership role
and convene an international summit to address the problem, t6
The conventional culture also tends to scale up economic threats posed by any
significant change. For example, the pressure to increase energy efficiency seems to
fall most heavily on one industry--requiring the domestic automakers to improve
automobile fuel economy--and therefore concentrates the costs. The automakers, as
might be expected, oppose such proposals. In 1989, the Bush administration
proposed raising the CAFE standards from 26.5 miles per gallon (mpg) to 27.5 mpg
for 1990. The Washington Post covered the Senate hearings that were held to study
the recommendation; one argument put forth by an industry representative against
the proposed change was the conventional refrain that Americans must choose
between protecting jobs and protecting the environment.
[F]ormer transportation secretary James Burnley... proposed that
Congress eliminate CAFE altogether on the grounds that it was 'a
dinosaur that should be extinct' and that it was a 'perverse law' that
would 'ship American automobile workers' jobs out of this country. 't7
Later that month, in a Washington Post editorial that supported the increase in the
CAFE standards, the editorial staff presented the auto industry's side.
The U.S. [auto] industry responds.., that higher [CAFE] standards
would produce little environmental and other gain at enormous cost
(assuming once again that they could even be achieved), and that it is
unfair to put the whole burden of energy conservation on a single
t_ 08.14-88 Washington Post Editorial, "Greenhouse Heat..."
t6 10.03-88 Weisskopf "In Evaluating Bush and Dukakis, Environmentalists Turn to 1983"
t, 05-03-89 W. Brown "Fuel-Economy Change has Detroit Shifting Gears; New Policy May Force
Redesign of Auto Lines"
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sector of the economyso besetby foreign competitionfl
Once again, the industry's stance represents the conventional belief that any
significant environmental action would be very costly for the economy.
Some proponents of energy efficiency also emphasize the conventional idea
that environmental action would be costly. Some environmentalists claim that
avoiding catastrophe would require a complete restructuring of the economy, as well
as of political institutions. Both of the bills proposed in the Senate in 1988 called for
national action on the issue and "set the price of avoiding the potentially catastrophic
results of the 'greenhouse effect' at nothing less than fundamental changes in the
U.S. economy. ''19 The ultimate effect of such far-reaching assertions, whether the
calls are made to encourage or to discourage environmental action, is to reinforce
the status quo since the demand for a comprehensive approach tends to accomplish
little in the way of producing actual policies. The political system is designed to
resist such an approach.
The automobile industry is not the only sector that stands to lose over the
issue of energy use. Whereas the nuclear power sector and the natural gas industry
have recognized potential business advantages in global warming, 2° representatives
of some of the more vulnerable industries--like the coal industry--see only harm if
proposals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions gain credence. They have called
upon other conventional ideas to bolster the status quo and resist changing current
energy practices. One of the main approaches is to argue that the high degree of
scientific uncertainty surrounding the extent and regional impacts of potential climate
change precludes rational policy-making. In the same Washington Post article that
L, 05-23-89 Washington Post editorial "Clean Air Per Gallon"
19 07-29-88 Welsskopf, .9.R. tit. ('Two Senate Bills Take Aim at 'Greenhouse Effea")
a_ "Natural gas producers and nuclear power interests aren't being crass about it, but they see what
may be a small silver lining for them in the thickening cloud of carbon dioxide around the earth..." 07-
22-88 Hamilton "Natural Gas Backers See Opportunity in Concern Over Greenhouse Effect"
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described the opportunities that the threat of climate change presented for nuclear
and natural gas interests, a vice president of the National Coal Association was
quoted as saying:
We think it would be incredibly shortsighted to begin to base energy
policy on perceived or alleged or anticipated environmental problems
that may be forty or fifty years away - in particular, in the greenhouse
areas where there is substantial scientific uncertainty. 2t
A spokesperson for the Electric Power Institute sounded a similar note: "'With that
kind of uncertainty, the managers of the industry really have no basis for planning
their plants, their production facilities' around the expected impact of the greenhouse
effect. "22
The conventional culture often assumes that the projections made by
scientists, economists, and other experts are dependable. In an early Washington Post
editorials on the issue, the editors claimed that "[i]f the present projections are
correct, danger lies ahead within the lifetime of most of the world's present
population. "23 Yet, they did not consider whether present projections were correct,
and there is an historical basis for skepticism that they are correct. Similarly,
representatives of the conventional culture tend to absorb or avoid uncertainty, rather
than address it head on.
According to scientists, greenhouse gases will trap so much heat by the
middle of the next century that world temperatures will rise as much
as eight degrees...A NASA scientist [James Hansen] testified in
Congress last month [June 1988] that...the global warming trend is so
hard to reverse that Stafford's ambitious measures could cut only one
or two degrees out of the expected eight-degree rise. 24
Yet, how do they know? On what basis do they make this claim? How can we know
that they know? The conventional culture invests more faith than reason in these
2L Hamilton, ibid.
" Hamilton,ibid.
"_ 06-12-86 WasMngton Post editorial, "The Warming Trend"
u 07-29-88 Weisskopf "Two Senate Bills Take Aim at 'Greenhouse Effect"
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experts and their projections.
The conventional culture frequently attempts to separate values from facts;
science is often viewed as existing in a separate sphere, independent of politics. The
Washington Post ran an op-ed piece on the debates over star wars [space weapons]
and nuclear power. The authors argued that both issues "should be discussed on
their technological merits and political polarization on these two issues is
deplorable...We...urge that the discussion avoid polarization for narrow political
ends. "25 They apparently assume that political polarization is a deplorable
interference with the technological merits, rather than a valuable means of bringing
the issues to the public.
Representatives of the conventional culture decry people's irrational behavior.
One advocate of nuclear power to cut dependence on fossil fuels disparaged people's
fear of nuclear technology and its attendant risks.
Coal miners routinely die of black lung disease and mine disasters.
Within a week of [New York's attempt to close the] Shoreham [nuclear
power plant by refusing to comply with the NRC's evacuation
requirements], 51 German coal miners died of suffocation in a mine
accident. (By comparison, 33 people died at Chernobyl.) 2_
Later, in the wake of the March 1989 Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, this same writer again demonstrated a failure to empathize with people's
fears. "Three Mile Island [was] the nuclear disaster that killed no one. The resulting
panic, however, doomed American nuclear power [which] has made inevitable an
increase in oil and coal use. "27 Finally, he criticized citizens for what he perceived
to be their irrational aversion to risk; "rhe Valdez disaster represents America's
attempt to export risk. The only reason we are now so upset is that this time we did
" 09-16-88 Bethe and Seaborg "Star Wars No, Nuclear Power Yes: Don't Let Politics Confuse the
Issues'; Hans Bethe is a former Cornell physics professor who helped develop the atomic bomb and
Glenn Seaborg served as Atomic Energy Commission chairman.
" 06-17-88 Krauthammer "Killing Nuclear Power'
z7 03-31-89 garauthammer "We Make Oil Spills Inevitable."
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not export it quite far enough. "28
The conventional culture views technology as a solution to society's problems,
even when the effluents of technology are recognized as the source of the problem.
A case in point occurs in an early Washington Post editorial on the climate change
issue that provided a technical diagnosis of the problem and proposed a technical fix:
global warming is "the result of air pollution - a massive accumulation of carbon
dioxide...It's a powerful argument for increased reliance worldwide on nuclear
power. "_ The belief that technological fixes can get us out of this predicament is
fairly widespread. In 1991, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, two
environmentalists separately wrote op-ed pieces in the Washington Post. Both pieces
were critical of different aspects of the ad hoc energy policy then in effect, but
nonetheless both drew upon the technological prowess exhibited in the Gulf War as
the standard to which automobile makers should be held. One writer criticized
domestic automakers because they claimed that they could not raise auto fuel
efficiency standards much higher.
With the Gulf War providing an unforgettable demonstration of just
how sophisticated and effective American technology can be when we
try, the argument that 27 mpg [miles per gallon] is the best we can do
sounds a little lame even to Detroit's ear) °
Another environmentalist wrote an op-ed piece criticizing a bill pending in the
Senate that would open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge up to oil exploration and
drilling. He, too, invoked the performance of American military technology during
the Persian Gulf War to call on Detroit to improve automobile efficiency.
The Gulf War put America's technological prowess on display. Mean-
while, back home, the Big Three auto companies say they can't build
cars that average 40 miles per gallon...The auto industry can build cars
" Krauthammer, ibid.
29 06-12-86 WP "The Warming Trend"
03-08-91 JTMathews "High Mileage and the 'Safety Excuse"; Jessica Mathews is vice president
of the World Resources Institute and also writes a regular column for the Post.
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as smart as our bombs. "3_
Proponents of energy technology in the conventional culture tend to focus on
the large-scale, centralized energy sources. Nuclear energy receives a high degree
of support. In one op-ed piece, the writer claimed that "of all the major power
sources, nuclear power is on balance the most environmentally benign. "32 The
Washington Post, too, continued to promote nuclear power.
Any rational strategy has to begin with much more serious
conservation than Americans are now practicing. But it has to include
power generation that doesn't require combustion, and that means
both solar and nuclear energy) 3
Conservation, on the other hand, tended to be a more peripheral consideration,
which the Washington Post editors acknowledged. "The warming trend gives further
urgency to energy conservation, a cause that has become less fashionable in a time
when oil tanks are full to the brim. "34 The Washington Post reported that DOE
"programs to boost conservation and explore renewable and alternative energy
sources...have been especially hard hit by budget cutbacks... "35 Others thought that
conservation would never he able to cut energy usage by enough to ha/t or reverse
potential climate change. "To say that conservation is the solution is disingenuous.
No industrial society is in any position to cut down its energy use by a third. It's 95
degrees. Which of the Luddites is willing to shut off his air conditioner? "3_
Lifestyles and living standards are viewed as threatened by global warming.
31 04-21-91 Frampton "Putting Energy Policy on Ice; Arctic Drilling May Be Long on Oil, But It's
Short on Vision"
06-17-88 Krauthammer "Killing Nuclear Power"
33 11-25-88 Washington Post editorial, "Mr. Reagan and the Reactors"
06-12-86 Washington Post editorial, "The Warming Trend"
02.22-89 Peterson "Watkins Facing Knotty Problems at DOE; Oil Imports, Greenhouse Effect,
Acid Rain Among Concerns"
06-17-88 Krauthammer "Killing Nuclear Power"
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They represent another aspect of the status quo that the conventional culture seeks
to protect, more by reflex than by conscious reflection on their realism and worth.
One op-ed writer was worded about protecting them when he wondered whether
energy sources
will be adequate to fulfill all our needs without jeopardizing our inde-
pendence, our environment, the standards of living of each and every
American?...Perhaps [the] most important [lesson of the energy crisis]
is that our nation's energy policy has the potential to affect the daily
lives of each and every American, today and for generations to
come j7
A Washington Post report about the problems facing James Watkins at the
Department of Energy as he became Secretary of Energy echoed the sense that
lifestyles are threatened. "Both [global warming and acid rain] are environmental
problems linked to the burning of fossil fuels...and resolving either is almost certain
to entail large scale changes in the way the world uses its traditional energy
resources. "3s The conventional culture perceives energy conservation as requiring
undue sacrifice.
'It's a sort of unfortunate backlash that has happened - that energy
conservation was equated with freezing in the dark,' said Robert K.
Watson, an energy resource specialist for the Natural Resources
Defense Council. 'Unfortunately people are not willing to give up
amenities right now. They're going to force our kids to do that. '39
The conventional culture tends to be silent about moral constraints and issues.
For example, economic growth is prized without really considering what continued
growth means. One op-ed writer asked "Will America have the energy it needs to
37 10-19-88 Zarb "Ignoring the Energy Issue: How Soon We Forget"
02-22-89 Peterson "Watkins Facing Knotty Problems at DOE; Oil Imports, Greenhouse Effect,
Acid Rain Among Concerns." In fact, part of the resistance to the global warming bills proposed by
Senators Wirth and Stafford stemmed from "complaints that [Stafford's] bill 'demands too much in a
few places' and would drastically alter American life styles..." (ff'/-29-88 Weisskopf "l'wo Senate Bills
Take Aim at 'Greenhouse Effect").
08-12-90 Hamilton & Brown "Conservation Complacency in the U.S.; Desire to Reduce
Consumption Waned as Prices Showed Stability"
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ensure future economic growth? '_° without also asking what the other value
consequences of increased energy use might be. A much stronger sense of the
morality of the conventional culture came through in a Washington Post report about
the political responses to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Two Senators
sought to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration and drilling;
one Senator was quoted as saying, "'If we're willing to risk American lives to protect
a source of foreign imports, we certainly ought to be able to risk environmental
consequences to develop' domestic sources. '_t Economic growth is an important
goal in the conventional culture. The conventional side of the energy and global
climate change issues, therefore, involves taking a centralized approach, is skeptical
of public participation, focuses on eliciting national and international cooperation
before taking action, and puts pseudo-rationality, economic growth, and technology
before the environment.
Non-Conventional Perspective
The political approach pursued by representatives of the non-conventional side
of the energy debate is quite different. The starkest example that highlights these
differences occurred when Department of Energy Secretary James Watkins
announced in July 1989 the steps he would take to prepare the National Energy
Strategy requested by President Bush. His strategy embodied democratic ideals since
he sought input from citizens as well as from a variety of interest groups.
Watkins has scheduled public hearings at cities throughout the country
to hear what scientists, industry officials, political leaders, economists,
environmentalists and ordinary citizens want to do about energy and
environmental policy... Watkins said.., that if hearings show that
rejection of nuclear power 'is the consensus of the responsible people
_* 10-19-88 Zarb "Ignoring the Energy Issue: How Soon We Forget"
4_ 08-21-90 Weisskopf and Lancaster "Environmentalists Fear Setback to Efforts; Oil Shocks of '70s
Put Pressure on Clean Air Advocates, but Movement is Stronger Now'; the two Senators were Ted
Stevens (R-Alaska), and his colleague, Senator Frank Murkowsid (R-Alaska).
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of this country, then that's the way the report's going to come out. '42
Yet Watkins' approach went against the grain of much that had transpired at
the national level regarding the development of nuclear energy up until that point.
The federal government had been pushing nuclear power. Many local and state
officials, however, opposed the impending start-up of new nuclear power plants,
especially Shoreham and Seabrook; opponents tried to block the opening of these
two plants by refusing to conduct the evacuation exercises required by NRC
regulations. 43 In frustration, the Reagan administration ordered the NRC to
circumvent the requirement for local evacuation plans, despite local resistance. _4
The Washington Post editorial staff recognized that if the federal government
continued to override local wishes, its actions would ultimately increase resistance
and be self-defeating. 45 Indeed, the NRC further alienated state and local officials,
whose resistance increased and led some to demand decentralized control. For
example, New York Governor "C'uomo is incensed at the federal intervention on
safety plans. He says that if NRC believes nuclear power plants are safe, they should
do away with the evacuation plan requirements. "_ Governor Cuomo negotiated
with the Long Island Light Company to close and decommission the Shoreham
nuclear power plant, a deal that was awaiting approval from the New York State
legislature at that time/7
,a 07-27-89 Lippman "Watkins to Design National Energy Strategy;, Secretary Plans Series of
Hearings to 'Listen to Everybody' on Environmental Concerns"
_3 06-17-88 Krauthammer "Killing Nudear Power"
44 01-05-89 McGrory "Double Trouble for Nuclear Foes"
45 11-25-88 Washington Post editorial, "Mr. Reagan and the Reactors'; "the whole history of the
nuclear industry is a warning that overriding local fears and opposition will not, in the long run, build
public support for reactors."
01-05-89 McGrory ot_. cit.
McGrory, ibid.
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Representatives of the non-conventional culture advocate a decentralized
approach to energy policy. One op-ed piece in by the Post called for a more flexible
approach to regulations on a state-by-state basis. 48
State-by-state emission caps should be adopted, and states should be
given flexibility to use a broad range of cost-effective tools to meet
their goals ...Establishing absolute caps on statewide emissions would
force states to consider longer-term issues related to growth, land use
and local economics. 49
While acknowledging that a role for government exists, the authors of this op-ed.
piece would not have the federal government dictate to states and localities how they
should meet the standards set by the federal government. This allows local officials
to enact measures that are suitable to the climate, business needs, population, and
infrastructure in each area.
The Washington Post's national news coverage in 1990 and 1991 provided
examples where states or local utilities took leading roles in developing alternative
energy sources.
Many states have been particularly aggressive in promoting and
developing energy efficiency and in funding research into alternative
energy sources than the federal government has been...Arizona [for
example] has spent $500 million on energy projects, including a 4,000-
home solar development on state land. _
In May 1991, Southern California Edison and the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power announced plans to cut their carbon dioxide emissions by conserving
energy, developing renewable sources, and by switching away from fossil fuels) t In
each of these examples, the federal government played no role in promoting the
policies.
4. 09-29-88 EI-Ashry and MacKenzie WRI "Killer Air'; the authors are staff members of the World
Resources Institute.
*_ 09-29-88 EI-Ashry and Mackenzie WRI "Killer Air"
s, 08-12-90 Hamilton & Brown "Conservation Complacency in the U.S.; Desire to Reduce
Consumption Waned as Prices Showed Stability"
51 05-21-91 Weisskopf "Two California Utilities Vow Emissions Cuts"
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The non-conventional culture also has a different conception of economics as
it relates to energy. Representatives of the non-conventional culture point out that
energy's market price doesn't fully reflect its cost to society. The
market price includes the cost of finding, processing and distributing
the energy. But it omits some broader costs of pollution, congestion
and the insecurity of supplies. The market price also doesn't
accurately reflect the replacement cost of today's energy, s2
Others point out the economic illusions that result from poor accounting:
representatives of a solar power company, Luz International Ltd.,
contend that their [solar] power costs would look even cheaper if
governments compared the costs not only of building a coal or nuclear
plant but also of digging up fragile landscape for more coal or uranium
and polluting the air and water, s3
The Washington Post editors pointed out the need to consider the hidden costs of
producing more energy:
One reason for the ferocity of the political combat over environmental
policy is the entrenched idea that cleaner air and better protection
have to impose enormous new costs on industry. But not always. If
this country's consumption of electricity continues upward at the
present rapid rate, the construction of new power plants and
transmission lines is going to be gigantically expensive, s'
This also means that, according to representatives of the non-conventional culture,
the full social costs of nuclear energy might make it a less viable solution." One
proposal that surfaces relatively frequently in the Washington Post sample is to tax
energy to incorporate the social costs s_ or to have "users of fossil fuels pay emission
52 01-24-91 Samuelson "Conserve Energy - Tax It." Jessica Mathews agreed: "energy is too cheap
in the United States relative to its unpriced costs, especially of pollution" (07-30-90 JTMathews "Energy
Tax Options').
" 03-02-89 Jay Mathews "Solar-Energy Complex Hailed as Beacon for Utility Innovation"
s_ 02-07-90 Washington Post editorial, "Getting Warmer?"
u 08-24-89 Booth "Nuclear Power Debate Shifts; Safer Reactors Gain Favor as Earth Heats Up"
Samuelsou, .Q_. cir.
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fees to reflect the 'full social costs' of the greenhouse gases they generate. "_7
Another point of disagreement between the non-conventional and the
conventional perspectives on energy regards the dependability of the economic
projections made to support or resist changes in energy policy to address the threat
posed by the buildup of greenhouse gases. The non-conventional culture uses a
softer approach to prediction, recognizing the uncertainty that is inherent in both
economic and scientific calculations regarding future projections in human affairs.
IT]here is tremendous disagreement about the cost and disruption to
society of such reductions. Recent calculations by a Stanford
economist and colleagues put the price tag at more than $3 trillion.
Other economists project the cost to be far less. Indeed, a National
Academy of Sciences panel is meeting next week to investigate whether
it is possible to estimate costs of reducing carbon dioxide and the other
greenhouse gasesJ s
Given that uncertainty surrounds so many aspects of the climate change issue,
the non-conventional culture acknowledges uncertainty and works with it rather than
trying to assume it away. One writer suggested that the wise approach would be to
do no harm.
What...is wise policy for a situation that marries major uncertainties
with high, and perhaps catastrophic, but certainly irreversible
impact?...Prudcnce dictates that we do nothing that will make the
problem worse while all-out research efforts are made to understand
what's happeningfl
Another op-ed writer advocated taking a gradual approach "to the greenhouse
problem. 'It doesn't make sense to restructure the whole energy side of the economy
based on greenhouse'...But it does make sense to begin using fossil fuels more
s7 03-21-89 Weisskopf "How on Earth to Turn Off the Heat; EPA Outlines Requisites to Counter
Global Warming Trend"
sa 03-10-90 Booth "Carbon DioJfide Curbs May Not Halt Warming"
07-05-88 JTMathews "Gas and the Greenhouse Effect"
June 30, 1992 - 89 - The Policy Debate
efficiently than we are now... '_° Another columnist likened the non-conventional
approach to hedging one's bets, as when deciding whether to believe in God or not;
it reminded him
of the philosopher Blaise Pascal's famous wager argument about the
existence of God. Nobody could be sure about whether the deity
really existed, Pascal reasoned. But either God was or God wasn't
and, in either case, the quality of our future existence may depend
greatly on the position we take in our lives. With the eternal to gain
from the belief that God exists, and with nothing to lose if there is
none, the wise person will choose, then, to believe in God. He who
continues to doubt in the circumstances is taking an enormous risk just
because he doesn't know which alternative is true? I
The non-conventional culture acknowledges that predictions are inexact and
incomplete.
Those who say so [that the earth's atmospheric temperature is rising]
could be entirely right. On the other hand, good scientific predictions
may also be entirely wrong. The global warming theory.., involves
broad predictions from inexact and incomplete data and is subject to
unknown and possibly uncontrollable variables. _2
Yet the non-conventional culture does not agree that uncertainty necessarily
precludes taking action. "This country and the world don't have to wait for the
scientists' debate over greenhouse effects to be settled. They already have plenty of
work to do, well justified for other reasons, that will also diminish the risk of severe
global warming. '_ One columnist pointed out the need to plan for the unexpected:
"the pace and direction of change in the energy picture in the last dozen years is a
timely reminder to the new administration of just how opaque the future is. '_
de 07-22-88 Hamilton "Natural Gas Backers See Opportunity in Concern Over Greenhouse Effect"
6_04-17-91 Warsh "We Have Nothing to Lose in Heeding Warnings About Global Warming." David
Warsh is a columnist for the Boston Globe; i_s column is carried by the Washington Post.
" 05-II-89 Yoder "Defender' of Sc/ence"
z 02_7-90 Washington Post editorial, "Getting Warmer?"
01-22-89 Will "The Blessings of Cheap Oil"
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Technology plays a very different role in the non-conventional culture as well.
One columnist warned, based on the disruption caused by the drought and heat wave
in the summer of 1988, that technology will not be able to shield us if the climate
does change. "Despite the massive power of modem technology, mankind depends
on the normal functioning of the planet, especially the climate system, as heavily as
did primitive societies. '_s In fact, the Exxon Valdez oil spill prompted another
columnist to noted that human technology is problematic; the oil spill was "more
ominously another of those episodic warnings about the fragility of our world: the
terrifying power that humans hold over, literally, everything. '_
Yet, technology is acknowledged in the non-conventional culture as having
some role, but to serve human needs and not to become an end in itself. Experience
is taken as a good test to see what works. On the non-conventional side of the
energy debate, therefore, gains in conservation and efficiency are played up. _'he
country has proved to itself that conservation can work... _ The lessons of the
energy crises of the 1970s appear to have been learned within the non-conventional
culture, and some of those examples have made their way into the Washington Post.
The nation is getting much more bang out of every barrel of oil it
burns than it did in 1973... The oil price spikes of 1973 and 1979 have
succeeded in building a measure of energy conservation into the fabric
of American life. a
One Washington Post report discussed the soft-path energy approach.
There likely is no better illustration of the potential of energy
efficiency than [Amory] Lovins's [Rocky Mountain] Institute in
Snowmass, Colo .... Its energy-saving devices from compact
fluorescent lamps to triple-pane windows and rooftop solar panels -
07-05-88 JTMathews "Gas and the Greenhouse Effect"
" 04-01-89 Goodman "Spilled Oil and Lost Illusions"
08-14-88 Washington Post editorial, "Greenhouse Heat..."
e, 08-12-90 Hamilton & Brown "Conservation Complacency in the U.S.; Desire to Reduce
Consumption Waned as Prices Showed Stability." Furthermore, the reporters made this comparison:
"If the United States were using oil no more efficiently now than it was 17 years ago, it would need
about 52 percent more oil than it uses to sustain today's economy..."
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cost $6,000 to install in 1983 and save an estimated $7,100 a year in
electricity and heating costs... 'The carbon d/oxide and other pollution
avoided by substituting efficiency for fuel is thus avoided not at a cost
but at a profit,' Lovins said? 9
Another columnist pointed out that "conservation has far exceeded 1970s
projections. "7° Not only did it work, but it worked without drastically altering
lifestyles. "The country has proved to itself that conservation...can work without
forcing people to live less comfortable lives. "7_
Another aspect of the non-conventional culture is an emphasis on
implementing modest trial programs to determine what works, where, and under
what circumstances. One columnist admonished that
"It]he greenhouse problem is here to stay. The sooner we recognize
that and take modest steps to adjust, the lower the eventual costs if
and when ...limits on greenhouse emissions become necessary. In the
meantime, let us not do something that must later be undone at great
expense. "72
The Washington Post reported the advancement of an electric car prototype; what
made this particular model more feasible was "the systems analysis - a combination
of many, many modest improvements to produce a car that is a giant leap
forward. ''m By supporting modest trial programs, it becomes easier to replicate the
approaches that work and to terminate the ones that don't. Flexibility is seen as
being important when dealing with an issue, like energy demand, that is subject to
uncertainty.
"Demand growth is erratic and uncertain. Utilities do have some
flexibility. Without building huge new coal or nuclear plants -- which
o 02-04-91 Weisskopf "From Beer to Utility Bills, Global Warming Measures Carry a Price"
_o 01-22-89 Will "The Blessings of Cheap Oil"
7t 08-14-88 Washington Post editorial, "Greenhouse Heat..."
n 07-05-88 JTMathews "Gas and the Greenhouse Effect"
n Quote by Paul MacCready, engineer and founder of AeroEnvironment_ a small California-based
firm that has been working with General Motors on the new model, called the Impact; 03-11-90 Moore
"Electric Cars: Against the On'rent?"
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have lead times of 10 or 12 years -- they can increase capacity by
adding smaller oil- and gas-fired turbines. Electricity is also being
generated by nonutility companies and sold to local power systems. ''74
Another aspect of the non-conventional approach involves an emphasis on preventing
pollution, rather than cleaning up pollutants after they have been generated. "Rather
than relying solely on regulations to control what leaves the tail pipe and smokestack,
we need to reduce the generation of pollution in the first place, principally by using
less energyf 5
The non-conventional culture acknowledges that morality has a place in
energy policy. One columnist pointed out that there must be "a moral lesson pouring
out of this disabled tanker [the Valdez]. We can't leave the remnants of unspoiled
wilderness in the hands of an Exxon. We can't risk trading a bay for a boatload of
oil, especially while we ask other countries to abstain. "7_ Another columnist said
that part of the "problem is to reconcile individual and societal self-interest.
Dampening energy demand is in our collective, long-term self-interest. Failing to
regulate our thirst for energy may create environmental stresses and shortages of
power or fuel." Another writer representing the non-conventional culture had an
op-ed piece appear in the Washington Post that was almost antithetical to the remark
made by a representative of the conventional culture regarding the morality of the
Gulf War.
The proposal to sacrifice the [Arctic National Wildlife] refuge is
particularly jarring as our troops return from the Persian Gulf War.
If we are prepared to shed blood and spend a small fortune largely to
protect our access to oil, it cannot be rational or even moral to
continue to waste oil at home, and compensate for our unwillingness
to end this waste by destroying important parts of America's natural
_4 12-21-88 Samueison "Blackouts Coming?"
75 09-29-88 EI-Ashry and MacKenzie "Killer Air"
04-01-89 Goodman "Spilled Oil and Lost Illusions"
77 05-24-89 Samuelson "Environmental Delusions"
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heritage. _s
Comments and Suggestions
Inflating the magnitude of the effort and/or the costs, relative to the less
extreme non-conventional expectations, is a tactic used by the two Senators who
proposed comprehensive global warming policies in 198879 to stimulate action on
global warming. It is also a tactic used by non-environmentalists to block action.
Both are technocratic in this respect. One problem with publicizing environmental
issues in this manner is that it eventually can erodes credibility. One columnist
expressed his increduLity about repeated "eco-catastrophes."
The public's attention on such matters is, however, hard to get - and
harder still to hold - for several reasons...Today's saturation journalism
pounces on environmental episodes - soil erosion today, oil spills
tomorrow - and quickly wrings them dry. So there is a constant media
hunger for new crises, each one less convincing than the last. Some
environmental activists have played fast and loose with facts to arouse
alarm3 °
As developed here, the distinction between the conventional and non-
conventional approaches does not coincide with popular distinctions between
conservatives and liberals or between non-environmentaList and environmentalists.
The article that discussed the two pieces of global warming legislation, introduced
in the Senate in July 1988, revealed that the liberal environmentalists mentioned in
the piece appeared to be quite conventional in their assumptions about the need for
centralized solutionsY Other environmentalists may advocate a less centralized
04-21-91 Frampton "Putting Energy Policy on Ice; Arctic Drilling May Be Long on Oil, But It's
Short on Vision"
'P 07-29-88 Weisskopf "Two Senate Bills Take Aim at 'Greenhouse Effect"
to 09-18-88 George Will "Who's the Real Environmentalist?"
,t 07-29-88 Weisskopf "Two Senate Bills Take Aim at 'Greenhouse Effect"
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policy approach, but still see a major need for national leadership and commands? 2
Representatives of the conventional culture who are skeptical of democracy
fail to recognize that the people are capable of good judgment if they have access to
materials of good judgment and some alternatives. The materials of good judgment
and serious alternatives are the responsibility of leadership. Regardless of who is to
blame for poor judgment, however, it is quite clear that the people will not rise and
take the lead. A committee of a dozen has difficulty exercising leadership, let alone
a committee of 250 million.
Representatives of the non-conventional side of the energy debate might
attempt to straighten out their power ambivalence. What are the preferred state and
local roles, what is the preferred national roles, and where should balance be struck
between the two? The appropriate national roles in a decentralized energy strategy
are primarily to direct attention, to provide seed money for decentralized innovation,
regulatory changes to facilitate decentralized initiatives that work, and independent
(third-party) evaluations for decentralized innovators and followers. Federal elected
officials play a leadership role and federal bureaucracies play a support role, but
neither group makes decisions that are better left to state and local officials and
representatives of the private sector. One can agree with the columnist s3 on the
need for someone to take (and we would add, share) a wider view, without
centralizing and concentrating all the decisions in whatever entity has the wider view.
Businesses line up on climate change according to their perceived economic
stake, u The justifications for their positions can be subjected to the test of
t2 See for example, 09-29-88 EI-Ashry and Mackenzie (World Resources Institute) "Killer Air"
,3 12-21-88 Samuelson "Blackouts Coming?"
u See especially 07-22-88 Hamilton "Natural Gas Backers See Opportunity in Concern Over
Greenhouse Effect."
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experience. For example,the Post reported that fuel-switching is an economical way
to reduce air pollution. The Hudson, Ohio, School District convened its bus fleet
to natural gas; the business manager said, "'We save roughly $10,000 per year on fuel
and probably $100 per bus on routine maintenance...We added three to five years to
the life of each bus. And there are no pollutants. '''Ss The general claim or general
assumption of a trade-off between the economy and the environment might be
confronted with examples of this kind. So might the general assumption of
compatibility between the environment and economics.
A federalrolealsoexistsforevaluatingsuch smallexperimentsas theHudson
fleetand disseminatinginformation about the successes and failures. This
acknowledges thatthe federalgovernment can help othersdec/de which programs
to adopt. The federal government already does some of this,whether it
acknowledges itor not. One WashingtonPostarticlediscussedthe taxcreditforcoal
companies thatmade iteconomicallyfeasibleto capture the methane from coal
seams, Spawning a whole new energy industry.
But only recentlyhave technologyand economics combined to make
itcommercially marketable. The economics includesa federaltax
credit...'FromEPA's perspective,thisisa win-win situation,'saidDina
Kruger, a methane specialistin the Global CI/mate Change division.
'The coalcompanies make money and we protectthe environment'by
capturingand sellingmethane -believedtobe a significantcontributor
to 'greenhouse'planetarywarming -thatwould otherwisebe expelled
intotheatmosphere by mine ventilators...Amocoofficialsacknowledge
that they can make money at thisonly became of the federaltax
credit..._
The federalapproach currentlyconsistsof sponsoringor conductingresearchon the
issuesathand. _I'oinvestigatethe technicalfeasibilityofsuch dramatic [CO2] cuts,
at leasta dozen studiesareunderway by federalagenciesand privateenvironmental
as 02-14-90 Lippman "More Use of Natural Gas as Motor Fuel Explored; Option is Cleaner,
Cheaper, Less Convenient"
u 04-12-90 Lippman "Long Feared, Methane Now Valued; Technology, Tax Credits Make Use of
Coal-Bed Gas as Fuel Feasible"
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and energy groups. "sT It is worthwhile to supplement such studies with field
experiments to see what works and what does not in practice.
A review of post-hoc forecast accuracy would be helpful to the public when
projections are taken or cited as a basis for decision. We question the conventional
claim that "scientific uncertainty precludes rational action" by noting adaptive
responses (e.g., Dave Porter, Wisconsin Public Service Co., see Chapter 1) and
reasserting the common sense of procedural rationality. Issues can be polarized for
common ends -- and must be, for the public to participate. While issues can be
polarized for narrow ends, as Bethe and Seaborg asserted, u polarization can also
serve common interests.
The conventional culture is concerned about protecting the existing quality of
life and ways of living, without pausing to reconsider it. The non-conventional
culture seeks to adapt the existing quality of life and ways to living to emerging
natural realities like global warming and/or to human aspirations like sustainability
and intergenerational equity. The alternatives are worth posing sharply for the
education of the public, and for public decision.
IlL The Culture
The Conventional Perspective
The conventional culture is inclined to look to the political, scientific, and
economic experts for assistance in making important decisions, rather than trying to
build a consensus among the public on how to proceed. This tendency has been
reinforced in aspects of the climate change issue that extend beyond the well-defined
t_ 03-10-90 Booth "Carbon Dioxide Curbs May Not Halt Warming"
= See 09-16-88 Bethe and Seaborg "Star Wars No, Nuclear Power Yes: Don't Let Politics Confuse
the Issues."
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confinesof the energy debate. Science, in particular, has played a significant role in
the global warming policy debate, as seen throughout this Washington Post sample,
because the evidence on whether the temperature has started to rise or not is
unclear, the possible regional impacts are unknown, and projections about future
changes in temperature and climate are replete with uncertainty. One indication of
science's central position is the numerous stories in recent years that focus on the
President's Science Advisor as well as the attention received by the question of how
well science research did in the annual budget determinations, s°
The best example in the Post of the conventional culture's insistence for
comprehensiveness in science is found in the report announcing the establishment of
the U.S. Global Change Research Program in 1989.
The aim of the [interagency] program is 'to gain a predictive under-
standing of the interactive physical, geological, chemical, biological,
and social processes that regulate the total Earth system,' according to
the report that details the White House research agenda. 9°
Some scientists tend to encourage this connection between policy and science, where
action on the policy is held at a standstill until the scientists come up with the
answers about the nature of the problem at hand. One columnist, writing from the
perspective of a scientist, advocated that people walt a year before deciding what to
do about global warming until after the National Academy of Sciences published its
major report on the issue.
Maybe a little centralized authority is what we need...It is precisely
here that organized science comes in. Science seems well ahead of
journalism or law or business or legislative politics as a way of getting
u See especially 02-02-90 Booth "Science and Technology Fare Well in Bush's Budget." The
reporter wrote: "While the Bush budget is full of cuts big and small for many domestic programs, there
are increases across-the-board for science and technology and scientific budget watchers are beside
themselves with praise for the administration's generosity. The promised budgetary largess includes
proposed hikes for all the major civilian science agencies, with some high-visibility jumbo-science
projects recommended for dramatic surges in spending. 'The President feels that support of science and
technology is one of the best investments he can make on behalf of the taxpayer,' said White House
science adviser D. Allan Bromley earlier this week."
9, 09-01-89 Booth "U.S. Details Global Warming Study;, Interagency Program Attempts to
Coordinate Federal Research"
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at some aspects of the world. Its traction stems from the idea that to
really know something, to pin it down, is to slice it thinner and thinner,
through a process of measurement, experimentation, replication and
peer review, until a consensus of all really well-informed specialists can
be obtained about particular propositions. This characteristic of
universal agreement among specialists is the difference between a
scientific truth...and a matter of opinion... 9t
This hubris arises in other examples about science and about technology as
well. One reporter likened the computer models that simulated atmospheric
processes to God's creating the earth in the book of Genesis. _ Scientists proposed
dumping hundreds of thousands of tons of iron into the ocean to create
giant blooms of marine algae that could soak up much of the excess
carbon dioxide believed to be responsible for global warming. If the
massive scheme is carried out, researchers say, it would be among the
greatest manipulations of nature ever attempted."
But, in this article, "greatest" seems to be meant in a positive way, rather than in a
more apprehensive sense in which it could also be taken. Finally, one Washington
Post columnist tried to get to the heart of the conventional culture; he explored
several aspects of the legacy of the 1986 explosion of the Challenger space shuttle.
The shuttle symbolizes the central role that technology plays in American politics.
The sun rises, the sun sets, the tropical clouds cruise overhead like
God's own spectator fleet and shadows slide over what has been called
the most complicated machine ever built, the triumph of technocracy,
9, 04-11-90 Warsh "Celebrating Earth Day Requites a Certain Calm"
06-12-89 Booth "Computers and 'Greenhouse Effect': The Genesis of Understanding." "In the
beginning, there was blank computer screen. And the Earth was without form, and void; and darkness
was upon the face of the deep. And the climate modelers said, let there be light. And there was light.
Or at least an equation representing solar radiation. The modelers - entering more equations into their
computers - gave the Earth mountains, snow cover and six types of vegetation. They gave the oceans
depth, salinity and currents. And then the modelers divided the Earth into a grid with thousands of
boxes, and they stacked these boxes one upon the other, up into the atmosphere and down to the
bottom of the sea. And into each box, the modelers inserted the basic laws of nature that govern
climate: the mathematical formulas that descn'be momentum, heat transfer, evaporation, condensation
and precipitation. And the modelers said, behold, this is good, and they switched on their
supercomputers to see what they had wrought."
¢s 05-20-90 Booth "Ironing Out 'Greenhouse Effect'; Dumping in Oceans Proposed to Spur Algae"
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the logical product of the "can-do" mentality.., s"
The conventional culture also tends to seek a comprehensive political
approach that would coordinate international action on the climate change issue
before determining what the United States or individual states or communities should
do about the potential problem. During several of the Group of Seven's economic
summits, some national leaders and some environmentalists tried to raise the issue
for discussion to push the international community towards action. The post-summit
communique from the July 1989 summit celebrated as "a watershed" the call for an
"innovative solution...'the conclusion of a framework or umbrella convention on
climate change to set out general principles or guidelines . . . to mobilize and
rationalize the efforts made by the international community. ''n Subsequent
attention surrounding later economic summits and the Earth Summit held in Rio in
June 1992 demonstrates the amount of credence put in this approach.
Ultimately, some representatives of the conventional perspective have decided
to fight back. A political and economic backlash appears to have developed--against
the environmental movement--that tries to protect the conventional culture. The
Washington Post reported on the recent rise of a Western movement that has
acquired some of the rhetoric of the environmental movement, but for very different
purposes. Spokespeople for this movement advocate the "wise use" of resources.
Another new twist is the development of an overarching philosophy to
counter what critics have dubbed the 'anti-human' bias of groups such
as the Sierra Club. Industry advocates who once couched their
arguments solely in economic terms now speak of 'man's place in the
ecosystem' and the obligation to use natural resources for the
betterment of mankind. 'We, as a matter of biological fact, no choice
of ours, are the dominant species on the planet,' said Ron Arnold,
executive vice president of the Center for the Defense of Free
Enterprise, based in Bellevue, Wash. 'What we think is that man and
94 09-28-88 HAUen "Space Symbols"
0%17-89 Rowen "Leaders at Summit Warn Bankers on Third World Debt"
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nature can live together in productive harmony. '_
The crusade appears to be rooted in the logging, ranching, and mining industries. 97
Yellowstone National Park Superintendent Robert Barbee described the depth of the
emotion and opposition he faced at a meeting where the Park Service's experimental
ecosystems management approach was opened to public discussion:
'I went to a meeting in Bozeman (Mont.) and there were 700 people
there...You can't imagine the virulence of the outcry....I was Saddam
Hussein...a communist, everything else you could think of. One lady got
up there, jaw quivering, used her time to say the Pledge of Allegiance,
then looked at me and called me a Nazi.'
The fears and emotions tapped by the new Western movement appear to run high,
suggesting that the conventional culture is deeply entrenched. The confidence of the
conventional culture showed through one column that appeared in the Post:
a virtually universal aspiration - economic dynamism...has done more
to improve life for more people in the last 100 years than was done by
all developments in all history prior to that. Man is messy, but any
creature that can create space vehicles can probably cope. That is,
mankind's inventiveness has been, so far, more creative than mankind's
environmental impact has been damaging. _
The Non-Conventional Perspective
The debate from the perspective of the nonconventional culture on the global
climate change issue is less well-defined than in the conventional culture. Important
aspects of the non-conventional approach occasionally rise to the focus of attention
to be heard. For example, Bill McKibben's book, The End of Nature, contains
alternative ideas about humans' view of nature. One columnist appreciated
McKibben's work because it raises important questions and makes people think
05-16-91 Lancaster Western Industries Fuel Grass-Roots Drive for 'Wise Use' of Resources"
97 In the same article, David Alberswertl_ public lands director for the National W'ddlife Federation,
is quoted as saying: "They claim to be protectors of the environment, but you don't have to look very
far beneath the surface to find out what they really want is exploitation of natural resources for private
financial gain...The philosophical arguments are only window dressing for the same old people."
09-18-88 George Will "Who's the Real Environmentalist?"
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about our current approach to nature.
'An idea can become extinct, just like an animal or a plant,'
[McKibben] writes, 'The idea in this case is 'nature' the wild
province, the world apart from man, under whose rules he was born
and died.' By changing the temperature, we have changed those rules.
They are ours and not nature's... 99
EPA Administrator William Reilly, in an op-ed piece that the Post carried to
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Earth Day, echoed these sentiments.
Our planet's natural systems do not exist just to be exploited or to
support human economic activity. Nature has an intrinsic worth that
transcends narrow utilitarian values and should be respected. We
should all take responsibility for practicing environmental reciprocity,
for nurturing and sustaining the planet that nurtures and sustains
us...we must remember that living in harmony with nature is both a
practical necessity and a moral obligation. Taking care of the
environment is not just important for our future - it is our future, z°°
Reilly challenges the conventional approach to nature that reduces things under
consideration to economic terms.
The money we spend on sound environmental programs is an
investment in the nation's well-being...Some analysts suggest that the
environment will be the growth industry of the 1990s...Using a
combination of incentives and tough enforcement of existing laws, we
can engage the marketplace in environmental protection without
having to rely exclusively on the kind of cumbersome government
intervention that we relied on in the past...People everywhere, in
developed and developing nations alike, must embrace a new ethic of
conservation and stewardship of nature.
Sustainability is a theme that is hinted at in the McKibben and Reilly pieces,
but it comes through most clearly in Post stories about the Worldwatch Institute.
Their annual State 0f th¢ World reports help draw attention to non-conventional
09-16-89 Goodman "Nature Under Glass." Compare this appreciative depiction of McKibben's
work with a more conventional and more skeptic.a/account by a Post staff vaiter who inter_ewed
MclG'bben, 01-113-90 Booth "William McKibben."
tee 04-22-90 Reiily "A World in our Hands: Forget the Doomsayers - Environmental Action Means
Both Progress and Profits"
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ideas in the media. In 1990,the Worldwatch Institute set out to envision what a
sustainablesociety would look like and how it might be attained; in the report, a
sustainablesocietyis defined as"'one that satisfiesits needswithout jeopardizing the
prospects of future generations.'''1°1 Sustainability directly challenges the
conventional faith in economicgrowth. "Basicassumptionsabout economicgrowth -
that human progressdependson the rising output of goodsand services- would be
supplantedby an emphasison other qualities, suchasdurability and environmental
protection."1°2
Finally, an interview with novelist Walker Percy (author of the best-selling
book, The Thanato_ Syndrome) takes a deeper look at the roots of the conventional
culture from a critical perspective. In his view, our way of life is debatable. "It is
precisely science and the scientific age...that have leeched the sovereignty out of
individual human beings, leaving empty self-less husks searching for meaning in
orgies of lust and war, or seeking escape... "t°3 Science and technology are
presented not as potent factors in modern society, but as objects of satire and
criticism for impinging on human dignity, integrity, and uniqueness. His novels
"satirize contemporary culture, often with savage force, while exploring how one
ought to live a life in a godless technological era that has brought material
improvements for many but also horrors beyond anyone's nightmares. "_°_ Percy was
concerned about ethical and religious restraints on the use of science-based
technology; quoting Dostoevsky, Percy agreed that "without God, all things are
permitted.'"
tel 02-11-90 Lancaster "Sustainable' Society Urged by Year 2030; Research Group Warns of Global
Degradation"
t,_ 02-11-90 Lancaster, ibid.
t*_ 05-14-87 McCombs Walker Percy & the Assault on the Soul: The Novelist, Striking a Blow
Against Technology in 'The Thanatos Syndrome"
_04 McCombs 05-14-87, ibid.
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Another Post article examined the conventional conception of progress, and
found it lacking. The author, perhaps without even realizing it, echoed Percy's point
that technology has both a wonderful upside, as well as a terrible downside.
...people believed in Progress. Life would inexorably improve. We
were headed toward a technological utopia. It was just assumed.
Today, "Progress" is a joke...Nowadays people believe in Regress. The
world is going to hell in a handbasket. It is just assumed...What killed
the idea of Progress for most people was the realization that
technology was a mixed blessing...Even as technology advances the life
span and health of individuals, growing multitudes live in horrifying
deprivation..) °_
The non-conventional culture would have society examine its use of technologies to
consider the possible unintended consequences that might accompany an unleashing
of newfound abilities and powers.
Comments and Suggestions
The evidence found in theseWashington Post piecesprovideshope thatthe
debate about globalclimatechange and the underlyingculturecan be opened up;
what needs to happen isthatconventionalideasand valuesmust be made explicit,
while non-conventionalvalues and ideas need to be raised to the fore so that
representativesofthe two world-viewscan faceoffagainstone another.People will
then have the informationthey need to findtheirplace in the debate;they willbe
able to make informed decisionsabout who theywant to have lead them and about
where theywant to be led.
One Post article,which explored the meaning of Earth Day to individuals,
highlightedthepotentialthatexistsout inthepublicthatiscurrentlygoing to waste.
Earth Day 1990 garnered a lotof attentionin the media, but itis questionable
whether many lastingchanges resulted.The people who were interviewedfor the
articlegenerallyindicatedthat they wanted to do the rightthing regarding the
tes 02-10-91 Achenbach "Desperately Seeking 'Progress' and Coming to Grips with a Future That
isn't What it Used to Be"
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environment, but felt confused, or even misled, by environmentalists. One environ-
mentalist said that "the main thrust of Earth Day 1990...'is to give people the feeling
of empowerment, to make them believe that their individual actions will produce
results. ''_°_ But what happened instead for many people was that their expectations
about what individual contribution each one could make were raised beyond hope
of being met; cynicism and disillusionment frequently resulted. "Because
environmental leaders, both in and out of government, have been reluctant to list
priorities for consumers or to stress which actions are crucial and which ones are
almost meaningless, many citizens say they feel more suspicious than
empowered. "t°7 Effective leadership could tap into the potential that exists.
Two articles in the Washington Post show how the debate can proceed along
these lines because both do a good job of contrasting the conventional culture with
the non-conventional. This highlights the differences between the two approaches,
allowing the individual reader to consider where he or she stands on these central
issues about how to live one's life. The 1988 presidential election campaign
presented two candidates who, in general, represented one or the other of the two
cultures. One article compared George Bush's more conventional environmental
positions with Michael Dukakis' stances, which were rooted more in the non-
conventional culture, l°a This article helped give voters a clear choice on the envi-
ronment; perhaps the opportunity to choose between a candidate who represents the
conventional culture and one who represents the non-conventional perspective will
become as clear in the upcoming (1992) presidential election. The second
constructive column contrasted two books, one rooted in the conventional culture and
to6 04-18-90 Booth and Cohn "Sharing the Environmental Burden; Individual Efforts Mix Concern,
Confusion and Contradiction"
ie7 04-18-90 Booth and Cohn, ibid.
_*_ 10433-88 Weisskopf "In Evaluating Bush and Dukakis, Environmentalists Turn to 1983"
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a second one that exemplified the non-conventional cultureJ _ By playing each
book and its core ideas off the other, the columnist effectively laid out the conflicting
values of each of the cultures in such a way that he pretty much left it up to the
readers to decide where they stood.
Conclusion
Our goal has been to reconceive the global climate change debate around the
distinctions between the conventional culture and the non-conventional world-view,
to transcend the traditional dichotomies between environmentalists and non-
environmentalists or between liberals and conservatives. The conventional culture's
approach to global climate change and, ultimately, to energy policy--with its
insistence on national and international consensus, on scientific evidence and on
guarantees that solutions will not ruin the economy--has thus far dominated the
policy debate on the issue. Opposing ideas from the non-conventional culture have
gained some attention, but analysis over time shows that those ideas have been
dwarfed in comparison. Leaders who represent the non-conventional side of the
debate can challenge the assumptions underlying the conventional culture to help
raise this alternative view-point to the focus of attention.
iw 08-29-90 Warsh "Looking into the Future of Planet Earth: Two Sharply Different Views." The
book representing the conventional culture is Pooulation Matters: Peovl_, Resource_ EnvirQnment gnd
lmmiaration by Julian Simon, while the one repre,,_enting the non-conventional culture is F_the
Common Good: Redirectina F.con m T mm " n " nat n " I
Fuaa-e by economist Herman Daly and theologian John Cobb.
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CHAPTER 4
CITIZEN VIEWPOINTS l
Michael H. Lynn
Introduction
Citizen viewpoints are important for leadership on global climate change
poLicy. In general, the task of responsible leadership in a democracy is to raise the
most important issues for the public, to formulate the major alternatives on those
issues for the public, and to compete on behalf of those alternatives for public
support. 2 If the unconventional ideas related to climate change policy are major in
potential but marginalized in the national debate, as argued elsewhere in this report,
then the primary task of responsible leadership is to raise these unconventional ideas,
to pose them as alternatives to the conventional ideas, and to initiate the competition
for public support. To be effective in this task, potential leaders need some
understanding of existing citizen viewpoints.
1 This chapter is adapted from Michael H. Lynn, Citizen Viewpoints on Global Climate Change:
Opportunities and Obstacles for Leadership (M.A. Thesis, University of Colorado at Boulder, 1992).
2 Compare E. E. Schattschneider, The Scmisovereign People: A Realist's ;r,ew of Democracy in America
_e, IL: Dryden Press, 1975), pp. 136-137: "The public is llke a very rich man who is unable to
supervise closely all of his enterprise. His problem is to learn how to compel his agents to define his options ....
The power of the people in a democracy depends on the/mportance of the decisions made by the electorate,
not on the number of decisions they make .... Above everything, the people are powerless if the political
enterprise is not competitive."
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The purpose of this chapter is to document and analyze citizen viewpoints on
climate change issues, as a basis for understanding how to communicate the non-
conventional alternatives to the public. The premise is that leaders do not "create"
public opinion, but operate on the predispositions of the public. The promotional
efforts of leaders can strengthen and give direction to predispositions, but they help
weaken predispositions only if supported by direct experience or credible evidence. 3
Hence in the analysis below, particular attention is paid to predispositions that are
consistent with the non-conventional alternatives, and predispositions that are
inconsistent but subject to challenge through appeals to experience and evidence.
In this connection, documentation of the energy policy experience is an important
asset for potential leaders.
The first section of this chapter explains the unusual methods used to
document citizens viewpoints as a basis for understanding and communication.
(Survey methods are less appropriate for such purposes.) The second section
presents the data on the structure and content of citizen viewpoints, and considers
the reliability of these results. The third section considers the implications of the
results for leadership on the narrower policy issues and on the broader cultural issues
of global climate change.
I. Methods
Q-Methodology
The purpose of this study is not to estimate the percentage of people who
have a particular opinion on a question of interest to the investigator. Instead, the
purpose is to understand the viewpoints of citizens, in order to clarify how to
3 See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Prem,
1950), pp. 113-114, and the remainder of Chapter VI on Symbols.
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communicatewith them on global climate change issues. The difference in purpose
entails a difference of standpoint:
[M]ost previous work in the behavioral tradition has stressed the
external standpoint of the investigator, i.e., has begun with his vision of
his world according to which all else is measured .... In contrast, there
have been fewer attempts to examine the world from the internal
standpoint of the individual being studied...[i.e.,] trying to understand
the political ramblings of the average man. 4
The internal standpoint of the individual on such complex issues as global climate
change consists of many preferences, beliefs, and loyalties that are more or less
integrated into a unique whole, s The individual will respond to the efforts of
potential leaders in terms of his or her viewpoint, and not in terms of one or several
discrete opinions.
Q-methodology is appropriate for examining the internal standpoint of the
individual and for the purposes of this study. 6 A Q-study is based on a sample of
statements (called a Q-sample) selected by the investigator to represent the universe
of discourse on an issue. The Q-sample usually consists of a few to several dozen
statements, each printed on a separate card; the cards are shuffled to randomize
their order. Each respondent expresses his or her viewpoint by sorting these
statements.
First, the respondent reads through the statements, placing those she generally
agrees with in a pile on the right, those she generally disagrees with on the left, and
those she considers unimportant, is unclear on, or feels uncertain about in the
middle. Second, the respondent examines the statements more closely, beginning
4 StevenR. Brown, PoliticalSubjectivity:Applicationsof Q Methodology inPoliticalScience(New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 1.
S The probability that any two individuals will have the tame opinion on a single question is quite high,
but the probability that they wi/l have the same opinion on 60 questions ia vaui_ing/y sma/l. Hence any
viewpoint described comprehensively is probably unique.
6 Q-methodology is contrasted with R-methodology, the realm of classical statistics including the Pearson
product-moment correlation, r.
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with the pile on the fight. From these statements, she selects the three statements
she agrees with most of all and places them below a marker, + 5/Most Agree, on the
far right of the table. Turning to the pile on the left, she selects the three statements
she disagrees with most of all and places them below a marker, -5/Most Disagree,
on the far left of the table. Returning to the pile on the right, she selects the four
statements she agrees with most, of those remaining, and places below a marker + 4.
She continues in this fashion, alternating from right to left and gradually
approaching the middle, until all the statements have been placed in a distribution
that resembles an inverted triangle. Finally, the respondent examines the distribution
and moves any statements, if necessary, to make the distribution reflect her viewpoint
more accurately.
The result of the sorting procedure is a Q-sort, which gives the direction and
intensity of response to each statement relative to all the other statements that
comprise the viewpoint. Direction is indicated by agreement or disagreement.
Relative intensity is indicated by the difference between, for example, a statement
at -3 and another at -4; disagreement with the latter being more intense. Moreover,
the meaning of any statement is constrained by the other statements in the Q-sort.
For example, a statement of distrust of the federal government is an ideological
statement if it occurs in a Q-sort anchored by statements that reflect agreement (+ 5)
with reliance on the free market and disagreement (-5) with government regulation
of the economy; in another Q-sort, the same statement of distrust could be non-
ideological, reflecting a pragmatic preference for state and local action.
Consequently, the respondent, not the investigator, controls the direction, intensity,
and meaning of each statement in the Q-sort. 7
7 Conversely, in R-methodology, including conventional opinion surveys, the investigator exercises control
through standardization of the meaning of each question and the respouse to it; if the meanings are no_
standardized, the operational definition of the variable is invalid. The investigator also exercises control by
deciding which questions to cross-tabulate with others.
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Global Change Q-Sample
The Q-sample, as mentioned above, is an instrument that represents the
universe of discourse on an issue. Statements are selected according to a factorial
design, which makes the basis of selection explicit and encourages balance and
comprehensiveness with respect to the most important dimensions of the universe of
discourse. The most important dimensions, given the purposes of the study, are the
following three:
Culture (Conventional, Non-Conventional)
Values (Power, Enlightenment, Wealth, Well-Being, Morality, Skill)
Problem-Orientation (Goals, Trends, Conditions, Projections, Alternatives)
Overlapping these three dimensions produces 60 categories (2 x 6 x 5 = 60). We
have selected 60 statements, one for each category in the factorial design, from
personal interviews, news and other reports, and the scholarly literature? The Q-
sample is reproduced in Appendix 4.1, which includes the statements, their
classification in terms of the factorial design, and the mean scores within the
principal citizen viewpoints as well as the entke sample.
The Culture dimension ensures a balance among statements that are roughly
classified as conventional and non-conventional with respect to climate change issues.
As operationalized here, the conventional statements are generally oriented tog, ard
centralized (national and international) policy decisions, science as the basis for
policy, continuing economic growth, protecting existing standards of living, developing
natural resources for human progress, and relying on large-scale technologies. In
contrast, the non-conventional statements are generally oriented toward decentralized
decisions, the limitations of science for policy purposes, the economic costs of
s More precisely, the statements were selected and paraphrased from these sources. Paraphrasing is
necessary because the source statements seldom meet standards of clarity, consistency of tone, or concisenem
required for a Q-study. Paraphrasing works because the same basic idea can be expressed in many way.
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environmental degradation, learning sustainableways of living, developing moral
constraints on the exploitation of nature, and relying on small-scale technologies.
The other two dimensions reflect distinctions that are important in sound
thinking about any policy issue. 9 The Values dimension distinguishes statements
according to the many kinds of preferred outcomes at stake in any policy setting.
Here it is practical to use only six value categories: Power (decision making, victory,
defeat); enlightenment (news, insight, scientific discovery); wealth (income,
ownership); well-being (safety, health, comfort); morality (rectitude, respect,
affection); and skill (proficiency, know-how). It is typically a mistake to focus
analysis on one or a few values, and to ignore or dismiss the many others as
i
externalities. What is external to an analysis may be critical in the real world; an if
so, mistakes will be made when action is taken in the real world.
The Problem-Orientation dimension distinguishes statements according to the
five tasks that are logically entailed in any rational policy exercise: Goals (what are
the preferences to be realized.`?); trends (what have the trends been with respect to
those goals?); conditions (what factors condition the direction and magnitude of the
trends.'?); projections (what are the possible future trends under various
contingencies.'?); and alternatives (what strategies and tactics will help realize the
goals?). To understand the logical necessity of statements of each kind, consider that
without alternatives, there is no decision; without goals, there is no basis for deciding
among alternatives; without consideration of trends, conditions, and projection, the
realism of a decision is questionable.
The respondent knows nothing about the factorial design underlying the
selection of statements in the Q-sample, and the sorting of 60 statements gives them
the opportunity to express an extremely large number of viewpoints. Hence the
9 See Harold D. Lasswell, A Ire.View of Policy Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 1971), Chs. 2 and 3
especially.
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respondent finds it rather easy to express his or her unique viewpoint by sorting the
statements -- which is, of course, the point of the exercise. Anyone else's viewpoint
is much more difficult to express.
Data and Analysis
Between May and June, 1991, Quantum Research Services Inc. contacted
approximately 115 citizens in the Denver metropolitan area for this study. Quantum
used randomly-generated phone numbers in six geographic subareas selected for
socioeconomic diversity. In addition, Quantum also used screening questions to
select a diverse sample of literate citizens, balanced with respect to socioeconomic
standing, gender, age, pohtical identifications, and views on the environment. Of
those who met requirements for the sample, 72 were asked and agreed to participate.
Each respondent completed a Q-sort and a supplementary questionnaire during an
interview in the respondent's home) °
The main viewpoints shared among these 72 respondents were discovered and
described through statistical analysis. Briefly, we used the correlation, r, between
each pair of Q-sorts as a coefficient of similarity between the viewpoints of each pair
of respondents, taking into account all 60 statements. (For an identical pair of O-
sorts, possible but extremely unlikely, r = 1; for an independent pair, r = 0; and for
opposed pair, r < 0.) Then we clustered respondents together on the basis of
similarity using the complete linkage algorithm. For a sample of 72 cases, clustering
algorithms begin with 72 single-member "clusters" and produce one 72-member
cluster at the end. At each intervening step, the algorithms merge the two most
similar clusters (of those remaining) into one cluster. The algorithms differ in the
t0 The interviews were conducted by Quantum employees trained for this study. The respondenta were
offered and paid $20 each upon completion of the interview.
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rule used to select the two most similar clusters at each intervening step. 1'
However, other algorithms produced essentially the same clusters of respondents as
the complete linkage algorithm, which is evidence of the robustness of the results
reported in the next section.
Note that the expectations of conventional opinion surveys do not apply here.
In particular, the dependability (including representativeness) of a Q-study does not
depend on a large probability sample of several hundred or more. Such samples are
required to estimate the quantitative distribution of opinion in a population from
sample survey data, but that is not the purpose of a Q-study. Rather, the purpose
of a Q-study is to discover and describe the qualitatively distinct viewpoints shared
among respondents. For this purpose, the sample must be diverse enough and large
enough to include several respondents who represent each sig_.'ficant viewpoint in
the population. Any more than several such respondents would be redundant -- in
effect, more examples of the same viewpoint. A body of experience backed by theory
indicates that a diverse sample of 72 is large enough to fulfill the purposes of this
study, n
II. Results
Three viewpoints on global climate change issues emerged from the cluster
analysis, and are labelled the Traditionalists (TR), Environmental Activists (EA), and
Environmental Idealists (EI). This chapter begins with the structure of these
viewpoints, including their homogeneity, size, and relationships to each other. Then
the content of each viewpoint is described in some detail. Finally, these results are
11 For each pair of clusters remaining, the complete linkage algorithm finds the similarity between the
two members (one from each cluster) that are most different. It then selects and merge8 the pair of clusters for
which that similarity is highest. For an introduction, see Maurice Lorr, Cluster Analysts for Social 5cien_rx
(San Francisco: Jouey-]_m, 1987).
12 See Steven R. Brown, op. cir.
June 30, 1992 - 114 - Citizen Viewpoints
compared with the results of other studies to clarify their dependability as a basis for
leadership strategies.
Structure of the Viewpoints
Figure 4.1, a dendrogram, summarizes the structure of the viewpoints that
emerged from the cluster analysis. The horizontal dimension of the clusters is
proportional to the coefficient of similarity at which the clusters were formed. For
example, when two clusters merged into EI, their similarity was about .40; when TR
merged with the cluster of everyone else in the last step, their similarity was almost
.00. The lower the coefficient of similarity, the later the cluster was formed. The
vertical dimension of the clusters is approximately proportional to the number of
respondents (n) in them. The average correlation (r) between each member of a
cluster and the duster's ideal type is a measure of homogeneity. The duster's ideal
type is simply the average score on all 60 statements among members of the
cluster_3; it is, in effect, the Q-sort of a hypothetical perfect specimen of the cluster.
Clearly, EI (Environmental Idealists) is by far the largest and the most
homogeneous cluster. Statistically, this is very unusual, since normally the
homogeneity of a cluster decreases as its size increases. This 49-member duster
includes over two-thirds of the respondents; yet the viewpoints of the two least-
similar members in this cluster nevertheless correlate at about .40, and the average
correlation of members' viewpoints with the ideal type is .74. EA (Environmental
Activists) is the next largest and next most homogenous duster. The 12 members of
this cluster (a sixth of the respondents) have an average correlation of .55 with the
ideal type. TR (Traditionalists) are the smallest and least homogeneous cluster,
apart from the two outliers. 1' The 9 members of this cluster (an eighth of the
t3 These average scores are reported statement by statement in Appendix 4.1.
14 The outlier's Q-sorts make little sense. The best explanation is that the respondents did not take the
task seriously.
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Figure 4.1
Structure of Viewpoints (Dendrogram)
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Note: r = average correlation of cluster members with ideal type of the cluster.
respondents)have an average correlation of .47 with the ideal type, and, as we shall
see, agree on much less than the EAs and EIs.
The TRs and EIs are the most different viewpoints in the sample, as shown
in Figure 4.1. The dendrogram shows that if the whole sample is split into two
clusters, it is split between the TRs and the cluster of everyone else. And it is clear
that in the cluster of everyone else, EI is the dominant core. Moreover, the
correlation between their ideal types is only .26, which is less than the correlation
between the TR and EA ideal types (.44) and much less than the correlation between
the EA and EI ideal types (.78). Hence the ideal types of the most different
viewpoints, TR and EI, can be taken as a frame of reference to locate the individual
members of the clusters. The result is graphed in Figure 4.2. The horizontal X-axis
represents the ideal type of the TRs; the vertical Y-axis represents the ideal type of
the EIs. x5 The X,Y coordinates of each individual member are merely its
correlations with the idea types of the TRs and EIs, respectively.
The main point of Figure 4.2 is to show that these viewpoints are not
polarized. 1_ That is to say, nearly all of the individual viewpoints have some
positive (even if small) correlation with both the TR and E1 ideal types, and
therefore quite literally occupy the middle ground between the ideal types. The
exceptions are two members of the TR cluster whose viewpoints are negatively
correlated with the EI ideal type, and the two outliers whose viewpoints are
negatively correlated with the TR ideal type. High and negative correlations would
indicate polarization, stemming from strong opinions about the same statements but
15 Technically, the angle between the x and y axes should be less than 90 degrees, to reflect the small
positive correlation between the two ideal types. They ate represented as independent here to enhance the
readability of the graph. Note that a perfect specimen of TR would be located at coordinates 1,0; a perfect
specimen of E[ would be located at coordinates 0, I.
I_ Figure 4.2 also depicts in another way the intermediate position of EAs between TRs and Ell, and the
relative size and homogeneity of the three clusters. Note especially how the TRs ate dispersed over a rather
large and thinly-populated area.
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Figure 4.2
Relationships Among Individual Viewpoints
TR = Traditionalist ideal type (X-axis)
E1 = Environmental Idealist ideal type (Y-axis)
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in opposite directions. Apart from the exceptions, disagreement among individual
viewpoints is largely a matter of strong opinions about different statements.
In summary, the structure of citizens viewpoints on global climate issues is
strikingly simple compared to other issues. From the standpoint of potential leaders,
note that:
The dominant cluster of viewpoints, EI, is unexpectedly large and
homogenous.
The only potential opposition, TR, is quite small and rather heterogenous.
Overall, there is more consensus than conflict in this sample of citizen
viewpoints.
Complementary information about the content of viewpoints is also relevant to
potential leaders.
Content of the Viewpoints
Consensus within Viewpoints. The shared content or consensus within each
cluster consists of the statements that have the highest negative and the highest
positive mean scores among clusters members. (These are the statements that would
appear at the Most Disagree and the Most Agree extremes in the Q-sort of the
cluster's ideal type, the hypothetical perfect specimen.) Statements that are relatively
controversial or unimportant among cluster members have mean scores near the
middle of the distribution, roughly -2.0 to + 2.0. This section reviews the TR, EA,
and EI clusters in turn, reporting the consensus among members of each cluster
along with their socio-demographic characteristics.
The relatively weak consensus within the Traditionalist (TR) cluster appears
to focus on concern about the economic implications of global climate change (see
Figure 4.3A). Consisting mainly of male, conservative Republicans (see Figure 4.3B),
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Figure 4.3A
Consensus Within Traditionalist Cluster (TR)
Mean Scores (Sample, Tit, EA, EI)
Disagree
50. I support national taxes on
fossil fuel consumption to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases.
(-0.0, -3.4, + 0.3, + 0.6)
54. We should trust the government
in Washington to direct and coordinate
responses to global warming.
(-3.3,-2.8,-4.1,-3.3)
03. I support investing about $1
billion a year to monitor the global
climate and develop better scientific
models.
(+0.0,-2.4,-1.0, +0.6)
31. Environmentalists are virtually
powerless against the combination of
big business and big government.
(-1.4, -2.3, -1.3, -1.5)
48. Economic growth is partly an
illusion because it fails to account for
damage to nature.
(+ 0.9, -2.0, -0.1, + 1.6)
Agree
44. We must learn sustainable ways
of living that recognize and respect
nature's limits.
(+3.2, +2.6, +3.1, +3.4)
08. Global warming, like most other
policy problems, is a matter of
weighing benefits against costs.
(-0.9, +2.2,-1.0,-1.5)
43. Better scientific understanding
is required before making major policy
decisions on global climate change.
(+0.6, +2.2, +2.8,-0.2)
Figure 4.3B
Characteristics of Traditionalist Cluster (TR)
Age
Sex
Married
Occupation
Income
Race
Education
Political Party
Ideology
Environmentalist?
Religious?
Main News Source
Trust/Credible
Mean: 40.4 years
Range: 27-79 (52 years)
Distribution:
# Age
(1) 20-29 X
(5) 30-39 XXXXX
(2) 40-49 XX
(0) 50-59
(0) 60-69
(1) 70-79 X
7 Males; 2 Females
6 Yes; 3 No
Professionals. Numbers-orientation
3 Refused; 2 20+; 2 30+; 1 50+; 1 10-;
7 Whites; 1 Black; 1 Hispanic
4 Bachelors; 2 High School; 2 Masters ; 1 Associates
5 Republicans; 2 Independents; 2 Democrats
7 Conservatives; 2 Moderates; 0 Liberals
7 Yes; 1 Maybe; 1 No
6 Yes; 3 No
3 TV; 3 Papers; 1 Journal; 1 College; 1 Combination
5 Scientists; 3 None; 1 Combination;
0 Environmentalists; 0 Business Leaders;
0 Religious Leaders
the TRs are reluctant to pay for environmental protection, rejecting both taxes on
fossil fuels [50;-3.4] and investing to develop better scientific models [03;-2.4]. t7
These middle-to higher-income, numbers-oriented professionals also reject the idea
that economic growth is an illusion because it ignores damages to nature [48;-2.0].
This cluster tends to favor a robust, thriving economy over environmental concerns,
and perceives the two to be mutually exclusive.
The TRs also distrust the federal government to handle global warming policy
[54;.2.8], and believe that environmentalists are not a powerless group [31;-2.3].
Consequently, they may view environmental organizations as powerful interest groups
capable of exerting control over Washington and big business, perhaps threatening
the nation's economy. This duster's support for better scientific understanding as a
prerequisite for policy [43;+2.2] and for taking a cost-benefit approach [08;+2.2]
reflects their caution and skepticism about global warming. In addition, their choice
of scientists as the most credible and trustworthy sources of information tends to
reinforce the two previous notions.
Finally, and unexpectedly, the TRs agree that we must learn sustainable ways
of living [44;+2.6], and they identify themselves as environmentalists. From their
perspective, environmentalism and conservatism are evidently compatible, at least in
these respects.
The Environmental Activists (EAs) share an action-oriented viewpoint (Figure
4.4A). Consisting of moderately-educated small-business people (Figure 4.4B), they
combine environmental concerns with both scientific and economic caution, making
them intermediate between the TRs and EIs in these respects.
17 The first number within the brackets is a statement number; the second is the mean score on that
statement within the cluster.
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Figure 4.4A
Consensus Within Environmental Activist Cluster (EA)
Mean Scores (Sample, TR, EA, EI)
Disagree Agree
54. We should trust the government
in Washington to direct and coordinate
responses to global warming.
(-3.3,-2.8,-4.1,-3.3)
12. Environmental protection is
another burden on the weak and poor
in the United States and abroad.
(-2.1, -0.1, -2.4, -2.5)
39. Recycling is just one of many
time-consuming inconveniences
inspired by environmentalists.
(-3.1,-1.6,-2.2,-3.7)
38. We should rely on advances in
technology to meet such challenges as
global climate change.
(-0.7, +0.9,-2.0,-0.6)
19. I support policies
expand the production
nuclear power.
(-1.2, + 1.0, .2.0, -1.3)
that would
and use of
04. We should think globally but
act locally, relying on ourselves as
citizens to protect the global climate.
(+ 2.7, + 1.6, + 3.3, + 2.8)
10. I support research and
development to make better use of
renewable resources, like solar, hydro,
and wind.
(+3.1, +1.9, +3.2, +3.4)
44. We must learn sustainable ways
of living that recognize and respect
nature's limits.
(+3.2, +2.6, +3.1, +3.4)
43. Better scientific understanding
is required before making major policy
decisions on global climate change.
(+0.6, +2.2, +2.8,-0.2)
46. People eventually will have to
acquire a sense of stewardship for the
Earth and all life on it.
(+3.2, +1.3, +2.4, +3.6)
16. I support modest trial programs
to discover what can and should be
done about global warming.
(+ 1.5, -0.9, +2.1, + 1.9)
Figure 4.4B
Characteristics of Environmental Activist Cluster (EA)
Age
Sex
Married
Occupation
Income
Race
Education
Political Party
Ideology
Environmentalist?
Religious?
Main News Source
Trust/Credible
Mean: 38.1 years
Range: 22-65 (43 years)
Distribution:
# Age
(2) 20-29 XX
(6) 30-39 XXXXXX
(1) 40-49 X
(0) 50-59
(2) 60-69 XX
7 Males; 5 Females
7 Yes; 5 No
Nonprofessionals. Small business-orientation.
4 10+; 3 Refused; 2 20+; 2 30+; 1 75+
8 Whites; 3 Blacks; 1 Hispanic
5 High school; 4 Associates; 3 Bachelors
4 Republicans; 4 Independents; 4 Democrats
7 Conservatives; 5 Moderates; 0 Liberals
7 No; 5 Yes
9 Yes; 3 No
7 TV; 2 Newspaper; 1 Magazine; 1 Combination; 1 Work
7 Scientists; 3 Environmentalists; 1 Religious;
1 None; 0 Business leaders; 0 Religious leaders
The EA's action-orientation is local and small-scale, as evidenced by their
belief in thinking globally but acting locally [04;+3.3]. They also support research
and development for renewables [10;+3.2], modest trial programs [16;+2.1], and
recycling [39;-2.2]. In addition, the EAs reject relying on technological advances
[38;-2.0] as well as nuclear power [19;-2.0]. However, they believe that we need
more scientific understanding on global warming [43;+2.8] before making major
policy decisions.
Philosophically, the EAs support learning sustainable ways of living [44; +3.1]
and acquiring a sense of stewardship for the Earth and all its life [46; +2.4]. This
moderate to conservative cluster is the most distrustful of the federal government
[54;-4.1]. Combined with their small-business background, this distrust fuels a strong
support for active programs to protect the environment.
Consensus among the Environmental Idealists (EIs), the large and cohesive
cluster, emphasizes environmental ideology (Figure 4.5A). Socio-demographically
they are diverse, as evidenced by their varied occupations, fields, parties, and
ideologies (Figure 4.5B). Education levels are moderate, and their incomes are
mostly middle class.
The EIs are concerned about the Earth's limits, strongly rejecting the idea that
the world can support an ever-increasing human population [32;-4.0]. They also
support learning sustainable ways of living [44;+3.4] not based on human greed
[14;+2.6], and believe that environmental deterioration is the one cost we cannot
afford to pay indefinitely [06;+3.5]. They show concern for other life forms and
those not yet born, favoring both a sense of stewardship for the Earth and all its life
[46;+3.6] as well as intergenerational equity [21;+2.7]. The EIs also question the
values and institutions that have guided progress over the last two centuries [33;-2.7],
especially the dominance of man over nature [20;-3.3], and they do not trust the
federal government to direct and coordinate responses to global warming [54;-3.3].
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Figure 4.5A
Consensus Within Environmental Idealist Cluster (El)
Mean Scores (Sample, TR, EA, El)
Disagree Agree
32. The world has the carrying
capacity to support an ever-increasing
human population.
(-3.0,-0.3,-1.3,-4.0)
46. People eventually will have to
acquire a sense of stewardship for the
Earth and all life on it.
( + 3.2, + 1.3, + 2.4, + 3.6)
39. Recycling is just one of many
time-consuming inconveniences
inspired by environmentalists.
(-3.1, -1.6, -2.2, -3.7)
06. I believe that environmental
deterioration is the one cost we cannot
afford to pay indefinitely.
(+2.7, +1.6, +1.2, +3.5)
54. We should trust the government
in Washington to direct and coordinate
responses to global warming.
(-3.3,-2.8,-4.1,-3.3)
44. We must learn sustainable ways
of living that recognize and respect
nature's limits.
(+3.2, +2.6, +3.1, +3.4)
20. We must respect the Western
religious tradition that gives man the
right to dominate nature.
(-2.6, +0.4,-1.6,-3.3)
10. I support research and
development to make better use of
renewable resources, like solar, hydro,
and wind.
(+3.1, +I.9, +3.2, +3.4)
17. I oppose federal regulations to
force manufacturers to build more
fuel-efficient cars.
(-2.5, -0.2, -i.8, .3.0)
04. We should think globally but
act locally, relying on ourselves as
citizens to protect the global climate.
(+2.7, +1.6, +3.3, +2.8)
13. Global warming will turn out to
be like other scares, such as nuclear
winter and oil costing $100 per barrel.
(-2.0, +0.9,-0.3,-2.9)
27. Global climate cannot be
protected without international
cooperation and regulations.
(+2.4, +I.1, +1.7, +2.8)
15. The President and Congress
should attend to more important
problems than global climate change.
(-1.9, +0.0,-0.4,-2.7)
21. We must leave future
generations with as many opportunities
to meet their needs as we have had.
(+2.3, + 1.3, +1.8, +2.7)
Figure 4.$A (Continued)
33. I have confidence in the values
and institutiom that have guided our
progress over the last two centuries or
more.
(-2.0, +0.2,-1.8, .2.7)
12. Environmental protection is
another burden on the weak and poor
in the United States and abroad.
(-2.1, -0.1, -2.4, -2.5)
14. We must conceive and construct
a world not centered primarily on
human greed.
(+1.7,-1.7, +0.6, +2.6)
30. I support programs to help
families, firms, and localities cut back
their fossil fuel consumption.
(+1.8,-0.2, +0.4, +2.5)
Figure 4.513
Characteristics of Environmental Idealist Cluster (El)
Age
Sex
Married
Occupation
Income
Race
Education
Political Party
Ideology
Environmentalist?
Religious?
Main News Source
Trust/Credible
Mean: 41.5 years
Range: 19-75 (56 years)
Distribution:
# Age
(1) 18-19 X
(8) 20-29 XXXXXXXX
(19) 30-39 XX_O_(XXXXXX.'_K,_
(8) 40-49 XXXXXXXX
(4) 50-59 XXXX
(7) 60-69 XXXXXXX
(2) 70-79 XX
28 Female; 21 Male
31 Yes; 18 No
Wide range covering full socioeconomic span
13 30+; 10 20+; 8 10+; 6 50+; 3 75+; 3 10-; 6 Refused
45 White; 2 Black; 1 Hispanic; 1 Native American
18 High School; 15 Bachelors; 9 Associates;
5 Masters; 2 High School Dropouts
23 Independents; 14 Democrats; 12 Republican;
17 Moderate; 16 Liberal; 15 Conservative; 1 Refused
38 Yes; 11 No
30 Yes; 19 No
15 TV; 14 Magazines; 13 Newspaper; 4 Other; 3 Radio
24 Scientists; 21 Environmentalists; 1 Congress;
3 Other; 0 Business Leaders; 0 Religious Leaders
This cluster also favors action on a number of levels. On a smaller level, they
support recycling [39;-3.7], renewables research and development [10; + 3.4], thinking
globally but acting locally [04;+2.8], and programs to help families, firms, and
localities cut their fossil fuel consumption [30; +2.5]. On a larger level, they support
federally mandated automobile fuel-efficiency standards [17;-3.0], and international
cooperation and regulations on global warming [27;+2.8].
Finally, unlike the other clusters, the EIs are not skeptical or cautious about
global warming, and believe that it is real. They reject the idea that global warming
will turn out to be like other scares [13;-2.9], and also reject the idea that the
President and Congress should attend to more important problems [15;.2.7].
Consensus Across Viewpoints. Viewpoints in the sample as a whole are
relevant to potential leaders who might choose to address an undifferentiated
audience, as opposed to separate audiences of like-minded citizens such as EIs.
Reliance on statements that are already a matter of broad consensus will tend to
reinforce that consensus, even if the statements are interpreted differently within
different viewpoints (as is often the case). Reliance on such statements will also tend
to elicit a positive response toward the leader who identifies with them. Figure 4.6
reproduces the statements which are a matter of consensus across the three
viewpoints, and which also have the highest negative and the highest positive mean
scores in the sample, ts
The TRs, ETs, and EIs all tend to agree on general environmental ideals. For
example, they all strongly support acquiring a sense of stewardship for the Earth and
all life on it [46], learning sustainable ways of living [44], and leaving future
generations as many opportunities as we have had. In addition, they all tend to
Is Three statements have among the highe_ negative mean wore, in the sample, but are not a matter of
consensus since their means scores in Tit are pmitive. These statemeum refer to respect for the tradition of
human dominance over nature [20], confidence in the values and traditions that have guided progress [33], and
the belief that global warming will turn out to be like other scares [13].
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Figure 4.6
Consensus Across Viewpoints
Mean Scores (Sample, TR, EA, EI)
Disagree
54. We should t'-ust the government
in Washington to dtrect and coordinate
responses to global warming.
(-3.3, -2.8, -4.1, -3.3)
39. Recycling is just one of many
time-consuming inconveniences
inspired by environmentalists.
(-3.1, -1.6, -2.2, -3.7)
32. The world has the carrying
capacity to support an ever-increasing
human population.
(-3.0,-0.3,-1.3,-4.0)
17. I oppose federal regulations to
force manufacturers to build more
fuel-efficient cars.
(-2.5, -0.2, -1.8, -3.0)
12. Environmental protection is
another burden on the weak and poor
in the United States and abroad.
(-2.1, -0.1, -2.4, -2.5)
01. Only the large-scale, advanced
technologies can be effective in
responding to global climate change.
(-2.0, -1.8, -1.5, -2.3)
Agree
44. We must learn sustainable ways
of living that recognize and respect
nature's limits.
(+3.2, +2.6, +3.1, +3.4)
46. People eventually will have to
acquire a sense of stewardship for the
Earth and all life on it.
(+ 3.2, + 1.3, + 2.4, + 3.6)
10. I support research and develop-
ment to make better use of renewable
resources, like solar, hydro, and wind.
(+3.1, +1.9, +3.2, +3.4)
04. We should think globally but
act locally, relying on ourselves as
citizens to protect the global climate.
(+2.7, +1.6, +3.3, +2.8)
06. I believe that environmental
deterioration is the one cost we cannot
afford to pay indefinitely.
(+2.7, + 1.6, +1.2, +3.5)
27. Global climate cannot be
protected without international
cooperation and regulations.
(+2.4, +1.1, +1.7, +2.8)
21. We must leave future
generations with as many opportunities
to meet their needs as we have had.
(+2.3, +1.3, +1.8, +2.7)
09. Sound policy on global warming
depends on the integration of science,
morals, and politics.
(+2.2, +1.7, +1.4, +2.5)
believe that environmental deterioration is the one cost we cannot afford to pay
indefinitely [06], and that the world has a limited capacity to support an ever-
expanding human population [32]. Potentially at least, there is support for
leadership on behalf of these environmental ideals and beliefs.
There is widespread distrust of the government in Washington to direct and
coordinate responses to global warming [54]. However, there is support for acting
locally, relying on citizens to protect the global climate [04]. And there is a
widespread belief that international cooperation and regulations are necessary to
protect the global climate. Most believe that sound policy on global warming
depends on the integration of science, morals, and politics [09].
Finally, there is a consensus on several courses of action on global warming
that are consistent with environmental ideas and beliefs. For example, all three
viewpoints show support for research and development on renewable energy
resources [10], recycling [39], and stricter regulations on automobile fuel efficiency
[17]. Finally, all three viewpoints tend to reject relying on large-scale, advanced
technologies [01].
Conflict Across Viewpoints. Figure 4.7 reproduces the statements which are
most in conflict across the three viewpoints. The themes represented by these
statements are worth avoiding to the extent that building a broad consensus is a
relatively high priority for potential leaders.
General economic considerations are an important focus of conflict. In
contrast to the EIs and EAs, the TRs show an unwillingness to pay for environmental
protection, and are more concerned about the economy. For example, the EIs
believe that we must conceive and construct a world not centered primarily on
human greed, while the TRs disagree with this notion [14]. Similarly, the TRs
disagree that economic growth is partly an illusion for ignoring environmental
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Figure 4.7
Conflict Across Viewpoints
Mean Scores (Sample, TR, EA, EI)
Note: Difference between the two most extreme scores is given after parenthesis.
Disagree Agree
50. I support national taxes on
fossil fuel consumption to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases.
(-0.0, -3.4, + 0.3, + 0.6) 4.0
14. We must conceive and construct
a world not centered primarily on
human greed.
(+1.7,-1.7, +0.6, +2.6)4.3
13. Global warming will turn out to
be like other scares, such as nuclear
winter and oil costing $100 per barrel.
(-2.0, +0.9,-0.3, -2.9) 3.8
48. Economic growth is partly an
illusion because it fails to account for
damage to nature.
( + 0.9, -2.0, -0.1, + 1.6) 3.6
32. The world has the carrying
capacity to support an ever-increasing
human population.
(-3.0,-0.3,-1.3, -4.0) 3.7
51. The belief that humans can
exploit nature without limit is the root
cause of the growing environmental
crisis.
(+ 1.5, -1.1, + 1.2, +2.1) 3.2
20. We must respect the Western
religious tradition that gives man the
right to dominate nature.
(-2.6, +0.4,-1.6, -3.3) 3.7
03. I support investing about $1
billion a year to monitor the global
climate and develop better scientific
models.
(+0.0, -2.4, -1.0, +0.6) 3.0
08. Global warming, like most other
policy problems, is a matter of
weighing benefits against costs.
(-0.9, +2.2, -1.0, -1.4) 3.6
16. I support modest trial programs
to discover what can and should be
done about global warming.
(+ 1.5, -0.9, + 2.1, + 1.9) 3.0
36. Spending large amounts of
money to control the build-up of
greenhouse gases is not justified at this
time.
(-1.6, + 1.0, -1.4, -2.1) 3.0
43. Better scientific understanding
is required before making major policy
decisions on global climate change.
(+ 0.6, + 2.2, + 2.8, -0.2) 3.0
damages[48]. Finally, the TRs favor reducing global warming to a matter of cost-
benefit analysis [08].
Conflict on general economic considerations carries over into conflict on
specific courses of action. In contrast to the EIs and EAs, the TRs are reluctant to
take action. The TRs do not support spending large amounts of money to control
the build-up of greenhouse gases [36] or having national taxes on fossil fuel
consumption [50], while the EIs and EAs tend to favor these approaches. In
addition, the TRs and to a lesser extent the EAs do not support investing to monitor
the global climate, while the EIs tend to support this [03]. Finally, the EIs and EAs
support modest trial programs to discover what can and should be done about global
warming, while the TRs tend to reject this approach as well [16].
The priority of man over nature is another area of conflict. The EIs do not
accept this traditional priority [20], reject the claim that the world can support an
ever-increasing human population, and see the belief that humans can exploit nature
indefinitely as the root cause of the ecological crisis [511. The TRs disagree with
these notions. In addition, the TRs are skeptical about the validity of global
warming, whereas the EIs believe that it is real [13]. Finally, both the TRs and EAs
desire more scientific knowledge, while the EIs are neutral [43].
Dependability of the Results
Perhaps the most surprising result of this study is the relatively small size and
large heterogeneity of the TR viewpoint, which is probably closest to the viewpoint
expressed in present national policy. This raises the question of how dependable the
results might be as a basis for formulating strategies for leadership. The question
can only be answered through replication of the study with similar samples both in
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and outside the Denver metropolitan areafl In the meantime, it is worth
comparing the results of this study with selected results of other studies as a gauge
of dependability.
A Gallup poll conducted from April 11 to 14, 1991, showed that in response
to the question "Do you consider yourself to be an environmentalist, or not?", 78%
of a national sample responded yes.20 This percentage was basically the same across
gender, ethnicity, education level, age, income, and political ideology. The Texas
Environmental Survey conducted in 1990 showed that 62% considered themselves to
be "sympathetic to environmental causes but not active. "2t In the Q-study, the 72
respondents were asked the question, "Do you consider yourself an
environmentalist?" Seventy-one percent said '3'es," which is near the middle of the
range between the national and the Texan percentages. The 72 respondents also
resemble national probability samples in terms of other political identifications. An
American Profile -- Opinions and Behavior, 1972-1989 shows that as of 1989, 28% of
Americans considered themselves liberal, 39% moderate, and 32% conservative, z2
The Q respondents are slightly more conservative, showing 23% liberal, 34%
moderate, and 41% conservative.
The Q-study sample matches U.S. Census data for 1980 rather closely on some
socio-demographic characteristics. Gender distribution nationally was 51.4% female
and 48.6% male, whereas the Q-study respondents are evenly split between female
and male. The national distribution by race was 83.1% white, 11.7% black, 6.4%
t9 As mentioned above, a body of experience backed by theory suggests that such re_lts are replicable.
20 George Cndlup, Jr., Public Opinion Annual Series 1991, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources,
Inc. Survey _ 122025.
21The Texas Environmental Survey, Department of Sociology, Rice University. Survey conducted July 28
to August 12, 1990. ,
22 An American Profile - Opinions and Behavior, 1972-1989, National Opinion Research Center.
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Hispanic, and 0.6% other, whereas the Q-study respondents are 85.7% white, 8.6%
black, 4.3% Hispanic, and 1.4% other. However, people in the 30-39 year old age
group are over-represented among the Q-study respondents compared to national
norms, but otherwise the age distributions are quite similar. The most important
difference is that the Q-study respondents are more highly educated, with 41.4%
reporting 4 years of college or more, compared to 16.2% nationally.
The distributions of opinion on significant Q-sample statements (those with
the highest negative and highest positive mean scores) approximate the distributions
of opinion on national and/or state survey questions that were similarly worded. For
comparison, note that the EIs comprise 70% of the respondents in the Q-study,
followed by the EAs and TRs at 17% and 13%, respectively. Where appropriate, the
Q-study statement number is given in brackets.
First, general confidence in Washington is low. In 1989, when asked "How
much confidence do you have in the executive branch of the federal government of
this country?", 57% responded "only some" and 23% "hardly any." When asked the
same question about Congress, 60% responded "only some" and 23% responded
"hardly any. "z3 This tends to match the high level of distrust of the government in
Washington found in the Q-study [54]. For example, 93.1% rejected the idea that
we should trust Washington to direct and coordinate responses to global warming,
whereas only 4.1% agreed, while 2.8% were neutral.
The Texas Environmental Survey showed 69% agreeing with the statement "We
humans are approaching the limits of the Earth's room and resources." In addition,
78% disagreed with the statement "Humans don't need to adapt to the natural
environment because they can change it to suit their needs." These two statements
tend to match up with the strong desire to learn sustainable ways of living in the Q-
study [44]. 98.6% of the Q-sample agreed that we must learn sustainable ways of
An American Profile - Opinions and Behavior, 1972-1989, p. 656 and p. 672.
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living that recognize and respect nature's limits. In addition, the Texas survey
showed 64% disagreeing with the statement "Plants and animals exist primarily to be
used by humans." Again, this tends to match closely with the high level agreement
with the idea of acquiring stewardship [46]. The Q-study showed 86.1% agreeing
that people eventually will have to acquire sense of stewardship for the Earth and
all life on it, with 6.9% disagreeing, and 6.9% remaining neutral.
Renewable energy resources are supported in national polls. For example, a
study for the Union of Concerned Scientists conducted in November, 1989, found
61% strongly agreeing and 27% somewhat agreeing with the statement that "An
important way for utilities to reduce their use of fossil fuels like oil and coal is to use
renewable energy sources like solar, wind, and water. "u This corresponds to the
high support for renewable energy resources among respondents in the Q-study [10],
which shows 93.0% supporting research and development to make better use of
renewable resources such as solar, hydro, and wind. (Only 1.4% are non-supportive,
while 5.6% are neutral.) Support for recycling has been rising over the years, and
is currently very high. From 1987 to 1990, those claiming to have made changes in
behavior to recycle cans, bottles, and paper has risen from 57% to 84%.25 Again,
this corresponds to the high support for recycling in the Q-study [39]. 88.9% of the
Q-study respondent disagreed with the statement that recycling is just one of many
time-consuming inconveniences inspired by environmentalists, while only 7.0%
agreeing, and 4.1% remaining neutral. Finally, regarding faith in technology, The
Texas Environmental Survey reported 65% disagreeing with the statement that "We
will be able to solve our environmental problems through better technologies alone,
without having to change our lifestyles." Again, this corresponds to the Q-study result
[01], which shows 83.3% of the respondents rejecting the idea that only the large-
24 Cdobal Wmmin8 and Energy Priorities: A Na_onal Perspectiw, A Study for the Union of Concerned
Scientists, Re.arch/Strategy/Management, Inc., November 1989.
25 Riley E. Dunlap and Rik Scarce, "The Polls - Poll Trends: Environmental Problems and Protection,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, 55:651-672, 1991.
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scale,advancedtechnologiescan be effective in responding to global climate change.
(Only 9.8% agreed, while 6.9% remain neutral.)
Although this Q-study was not designed to estimate percentage distributions,
the distribution of political identifications, other sample characteristics, and opinion
on statements in the Q-sample are broadly consistent with national or state studies
designed for that purpose. Pending replication of the study, we beLieve that the
sample is diverse enough to include representatives of any significant viewpoint and
that the results are not biased toward any particular viewpoint in any obvious way.
In particular, the relatively small size and minimal consensus within the TR viewpoint
does not appear to be an anomaly. We conclude that the results are dependable as
a qualitative basis for formulating leadership strategies.
IlL Implications
On the basis of these results, the predispositions of the public provide ample
opportunities for leadership in response to the threat of global climate change, and
in particular for efforts on behalf of the non-conventional alternatives beginning with
a decentralized energy strategy. Before outlining one of these opportunities,
however, it is worthwhile to place these results in a broader historical context, which
has leadership implications.
Historical Context
Environmentalism, as reflected in the EA and EI viewpoints, is a relatively
recent and rising outlook compared to the traditional viewpoint that coevolved with
the European settlement and development of North America. Indeed,
environmentalism may be in large part a reaction to the adverse effects of settlement
and development.
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The historic roots of environmentalism in the U.S. can be traced to the
conservation movement which began in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1851, Henry
David Thoreau articulated the need to appreciate and preserve nature and
wilderness. _ This was followed by a rapid growth in outdoor and nature education,
which led to the creation of the two national park systems in North America and
eventually the national forest system in the U.S. However, the early movement was
mainly anthropocentric and concerned with using scientific management practices on
natural resources and their potential products. Three conservationists, most notably
George Perkins Marsh, John Muir, and Aldo Leopold, took conservation a step
further and applied an ecological perspective to human activities? s Their thoughts
laid the foundation for the writings of a new breed of environmentalists in the 1960s
and 1970s, most notably Rachel Carson, who helped to develop a deep and
widespread public concern with pollution as well as humanity's connections to
nature. _ Carson and her successors have helped to shape environmental opinion
in our time.
Public opinion polls show public interest in the environment peaking during
the first Earth Day in 1970, then declining somewhat through the remainder of the
decade. Surprisingly, there was little reaction against environmental protection
measures, even though the nation suffered from economic and energy-shortage
Roderick Hash, W//derness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967,) pp.
84-97.
45 /b/d. George Perkins Marsh hu been credited with creating the modern concept of ecology, i.e., the
study of the interrelationships between organisms and the environment. His mint important work, Man and
Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1864), addressed the unintended negative effects of human
economic activities on the environment. John Muir saw nature, wildernem, and people M part of a spiritual
whole, and strove to preserve wilderness for its own sake. (John Muir, The W//derne_ World of John Muir,
ed. Edwin May Teale, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1954.) Aldo Leopold blended ecology and ethics, and saw
the land itself as a living organism. His most notable work is A Sand County A/manac (New York: BaUantine
Books, 1949).
Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
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problems.4v However, the 1980s showed notable increases in public support,
perhaps because of frustration over Reagan Administration policies and the
emergence of new problems like global warming and ozone depletion. _ Since then,
policymakers, scientists, and environmental activists have served to accelerate this
trend during the Bush Administration. 49 Partly in response to the twentieth
anniversary of Earth Day in 1990, concern over the environment as well as support
for environmental protection measures appears to be at an all time high.
Trends on specific issues show this in more detail. For example, there is a
growing preference for environmental quality over economic growth to the point that
it is now preferred by large majorities. From 1976 to 1990, those responding
positively to the statement "We must sacrifice economic growth in order to preserve
and protect the environment" rose from 38% to 64%. 5° New York Times/CBS
News polls taken from 1981-90 show agreement with the statement "Protecting the
environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and
continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost" increasing
from 45% to 74%? t However, it is important not to overestimate the relative
importance of the environment. For example, a November, 1990, Gallup poll showed
only 2% volunteering "environment" or "pollution" as the most important problem
facing the United States. And a July, 1990, Cambridge poll showed that 47% would
not be willing to accept a higher rate of unemployment so that industry could better
47 R. C. Mitchell, "Public Opinion on Environmental Issues," in Enviro_nental Quality: The Eleventh
Annual Report on the Council on En_ro_,tnml Quality (Washington, D.C.: Council on Environmental Quality,
zgso).
48 I. M. Gilroy and R.Y. Shapiro, "The Polls: Environmental Protection," Public Opinion Quarterly 50
(1986), pp. 270-79.
49 R. C. Mitchell, "Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s7," in En_ronmental Policy
in the 1990s: Towards a New Asemda, ed. N.J. Vig and M.E. Kraft (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1990).
5o Dunlap and Scarce, 1991.
_t Ibid.
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preserve and protect the environment. So while an environmental ethic appears to
be emerging, it is also clear that economic considerations are of great importance to
many citizens.
Surveys also show that increasing numbers of citizens view global warming as
a serious problem. From 1982 to 1989, in response to the question, "[D]o you feel
the greenhouse effect is a very serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too
serious a problem, or not a serious problem at all?', the percentage choosing "very
serious" grew from 12% to 41%. s2 In addition, a 1991 Florida poll found 70%
believing global warming to be serious enough to warrant aggressive action by the
US government. 53
The historical rise of environmentalism, as manifest in these trenos, appears
to coincide with a decline in the traditional viewpoint, at least in the global climate
change context. The results of this study suggest that the traditional viewpoint is
much smaller and much less cohesive than it once must have been -- perhaps because
leaders have not articulated the traditional viewpoint as often or as well as the
environmental viewpoints. For example, there is very little overt anti-
environmentalism; the opposition to environmental ideals and initiatives is typically
expressed indirectly as opposition to their economic costs. Environmental ideals, if
not environmental initiatives, tend to flourish under these circumstances.
Whatever the reasons may be, the traditional viewpoint is a relatively weak
viewpoint within the public at this time, but it is still the viewpoint closest to current
policy. Hence the situation is unstable, and the environmental viewpoints are not
likely to go away. The situation, in short, is ripe for leadership.
J2 Ibid.
s3 T_ Energy/M/by, Vol. 20 (January 10, 1992).
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Opportunities for Leadership
In the conclusion to Chapter 1 of this report, a case was made that leadership
on behalf of the non-conventional alternatives -- a decentralized energy strategy and
the more general preferences, beliefs, and loyalties associated with it -- can be
justified on grounds of more rational decisions, and a more democratic decision
process, in response to the threat of global climate change. In the global change
context, a decentralized energy strategy is a field-tested step toward curbing CO2
emissions that contribute to global warming, and toward developing local and
regional capacities to cope with the geographically diverse impacts of global warming,
if it occurs.
The results of this chapter suggest few obstacles and many opportunities to
lead public opinion in this direction. Consider, for example, a promotional strategy
based on themes represented by the following statements in the Q-sample. Apart
from two exceptions, all of these statements are a matter of consensus within the
sample as a whole and within the three shared viewpoints. The exceptions are two
of the program initiatives, [30] and [16], which are controversial among the TRs,
who are on average slightly opposed by them. The task, therefore, is to reinforce and
give direction to existing predispositions.
54. We should trust the government in 16. I support modest
Washington to direct and coordinate discover what can and
responses to global warming, about global warming.
(-3.3 , -2.8, -4.1, -3.3) (+1.5, -0.9, +2.1, +1.9)
04. We should think globally but act
locally, relying on ourselves as citizens to
protect the global climate.
(+2.7, +1.6, +3.3, +2.8)
57. Efficiency and conservation were the
least costly and most effective responses to
past energy crises.
(+1.3, +1.8, +0.4, +1.4)
30. I support programs to help families,
firms, and localities cut back their fossil
fuel consumption.
(+1-11, -0.2, +0.4, +2.5)
trial programs to
should be done
10. I support research and development to
make better use of renewable resources,
like solar, hydro, and wind.
(+3.1, +1.9, +3.2, +3.4)
44. We must learn sustainable ways of
living that recognize and respect nature's
limits.
(+3.2, +2.6, +3.1, +3.4)
46. People will eventually have to acquire
a sense of stewardship for the earth and all
ilfe on it.
(+3.2, +1.3, +2.4, +3.6)
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The rather intense distrust of the government in Washington to direct and
coordinate responses to global warming [54] might be constructively channelled into
support for local action [04], in which ordinary citizens and their local leaders, public
and private, take the initiative. Paradoxically, leadership from Washington is
necessary to promote such a decentralized strategy. Otherwise, a decentralized
strategy would be unable to compete for attention and other forms of support -- both
in Washington and around the country -- with the centralized alternatives that have
preoccupied national attention. Reliance on localities for policies appropriate to
their own circumstances is justified by the experience of the energy crisis of the
1970s. And this experience can be used to reinforce rather weak support for the idea
that efficiency and conservation (which require local action) were the least costly and
the most effective responses to past energy crises [57]. Evidently, the story of the
energy crisis told in Chapter 2 has not yet been effectively told for the general public.
The program initiatives in a decentralized strategy might include, but are not
limited to, conservation and efficiency programs to help families, firms, and localities
cut back their fossil fuel consumption [30], modest trial programs at the local level
to discover what can and should be done about global warming [16], and further
research and development to make better use of renewable energy resources [10] as
substitutes for fossil fuels. A decentralized strategy based on initiatives of this kind
is procedurally rational. The point is to act in order to reduce uncertainties about
the consequences of alternative programs and to clarify ambiguities in the
preferences we use to evaluate consequences and select among the alternatives.
There are many opportunities for this trial-and-error approach as there are localities.
Failures could be limited to one locality; successes could be considered for
adaptation to many localities. The national response to global warming need not
presume that there is one comprehensive, centralized policy that can be discovered
by the experts who advise the President and Congress, and can be enacted by these
elected representatives of the public.
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Finally, these program initiatives can be justified in terms of the need to learn
sustainable ways of living that recognize and respect nature's limits [44], and to
acquire a sense of stewardship for the earth and all life on it [46]. As noted in
Chapter 3, "sustainability" and "stewardship" are key symbols of justification that have
been used by environmentalists and by the Bush Administration in connection with
global climate change. They also appear to be key symbols of justification accepted
by the public. Like other key symbols, their function is to mobilize consensus on the
basic aim or direction of policy and to provide a common basis for debating the
merits and limitations of specific actions proposed to take the next steps in that
direction.
There are many variations on this promotional strategy and many alternatives
to it that could be developed from the results of this study. For example, there is a
basis in the predispositions of the public for an effective promotional strategy against
the present de facto, centralized strategy of non-action on global warming. Of course
any promotional strategy, once/mplemented, tends to elic/t a counter-strategy. And
the resulting public debate contributes to rationality and democracy if the issue is
important and the alternatives are significant.
Conclusion
A primary function of policy inqu/ry is the "discovery of the means by which
all who participate in a policy-forming and policy-executing process can live up to
their potential for sound judgment. "s4 This chapter has attempted to clarify the
means by which public officials can make a sound judgment on leadership of public
opinion with respect to global climate change issues. There appear to be no
significant obstacles in the predispositions of the public to taking the lead on behalf
of the non-conventional alternatives. (Evidently, there must be obstacles of other
kinds.) If potential leaders do in fact take the lead in this direction, we believe that
S4 LaMwell, 1971, pp. 62-63.
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citizenswill have better means of living up to their potential for sound judgment.
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Appendix 4.1
Q-Sample:
Statements, Classification, and
Mean Scores (Sample, TR, EA, EI)
Power
Conventional Non-Conventional
54. We should trust the government
in Washington to direct and coordinate
responses to global warming.
Goal (-3.3, -2.8, -4.1, -3.3)
24. Most Americans are
uninterested, uninformed, and
uninvolved in environmental politics.
Trend (+ 0.6, + 1.6, + 0.2, + 0.8)
04. We should think globally but
act locally, relying on ourselves as
citizens to protect the global climate.
Goal (+ 2.7, + 1.6, + 3.3, + 2.8)
53. National leaders have displayed
an inability to debate and define issues
like global warming.
Trend (+0.9, -0.2, + 1.3, + 1.1)
27. Global climate cannot be
protected without international
cooperation and regulations.
Condition (+2.4, + 1.1, +1.7, +2.8)
31. Environmentalists are virtually
powerless against the combination of
big business and big government.
Condition (-1.4, -2.3, -1.3,-1.5)
13. Global warming will turn out to
be like other scares, such as nuclear
winter and oil costing $100 per barrel.
Projection (-2.0, +0.9,-0.3, -2.9)
15. The President and Congress
should attend to more important
problems than global climate change.
Alternative (- 1.9, + 0.0, -0.4, -2.7)
22. Political pressures from the
growing ecological crisis will lead
eventually to reforms or revolution.
Projection (.0.0, -0.9, .0.5, +0.3)
30. I support programs to help
families, firms, and localities cut back
their fossil fuel consumption.
Alternative (+ 1.8, -0.2, + 0.4, + 2.5)
Wealth
Conventional Non-Conventional
18. Even if the Earth warms up, we
should rely on individual consumers
making choices in free markets.
Goal (-1.3, -0.6, +0.3, -1.8)
14. We must conceive and construct
a world not centered primarily on
human greed.
Goal (+1.7,-1.7, +0.6, +2.6)
08. Global warming, like most other
policy problems, is a matter of
weighing benefits against costs.
Trend (-0.9, +2.2,-1.0,-1.4)
48. Economic growth is partlyan
illusionbecause itfailsto account for
damage to nature.
Trend (+ 0.9, -2.0, -0.1, + 1.6)
59. Only a strong economy can
cover the high costs of cleaning up the
environment.
Condition (-0.8, -0.2, -0.9, -0.9)
34. Economic growth as we know it
cannot be sustained over the next
several decades.
Condition (-0.0, -0.1, -0.4, + 0.1)
41. The costs of controlling the
build-up of greenhouse gases would be
high enough to cripple the economy.
Projection (-1.5, +0.4,-1.4,-1.9)
23. The growth industries of the
future will arise from demands for
environmental protection.
Projection (+ 1.4, +0.4, + 1.8, + 1.5)
36. Spending large amounts of
money to control the build-up of
greenhouse gases is not justified at this
time.
Alternative (-1.6, + 1.0, -1.4, -2.1)
06. I believe that environmental
deterioration is the one cost we cannot
afford to pay indefinitely.
Alternative (+ 2.7, + 1.6, + 1.2, + 3.5)
Enlightenment
Conventional Non.Conventional
45. We need to develop a
predictive model of the entire Earth
system, which includes human
interactions.
Goal (+ 0.7, + 0.7, -0.8, + 1.0)
44. We must learn sustainable ways
of living that recognize and respect
nature's limits.
Goal (+3.2, +2.6, +3.1, +3.4)
49. Scientific findings on global
climate change are independent of any
ethical or political position.
Trend (-0.6, -0.9, +0.6, -0.8)
29. The atmosphere and biosphere
are too complex for accurate, precise
predictions beyond the short-term.
Trend (-0.7, -0.9, +0.0, -0.8)
43. Better scientific understanding
is required before making major policy
decisions on global climate change.
Condition (+ 0.6, + 2.2, + 2.8, -0.2)
09. Sound policy on global warming
depends on the integration of science,
morals, and politics.
Condition (+ 2.2, + 1.7, + 1.4, + 2.5)
58. We will be able to predict the
regional impacts of global climate
change within a decade or two.
Projection (-0.6, -0.6, -1.5, -0.5)
25. Rational policy-making will
depend upon continuing political
debate over global warming issues.
Projection (+ 0.2, -0.3, + 0.0, + 0.3)
03. I support investing about $1
billion a year to monitor the global
climate and develop better scientific
models.
Alternative (+0.0,-2.4, -1.0, +0.6)
16. I support modest trial programs
to discover what can and should be
done about global warming.
Alternative ( + 1.5, -0.9, + 2.1, + 1.9)
Skill
Conventional
38. We should rely on advances in
technology to meet such challenges as
global climate change.
Goal (-0.7, +0.9, -2.0, -0.6)
42. If we can put a man on the
moon, we can also limit global
warming, or adjust to it if necessary.
Trend (+ 0.6, + 1.2, + 0.8, + 0.4)
01. Only the large-scale, advanced
technologies can be effective in
responding to global climate change.
Condition (-2.0,-1.8,-1.5,-2.3)
35. Genetic engineering and other
technologies will ensure adequate food
supplies even if the Earth warms up.
Projection (-1.4, -0.8, -1.2, -1.6)
19. I support policies that would
expand the production and use of
nuclear power.
Alternative (-1.2, + 1.0, -2.0, -1.3)
Conventional
26. We must protect the quality of
life in America from those seeking
limits to growth.
Goal (-0.5, +1.8, +0.8,-1.2)
39. Recycling is just one of many
time-consuming inconveniences
inspired by environmentalists.
Trend (-3.1, - 1.6, -2.2, -3.7)
12. Environmental protection is
another burden on the weak and poor
in the United States and abroad.
Condition (-2.1, -0.1, -2.4, -2.5)
Non-Conventional
52. We must learn how to limit
climate change or how to prepare for
its disruptive impacts on society.
Goal (+1.9, +0.1, +1.9, +2.1)
57. Efficiency and conservation
were the least costly and most effective
responses to past energy crises.
Trend (+ 1.3, + 1.8, + 0.4, + 1.4)
56. Small-scale technologies can be
adapted to different localities without
major environmental impacts.
Condition (-0.0, -0.1, + 0.3, -0.0)
47. Science-based technology will
not shield us from the disruptive
effects of global climate change.
Projection (-0.1, -0.8, -1.3, + 0.2)
10. I support research and develop-
ment to make better use of renewable
resources, like solar, hydro, and wind.
Alternative (+ 3.1, + 1.9, + 3.2, + 3.4)
Well-Being
Non.Conventional
21. We must leave future
generations with as many opportunities
to meet their needs as we have had.
Goal (+ 2.3, + 1.3, + 1.8, + 2.7)
37. More frequent and severe
tornados, floods, and droughts are
indicators of global warming.
Trend (+0.1,-1.4, +0.1, +0.4)
07. The burning of forests and fossil
fuels produces "greenhouse gases" that
warm the Earth's climate.
Condition (+1.8, +0.7, +0.5, +2.1)
55. With enough time, Western
standards of living can be achieved
throughout the Third World.
Projection (- 1.0, -0.8, -0.6, - 1.1)
02. The Earth's average
temperature will increase between 2 to
9 degrees Fahrenheit over the next
half century.
Projection (-0.3, -1.9, -0.2, -0.1)
17. I oppose federal regulations to
force manufacturers to build more
fuel-efficient cars.
Alternative (-2.5, -0.2, -1.8, -3.0)
50. I support national taxes on
fossil fuel consumption to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases.
Alternative (-0.0, -3.4, + 0.3, + 0.6)
Morality
Conventional Non-Conventional
20. We must respect the Western
religious tradition that gives man the
right to dominate nature.
Goal (-2.6, +0.4, -1.6, -3.3)
05. We need moral constraints on
uses of science and technology that
threaten the global environment.
Goal (+ 1.4, -0.1, + 0.8, + 1.7)
28. Progress is the continued
development of the world's natural
resources for human purposes.
Trend (-1.3, +0.9, -0.8, -1.8)
40. The threat of global climate
change is not appreciated by self-
centered or short-sighted people.
Trend (+0.7, +0.2,-0.8, +1.1)
60. Our way of life depends upon
continued long-term growth and
development of the economy.
Condition (+ 0.1, + 1.4, + 1.7, -0.5)
51. The belief that humans can
exploit nature without limit is the root
cause of the growing ecological crisis.
Condition (+ 1.5, -1.1, + 1.2, +2.1)
32. The world has the carrying
capacity to support an ever-increasing
human population.
Projection (-3.0, -0.3, -1.3, -4.0)
46. People eventually will have to
acquire a sense of stewardship for the
Earth and all life on it.
Projection (+ 3.2, + 1.3, + 2.4, + 3.6)
33. I have confidence in the values
and institutions that have guided our
progress over the last two centuries or
more.
Alternative (-2.0, + 0.2, -1.8, -2.7)
11. I support those leaders who are
willing to question the values and
beliefs that guided industrialization.
Alternative (+ 1.4, -0.4, + 1.3, + 2.0)
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Sample of Respondents
Traditionalist (TR)
C AgS MOccup
05 45 M Y Nurse
27 37 M Y Unemploy
16 45 M Y Salesman
50 31 M Y Metrlgst
54 31 M N Accountnt
72 30 M N AcctsMgr
09 27 F Y Secretary
48 39 M Y DataProc
24 79 F N Retired
REd Field
W MA Geography
W BA Accountng
W BA Eng/Mgt
W MA Meteorlgy
W BA Accountng
W BA Accountng
B HS .........
H AS VocAgr
W HS .........
Environmental Activist (EA)
Prt Ide E R Rel News Trs lnc
Ind Con M N /'rot Col/ Sci 50+
Rep Con Y Y ..... TV None 20+
Rep Con N N ..... Pap None ---
Rep Mod Y Y Cath Jrn Sci ---
Rep Con Y Y Ouakr Pap Sci 30+
Rep Con Y N ..... Comb Comb 30+
Dem Con Y Y Ath "IV Sci ---
Ind Mod Y Y Cath Pap Sci 20+
Dem Con Y Y Bapt TV None 10-
C AgS MOccup
63 35 M Y Salesman
64 23 M N Paralegal
02 41 M Y ElecTech
14 65 F Y Nurse/ret
51 35 F N CreditMgr
R Ed Field
W BA LibArts
W BA English
W AS Computers
W AS Nursing
W AS Business
69 35 M N CabintMkr B AS Mechanics
57 63 M N Lawn Care H HS .........
67 34 M Y Postman W HS .........
32 37 F Y Housewife W HS .........
61 34 F Y Nurse B HS .........
33 22 M Y Banker W BA Music
15 33 F N Dry Clean B HS .........
Environmental Idealist (El)
prt ide E R Rel Nero Trs
Ind Mod Y N ..... Pap Sci
lnd Con N N ..... Work Sci
Rep Con N Y Luth Comb None
lnd Con Y Y SDAdv Mag Rel
lnd Mod Y Y Cath TV Env
Dem Mod Y Y Bapts TV Sd
Dem Con N Y Cath TV Sci
Rep Con N Y Chrst TV Sci
Rep Con N Y LDSts Pap Sd
Dem Con N N ..... "IV Sd
Rep Mod Y Y Chrst TV Env
Dem Mod N Y Bapts TV Env
llt¢
75+
30+
...
10+
20+
10+
30+
...
20+
10+
10+
C AgS MOccup
41 33 F Y Accotmtnt
62 40 M Y Plumber
66 63 M Y TravelAgt
45 69 F Y Retired
03 35 M N Salesman
28 43 F Y DisctMgr
R Ed Field
W AS CompSci
W HS .........
W HS .........
W HS .........
W DP .........
W HS .........
Prt Id¢ E RRel
Rep Lib Y Y Chrst
Dem Con Y Y Chrst
Ind Mod N N ....
Rep Con Y Y Meth
lnd Mod Y N .....
Dem Lib Y Y unorg
12 60 F Y Homemaker W BA Soc/Chem
13 67 M Y H2Orights
21 65 M Y Tchr/Post
23 51 M YMktgMgr
35 29 F N Attorney W JD Law
01 38 F Y LegaISec W HS .........
20 60 M N Engineer W BA Elec Eng
07 38 F Y WordProc W AS DentAsst
52 31 F Y Student W AS Sd/Med
70 37 F Y Receptnst W HS .........
10 43 F Y Tchr/Elem W BA Education
11 63 F Y Admin/ret W BA EngLit
31 58 F N Secretary W BA Eng/Bus
lnd Mod Y Y unorg
W MA Business lnd --- N N ---
W BA SocStud Dem Mod Y Y Luth
W MA Mass Comm Ind Mod Y Y Scien
Ind Con Y N Prot
Ind Lib Y Y .....
Rep Con N N ....
Dem Mod Y Y Cath
Ind Mod Y Y Cath
Ind Con Y N .....
Rep Mod Y Y unorg
Rep Con Y Y unorg
lnd Mod N Y Chrst
News Trs Me
Mag Env 50 ÷
TV None 30 +
TV Sci 30+
TV Env 20 +
Pap Env 20 +
Husb Env 30+
Pap Env ---
Mag Sd ---
TV Sci 10-
Ma8 Sci 50+
Rad Sci 20+
IG Env 30 +
TV Sci 10-
Mag Env ---
TV Sci 30+
TV Env 10 +
Mag Edu 30 +
TV Sci ---
Pap Env 10 +
59 35 M N CarpetCln W AS Business Rep
29 40 F Y TchrAide W BA Psych Dem
22 57 F N Homemaker W HS ......... Dem
56 38 M Y Post Off W HS ......... lnd
39 35 M Y Contracts W AS CompSci Ind
65 34 M Y Mechanic B AS IndstTech Dem
30 28 F Y Homemaker W HS ......... Rep
34 75 F N Retired W HS ......... Rep
19 27 F N EngrgAst W HS ......... Dem
08 22 M Y MgrSears W DP ......... Dem
44 31 F N LegalSec I HS ......... Rep
47 19 M N Retail W HS ......... Ind
68 34 M Y Homemaker B BA Busmgt/FA Ind
17 34 F Y Accountnt W HS ......... Rep
42 40 F N Hostess W HS ......... Ind
37 29 F Y GraphArts W BA Journ Dem
49 32 F Y Homemaker W AS Psych Rep
04 45 F Y Plan IBM W BA Education Ind
53 53 M Y Engineer W MA Bus Adm Ind
18 27 F N Tchr Pre W BA ComHealth lnd
40 30 F N GraphArts W BA Art Dem
06 21 M N Student W AS Education ---
46 74 F Y Tchr/ret W MA Couseling Rep
55 38 F N ComArtist W HS ......... lad
58 36 F N Leasing W AS Med Asst Ind
38 36 M Y Teacher W BA Biology Dem
43 41 M N Productn H BA Education Dem
25 42 M Y AeroSpEag W BA Industry Dem
26 35 M Y lnstaltAC W BA Elect Eng Ind
36 22 M N Student W HS ......... Dem
Mod N Y Chrst Rad Sci 30+
Lib Y Y Univ Ppl Env 75 +
Con Y Y Cath TV Sci ---
Con N Y Cath Rad Sci 20+
Con Y N ..... TV Env 75+
Lib N N ..... TV Env 20+
Con Y Y Cath Pap Sci 30+
Mod Y N unorg TV Ear 10+
Con N Y Cath Mag Sci 20+
Con Y Y SDAdv Pap Env 10+
Mod N Y Epis Pap Env 10+
Lib Y N ..... Mag Env 10+
Con Y Y Chrst TV Sci 20 +
Con Y Y Chrst "IV Sci 30+
Lib Y N ..... Pap Sci 20+
Mod N Y Cath TV Sd 50+
Lib Y N ..... IG Env 20+
Mod Y Y Meth Mag Env 50+
Lib N N ..... Mag Sd 30+
Lib Y Y Cath Mag Env 10+
Lib Y Y unorg Pap Env ---
Mod Y Y Meth Mag Env 10-
Con Y N ..... Pap Sci 30+
Lib Y N ..... Mag Sci 10+
Mod Y N ..... Pap Env 20+
Lib Y N ..... Mag Sd 50+
Lib Y Y Cath Pap Comb 50+
Lib Y Y Luth Mag Sci 75+
Mod Y N ..... Pap Sci 30+
Lib Y N Jew Pap Sci 30+
C# : Case Number Ag : Age S = Sex (M = Male; F = Female) M ffi Married (Y = Yes; N = No)
Occup = Occupation (Accts Mgr = Accounts Manager; Data Proc = Data Processor; Distct Mgr =
District Manager; H20rights = Water rights; Tchr/eost ffi Teacher/Postal worker; Mktg Mgr =
Marketing Manager; CarpetCln = Carpet Cleaner; Post Off = Post Office; Engrg Ast =
Engineering Assistant; Mgr Sears = Manager Sears; GraphArts ffi Graphics Artist; ComArtist =
Commercial Artist; AeroSpEng = Aerospace Engineering; lnstallAC = Air Conditioner Installer;
Metrlgst = Meteorologist; ret = retired; CreditMgr = Credit Manager; CabintMkr = Cabinet
Maker; ElecTech = Electronics Technician)
R ffi Race (W = White; B = Black; I ffi Native American; H = Hispanic)
Ed = Education (DP = Dropout; HS = High School; AS = As.q_ates; BA = Bachelors; MA =
Masters; JD = Juris Doctor)
Field (Eng = Engineering; Mgt = Management; Voc Agr ffi Vocational Agriculture)
Prt = Party (Rep = Republican; Ind = Independent; Dem = Democrat)
Ide ffi Ideology (Con = Conservative; Mod ffi Moderate; Lib ffi Liberal)
g = Do you consider yourself an environmentalist? CY = Yes; N ffi No)
R = Do you consider yourself to be religious? (Y ffi Yes; N = No)
Rel = Religion (Chrst = Christian; Meth = Methodist; unorg = unorganized; Luth = Lutheran; Sdcn
= Scientology, Prot = Protestant; Cath = Catholic; Univ = Universalist; SDAdv = Seventh Day
Adventist; Epis = Episeopalean; Ouakr = Quaker; Ath = Atheist; Bapt = Baptist; LDSts = Latter
Day Saints)
Newt ffi Main News Source (Mag ffi Magazines; "IV ffi Television; Pap ffi Newspapers; Husb =
Husband; Rad = Radio; IG = Interest groups; Ppl = People; Coil = College; Jrn = Journals;
Comb = Combination)
Trs = Who do you find mint credible or trustworthy on this Issue? (Env = Environmentalists; Sci =
Scientists; Edu = Educators; Comb ffi Combination; Rel = Religious Leaders)
Inc ffi Income (Thousands of dollars)
